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Abstract 
 
The past four decades have witnessed a tremendous amount of change and development in 
the area of British Muslim identity politics. From the establishment and growth of local and 
regional community groups, to international Islamic movements taking root in the UK and 
making an impact on the attitudes and aspirations Muslim communities. From the Rushdie 
affair and its legacy, through to the impact of international terrorism (9/11), and terrorism 
on home soil (7/7), all of these events have left their unmistakeable mark on Britain’s 
Muslim communities. While there has been much recent academic study on British 
Muslims, there has been a lack of in-depth focus given to critically charting the 
development of a formal identity politics through official representative organisations, in 
the context of the rationale for claims that have been put forward towards government, 
their evolution and refinement over time and the impact of factors such as 
multiculturalism, Islamophobia and securitisation. 
 
With this thesis, I aim to contribute towards filling this gap in the literature. I first examine 
how formal Muslim identity politics ‘scene’ developed into the current familiar form. I look 
at some of the theory that has been used both to explain and to justify it. This includes 
examining aspects of British culture, and that of immigrant Muslim communities, which 
have informed and complicated approaches to engagement and dialogue at one and the 
same time. It also involves looking at notions of equality as recognition, and the idea of 
misrecognition. I propose that ever since the Rushdie affair of 1989, political claims put 
forward by Muslim organisations have been driven by the existence of an ‘equality gap’, 
and a keen desire to close this gap has informed and motivated their identity politics.  
 
Freedom of expression is a theme of particular interest. In the form of the Rushdie affair, it 
was a major trigger for the coming together of disparate Muslim groups to collectively 
engage with the government. Since then it has consistently been a site of much sensitivity, 
contention and debate. Deploying examples relating to freedom of expression, I illustrate 
how Muslim identity politics has evolved over the years and how priorities as well as tactics 
for Muslim groups and successive governments with whom they have engaged have both 
shifted and changed.  
 
Comparing and contrasting Muslim identity politics with the experiences of Britain’s Jewish 
communities, I draw out salient points of commonality and difference in their respective 
communal organisations. By pointing out how similar Muslim claims towards government 
have been to those made by Jews in the past, I show not only how Muslim identity politics 
has consciously benefited from the prior experiences of British Jewry, but, importantly, that 
Muslim political claims are not as exceptional or unreasonable as critics might suggest. 
 
Finally, I take stock of how British Muslim identity politics has progressed over this period, 
assessing the extent to which the ‘equality gap’ has been closed. I argue that while it has 
been considerably narrow, the events of recent decades have led to a change in its focus. I 
present projections and recommendations on the future of Muslim identity politics in the 
UK. I argue that whereas in the past period, Muslim organisations were overwhelmingly 
preoccupied with lobbying of the state, the future of identity politics lies in harnessing the 
potential of civic partnerships based on shared interests between diverse communities. This 
approach, when supplemented with the traditional lobbying role played by representative 
groups, can more effectively address the ‘equality gap’.  
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Glossary of non-English terms: 
 
Al salaf al salih           the pious predecessors. 
Al wala’ wal bara’       loyalty (to Islam/Muslims) and disassociation (from 
disbelief/disbelievers). 
Ashkenazi                  Jews who trace their origins to the indigenous Israelite tribes of the 
Middle East, generally used to describe present-day descendants 
of Rhineland Jews. 
Baitul mal                  treasury 
Bani Ibrahim             children of Abraham 
Banlieues                   suburbs, with connotations of low income populations and social 
housing. 
Da’wa                        call or ‘invitation’ to Islam. 
Dar ul Islam              realm of Islam. 
Dar ul kufr                realm of disbelief. 
Darul Uloom             house of sciences (in the UK used for Islamic seminaries in the    
Deobandi tradition). 
Du’a                          ‘callers’ to Islam/proselytisers (singular: da’iya).                 
Eid                            bi-annual Muslim festival. 
Ghira                         jealous guarding or protection of honour. 
Hadarim                    traditional Jewish religious schools (singular: heder). 
Haham                      Rabbi of Sephardi congregations. 
Halal                         permitted under Islam, e.g. halal meat. 
Illa rasulallah             (anyone/thing) except the messenger of God. 
Isa’ah                        insult, offence. 
‘ird                            honour, dignity. 
Janaza                       Muslim prayer for the deceased. 
Jihad                         struggle, greater jihad being the individual’s everyday struggle with her 
desires, lesser jihad is the armed struggle. 
Jihadi                        of jihad. 
Khilafa, khulafaa       succession, successors (of the Prophet Muhammad). Singular: khalifa. 
Refers to Islamic state and its ruler/s. 
Kuffar                       disbelievers. 
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Kunya                       nickname or epithet. 
Madhab                     school of thought in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Madrassa                   school providing supplementary Islamic education. 
Milad ul nabi             birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Mujahideen               those engaged in jihad. 
Nasheed                    songs, used to refer to Muslim religious/devotional singing. 
Sabb an nabi              insulting the Prophet. 
Sephardi                    descendants of Jewish settlers originally from the Near East, who 
settled in the Iberian Peninsula. 
Shahada                     Islamic declaration of faith. 
Shalwar Kameez        traditional South Asian dress consisting of a tunic over loose fitting 
trousers 
Shari’a                       the path to water (old Arabic), the (legal) path of Islam. 
Shaykh ul Islam         title denoting religious leadership of a Muslim community. 
Shechita                     method of ritual slaughter according to Judaism. 
Shi’a                          group/party (of Ali, the fourth khalifa), the minority denomination 
within Islam.  
Sunnah                      the recorded tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, and along with the 
Qur’an, a primary source of Islamic teaching.  
Sunni                        of the sunnah, the majority denomination within Islam. 
Tajdif                        blasphemy. 
Tawheed                   the oneness/unity of God. 
Ummah                    nation – used to refer to the worldwide Muslim community (nation). 
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Chronology of recent British Muslim identity politics, incorporating relevant 
domestic and international historical events: 
 
18th, 19th  and early 20th Centuries various waves of Muslim (mainly male) immigrants 
arrive in the UK to work as labourers, forming communities in UK port towns including 
Cardiff, Liverpool, London and South Shields.  
1887 Liverpool Muslim Institute (LMI) established by Abdullah Quilliam. 
1889 Quilliam’s LMI set up a prayer hall at Brougham Terrace in Liverpool; Woking 
mosque (later the Shah Jahan Mosque), is constructed, the first purpose built mosque in 
Britain. 
1910 London Mosque Fund opens with the aim of obtaining donations towards the 
establishment of a mosque in London. 
1913 Woking Muslim Mission established by Khwaja Kamaluddin, reviving the Woking 
(now Shah Jahan) Mosque, which had fallen into a period of disuse after the death of its 
founder Gottleib Wilhelm Leitner in 1899.   
1914 British Muslim Society founded by Lord Headley. 
1940 East London Mosque opens on its first premises on Commercial Street. 
1944 King George VI donates 2.3 acres of land in Regents Park for use as the London 
Central Mosque. This is in return for the similar donation of land in Cairo for use as an 
Anglican cathedral. 
1962 UKIM formed. 
Circa. 1962 MSS formed. 
1963 FOSIS established. 
1964 The Labour Party comes to power under Harold Wilson, beginning an 11 year stretch 
of Labour governments, ending in1979 [with the interruption of Edward Heath’s 
Conservative administration between the years 1970-74]. 
1965 First Race Relations Act introduced, along with the Community Relations 
Commission, the precursor to the CRE. 
1966 MET established. 
1968 YMO formed as the youth wing of UKIM. 
1970 UMO formed; Muslim Welfare House established in London. 
1971 Impact International, Muslim news and current affairs magazine launched. 
1973 Islamic Foundation established in Leicester. 
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1975 The East London Mosque opens in its current location at Whitechapel Road. 
1976 Race Relations Act; CRE established. 
1977 The London Central Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre at Regents Park is opened. 
1978 Dawatul Islam formed. 
1979 Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher is elected. 
1980s HT arrives in Britain; IFE formed. 
1984 Honeyford Affair; YMUK established as UKIM’s youth wing; JIMAS formed. 
Late 1980s YMUK breaks away from UKIM. 
1987 First Palestinian Intifada. 
1988 The Satanic Verses published by Viking Press; UKACIA formed. 
1989 The Muslim News first published. 
1990 Fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini calling for the death of Salman Rushdie; ISB 
established; the Muslim Institute established; First Gulf War commences with the invasion 
of Kuwait by Iraq and the allied intervention which ensued.  
1992 John Major is elected leader of the Conservative Party after Margaret Thatcher’s 
resignation, and thus replaces her as prime minister; Muslim Parliament of Great Britain 
launched; Bosnian War breaks out and continues through to 1995. 
1994 NICMU initiative commences; YMUK merges with ISB to become its official youth 
wing. 
1996 Al Muhajiroun formed by breakaway members of HT. 
1997 MCB established; MAB formed; Labour Party comes to power under Tony Blair; 
Runnymede Trust report on Islamophobia is published. 
1998 First two Muslim schools granted voluntary aided status (and state funding) by the 
Education Secretary. 
1999 Macpherson Report is published. 
2000 Terrorism Act 2000; Second Palestinian Intifada; Race Relations Amendment Act 
2000. 
2001 9/11 attacks; revised anti-terror legislation; an optional religion question included in 
the national census for the first time; British forces sent to Afghanistan as part of the US-
led coalition; Stop the War Coalition formed to oppose Britain’s involvement in the ‘War 
on Terror’, MAB is a key partner in the coalition. 
2003 Allied invasion of Iraq (Second Gulf War), as part of the War on Terror. 
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2004 RESPECT Party formed, it fields a number of high profile Muslim candidates in the 
European Parliament and local council elections that summer.  
2005 7/7 attacks; Preventing Violent Extremism working groups convened, producing 
extensive recommendations to the government; BMF and SMC launched; RESPECT Party 
leader George Galloway wins Bethnal Green and Bow seat (a constituency with a Muslim 
majority population) in the General Election, on an anti-war platform, and with 
endorsement and support of many Muslim groups and figures. 
2006 Terrorism Act 2006 passed; RRA Act passed; Prevent strategy initiated; Danish 
Cartoon Crisis (the cartoons were actually first published in Jyllands Posten in September 
2005, but international awareness picked up by the end of the year, reaching their peak by 
Jan/Feb 2006). 
2007 MINAB launched; NMWAG launched; Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC) comes into being, replacing the CRE and other statutory bodies to form a single 
equalities body dealing with discrimination against age, disability, gender, race, religion and 
sexual orientation.  
2008 Blasphemy laws abolished; YMAG launched; Quilliam Foundation formed; start of 
protracted public stand-off between MCB and government ostensibly over Daud 
Abdullah’s position re: Gaza. 
2009 Resumption of formal MCB-government relations, but this time as part of open 
engagement with much wider spectrum of Muslim groups, which included those emerging 
post-2005; EDL formed. 
2010 Labour defeated in the General Election and a Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition forms government with David Cameron as Prime Minister, review of the Prevent 
strategy commences. The Conservative Party demonstrates its antipathy towards ‘Islamism’ 
by instructing its politicians, including (then party co-chairman) Baroness Warsi, to boycott 
the Islam Channel’s annual Global Peace and Unity event; Home Secretary Theresa May 
uses ‘exclusion powers’ for the first time to refuse Indian TV preacher Dr. Zakir Naik 
entry into the UK after a right-wing campaign, on grounds of his ‘unacceptable behaviour’; 
meanwhile, Geert Wilders, a far-right Dutch politician known for his inflammatory anti-
Muslim views visits UK after successfully overturning a ban imposed during the previous 
year. 
2011 Review of Prevent strategy published; Sayeeda Warsi’s speech on Islamophobia. 
2012 MCB constitutional reforms passed, including a female quota in its National Council 
and a directly elected Secretary General; internet film, Innocence of Muslims reignites debates 
on free speech and Islam and provokes heated protest across Muslim world; Muslim 
Leadership Panel formed; TELL MAMA UK launched. 
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2013 Murder in Woolwich of an off-duty member of the armed forces, Fusilier Lee Rigby, 
by two Muslim men claiming to act in retaliation for ‘anti-Muslim’ British foreign policy. 
This was followed by a spate of arson attacks and vandalism on mosques and Muslim 
schools, apparently carried out by the EDL or their sympathisers in retaliation to the 
murder.  
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 
Preamble: 
Muslim presence in the UK can be traced back many centuries, with the earliest record of 
Muslim influence appearing to be the inscription of the shahada, the Muslim declaration of 
faith, on a coin issued by the Eighth Century Anglo-Saxon king, Offa of Mercia.1 There are 
extensive records of interactions between the British Isles and the Muslim world, through 
politics and warfare of course, as well as through culture and trade.2 In modern times, there 
have been various waves of immigration from Muslim countries which have resulted in 
settlement, and the development of communities in various, mostly urban, areas of the UK. 
To a large extent, immigrants from the Muslim world during modern times arrived for 
economic reasons. The 19th and early 20th Century settlement of Somali and Yemeni Sailors 
in Wales and South Shields respectively, and the later arrival of South Asian immigrants in 
the post-war period and beyond were all cases of economic migration. Young men usually 
travelled first to seek employment, only later to be joined by their families, or (notably in 
the earlier periods) to marry locally and settle with their families. 
 
A growing number of studies have been produced charting various aspects of this history, 
including the settlement of these immigrants, the development of communities and 
institutions, as well as efforts at claims-making and political engagement. Historic surveys 
have had a broader remit than political engagement, including it amongst cultural dynamics 
and developments, institution building, social aspects, including education and family life, 
as well as covering much longer time-spans.3 Some of these works have encompassed 
studies of some of the very earliest examples of Muslim identity politics in Britain, 
including the political activity of individuals such as Syed Ameer Ali,4 Khwaja Kamaluddin5 
                                                          
1 Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain: an introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.6-7. 
2 Nabil Matar, Islam in Britain (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). 
3 Humayun Ansari, The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800 (London: C. Hurst, 2004); Gilliat-Ray, 
Muslims in Britain (2010). 
4 Rozina Visram, Ayahs, Lascars and Princes: Indians in Britain 1700-1947 (London: Pluto Press, 1986), pp.97-
102; Humayun Ansari, ‘Introduction’ in The Making of the East London Mosque: 1910-1951 ed. by Humayun 
Ansari (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.6-9. Ali was a British-educated Indian lawyer who became the 
first Indian to be appointed to the Privy Council. His earliest political activity was focused on the Muslims of 
India, co-founding the All-India Muslim League to promote educational and economic ‘advancement’ among 
Muslims. But by 1904 he had retired and settled in Britain and in due course became chairman of the 
Committee of the Woking Mosque, as well as the London Mosque Fund, campaigning enthusiastically for a 
mosque in central London (what became the East London Mosque). 
5 Khwaja Kamaluddin is credited with having revived the Woking Mosque after a period of dormancy, and 
establishing the Woking Muslim Mission, cf. Ansari, The Infidel Within (2004), p.88 and 126. 
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and William Abdullah Quilliam,6 all of whom engaged with the state on behalf of Muslim 
‘community interests’.  
 
There have been numerous studies of contemporary British Muslim political engagement 
as part of European surveys,7 or as single chapters within wider collections.8 There have 
also been studies that have looked at political engagement and community organising on a 
smaller, regional scale, such as Philip Lewis’ Islamic Britain which specifically focuses on the 
Muslim communities of Bradford during the 1990s,9 identity and political awareness among 
young Muslims,10 and studies that centre around single events, and their impacts and 
reverberations.11 
 
The development of a formal Muslim identity politics during the latter half of the 20th 
Century up until present times has not received comparable extensive and in-depth 
scholarly attention from an historical perspective, and thus, it will be the focus of my thesis. 
The work of Tariq Modood has been seminal in discussing structural disadvantages that 
Muslims have faced in the political landscape, as well as understanding the experience of 
anti-Muslim racism and discrimination, and how British Muslims have responded with a 
politics of identity.12 However, his approach has been from within the disciplines of 
political philosophy and sociology, thus highlighting the opportunity, and need for an 
historical analysis of the subject.   
 
While there have been innumerable instances of political engagement and community 
organising amongst Muslims in Britain during preceding periods, these were largely 
concerned with setting up basic community institutions such as mosques, and  other 
                                                          
6 Ron Geaves, Islam in Victorian Britain: the life and times of Abdullah Quilliam (Leicester: Kube, 2010). 
7 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2006); Jonathan 
Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: the state’s role in minority integration (Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2012), as well as edited volumes including Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin eds., European Muslims 
and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) and Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-
Barrero, Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach (London: Routledge, 2006). 
8 Steven Vertovec, ‘Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain’ in Muslims in the West: from Sojourners to 
Citizens ed. by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (New York: OUP, 2002).  
9 Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: religion, politics and identity among British Muslims (London: IB Tauris, 1994). 
10 Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim (London: Continuum, 2007), Nahid Afrose Kabir, Young British 
Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 
11 Mark J Halstead, Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity: An Examination of the Honeyford Affair, 1984-85 
(London: Falmer, 1988), Paul Weller, A Mirror for our Times: the Rushdie affair and the future of Multiculturalism 
(London: Continuum, 2009). 
12 Examples include: Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: a civic idea (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), Tariq Modood, 
Multicultural Politics: racism, ethnicity and Muslims in Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), Tariq 
Modood, ‘Muslims and the Politics of Difference’ Political Quarterly Vol. 74:S1, (August 2003), pp.100-115. 
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community support services for recently arrived immigrants. My focus will be on a phase 
that was distinguished by its concern with coordination and representation on a national 
level. There were emergent elements of this concern from the early 1960s, however, I will 
argue that it was the Rushdie affair during the late 1980s that really set into motion a drive 
for a formally instituted and widely recognised national body for the communal leadership 
and representation of Britain’s Muslim communities.  
 
I begin by tracing the journey of British Muslim identity politics on numerous and 
sometimes rather disparate fronts, from the 1960s through to the 1980s, a period of over 
two decades which was marked by a preoccupation with identity preservation among 
immigrant communities that were coming to terms with their now permanent settlement in 
the UK. I then look at the period from the later 1980s to 1997, a highlight of which was 
the Rushdie affair of 1988/9, and the subsequent formalisation of Muslim identity politics. 
From this, I develop a solid background from which to proceed with a study of formalised 
Muslim identity politics from 1997 (marked by the launch of the Muslim Council of Britain 
and the publication of the Runnymede Trust’s report on Islamophobia), through to 2010. 
With these two decades being a period of remarkable flux on so many levels, I have chosen 
to narrow my focus to the theme of freedom of expression.  
 
This theme is of distinct interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, as I will go on to argue, 
freedom of expression was a central theme to the events of the late 1980s (namely the 
Rushdie affair), which propelled British Muslim communities to forge a path towards 
formal identity politics on a coordinated, national scale. Secondly, it is a theme which 
brings out very interesting points of historical, cultural and geopolitical contrast and 
comparison between the immigrant Muslim communities to Great Britain, and the public / 
political culture of Great Britain itself. On a global level, there has been a continuing trend 
of instances where Muslims have claimed that deep provocation and gratuitous offence had 
been caused by instances where aspects of their faith had been mocked and ridiculed by 
others. Such moments have invariably drawn heated and heartfelt protest from among 
Muslims worldwide (British Muslims among them), as well as regularly prompting calls for 
censorship, censuring and occasionally violent and even fatal incidents. Many on the right 
wing of politics have argued condescendingly that the Muslim reaction to such moments 
has consistently been an expression of exceptionally irrational and unfathomable, ‘Muslim 
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rage’.13 Examples such as the extensive and often hysterical global reaction in 2006 to the 
Muhammad cartoons published by the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten;14 through to the 
violent protests that took place against the 2012 amateur internet video, ‘The Innocence of 
Muslims’, have all been cited in this context.15 
 
However, I will show that although there has been some consistency in Muslim intolerance 
of, and deep-seated offence towards mockery or ridicule of their faith, this trend cannot be 
understood simply by making reference to their faith, without taking into account a host of 
other explanatory factors. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that while this reaction of 
anger towards religious offence, and calls for censorship has continued to manifest itself at 
various moments over recent decades, it nonetheless is an approach which is experiencing 
significant adjustment and revision among many Muslims. This, I will argue, is telling of 
wider change and development that is taking place within Muslim communities – especially 
in Western countries and, as I will demonstrate, Britain is an apt example of this. 
 
Finally, the theme of freedom of expression is one that has attracted a great deal of 
resurgent interest in the post-9/11 age of terrorism and securitisation. New-wave counter-
terrorism laws have delved ever deeper into the area of expression, to the extent that they 
have been charged by their opponents with creating ‘thought crimes’.16 At the same time, 
‘soft’ initiatives run and/or funded by the government to combat radicalisation and violent 
extremism by ‘winning over hearts and minds’, have been associated with the targeted 
surveillance, harassment and excessive monitoring of Muslims, and as such have been 
accused of having a chilling effect on free expression within these communities.  
 
I will argue that contemporary British Muslim identity politics has grown and developed 
around the broad notion of an ‘equality gap’17 – which I define as the idea (both real and 
perceived) that Muslims did not have recourse to the same level of equality under the law 
                                                          
13 A term used by Newsweek in the cover of its 24th September 2012 edition, which was swiftly reclaimed as a 
focus of satirical parodies by users of Twitter and other social media sites across the world. See Alexander 
Hotz, ‘Newsweek ‘Muslim rage’ cover invokes a rage of its own’ US News Media Blog, The Guardian (17th 
September 2012). The term ‘Muslim rage’ was also used as early as 1990 by Bernard Lewis in his From Babel to 
Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East (New York: OUP, 2nd edition, 2004), where he describes it as the 
‘irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular 
present, and the worldwide expansion of both’, p.330. 
14 They were originally published in late 2005, although worldwide protests only really gained momentum by 
January 2006. 
15 David Aaronovitch, ‘Is this the reaction of a grown-up religion?’ The Times 20th September 2012.  
16 Cf. the Samina Malik and Ahmed Faraz cases, discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
17 This shall hereinafter be referred to as the Equality Gap. 
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as other non-Muslim citizens. This was often expressed with reference to discrepancies in 
specific anti-discrimination provisions, but also extended wider than this.18 Using free 
speech-related examples, I will examine contemporary British Muslim identity politics from 
the point of genesis up until 2010. I will, at various junctures, assess the successes and 
failures of the path that organised Muslim identity politics has followed, and I will conclude 
by giving recommendations for the future and offering a vision for how the Equality Gap 
can be effectively narrowed, if not, closed. 
 
There exists a large and growing body of academic literature that covers the British Muslim 
experience from various angles, however, there is an absence of an in-depth, analytical 
narrative that charts the development of modern Muslim identity politics in the UK, 19 in 
particular, the development of this identity politics has not been explored from the lens of 
freedom of expression issues, in the type of depth that I hope to offer in this thesis. 
Additionally, since the time period under discussion is a very recent one, I will be using a 
range of current and recently released evidence and source material. 
 
I will conduct this study as an historical analysis, using a range of primary and secondary 
sources. These include a number of in-depth interviews and informal conversations that I 
have conducted with key figures within Muslim community organisations, as well as other 
relevant figures. Additionally, I have had access to documentary material from the various 
organisations and structures both within British Muslim communities as well as the 
relevant material from government departments and structures – these include promotional 
documents, as well as internal membership communications, meeting minutes and 
correspondences. Newspapers, magazines and other forms of media including television 
and radio – both mainstream and community-based – have all provided useful primary and 
secondary sources for events and perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
19 Two recently published contributions in this field are: Nasar Meer, Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of 
Multiculturalism: The Rise of Muslim Consciousness (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) and Tahir Abbas, 
Islamic Radicalism and multicultural politics (London: Routledge, 2011). 
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Setting the Scene: historical and theoretical contexts 
This first chapter outlines the context in which the thesis will be set, and the key questions 
that it will tackle. Taking the notion of social equality and justice as my starting point, I will 
hone in on three important themes which have particular bearing on the integration and 
claims-making of Muslims as a newly-settled minority in Britain.  
 
The first theme is that of freedom of expression, and more generally, of civil liberties – 
the lens through which the thesis as a whole will be analysing the development and 
evolution of British Muslim identity politics. I will begin with a survey of the 
Enlightenment roots of the historical development of these concepts in British political 
thought and their impact on constitutional and legal evolution. I will then also look at the 
historical pathway that similar ideas have travelled in Islamic theological and political past, 
and how they have fared in recent history, in Muslim majority countries, many of which are 
– in their present forms – relatively recent creations. This examination is important insofar 
as it sheds light upon the theme of freedom of expression and the understanding and 
approach to civil liberties as it unfolded in recent British Muslim history. It facilitates in the 
comprehension of the ensuing historical analysis – where causal factors behind moments of 
conflict and intractability can only be fully understood with an appreciation of these 
different historical pathways, and their role and place in shaping the mindset and 
perspectives of the political establishment, the media and the wider public on the one hand, 
and those of Muslim community groups and interlocutors/representatives on the other.  
 
Before I do this, mention must be made of the extent to which there was an awareness of 
Islam, its scriptures and traditions among enlightenment thinkers.20 Indeed, occasional 
sympathy towards Islam demonstrated by many key figures of the enlightenment may be 
taken to contradict the popular impression that ‘Islam’ and ‘the west’ have long been the 
sites of rival or opposing value-systems. This leads me to point out that although it may be 
tempting to portray Muslim and British (western) perspectives on free speech as two 
separate monoliths, this would be inaccurate, since the works of several Enlightenment 
writers express admiration towards and fascination with aspects of Islam, including the 
                                                          
20 Ziad Elmarsafy, The Enlightenment Qur’an: the politics of translation and the construction of Islam (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2009) draws our attention to a number of (often sympathetic) European translations of the 
Qur’an that were written during the early modern period. Accompanying commentary and critiques also 
expressed high regard for the ‘achievements’ and leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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person of the Prophet Muhammad, of Muslim societies, values and government.21 
Similarly, Muslim thinkers have differed in their understandings of free speech, not least 
due to their own cross-cultural interactions. As I will show, these interactions and 
exchanges between cultures and contexts continue to the present day and are visible in the 
developing perspectives of Western Muslims on notions of free speech and blasphemy, and 
their responses to instances of offence. 
 
The second part of this chapter will look more closely at the idea of equality, in the 
understanding with which it has been used for motivating and justifying British public 
policy over the past four or five decades, specifically with reference to British Muslims as a 
religious minority. It will look at the themes of equality and justice, and discuss 
contemporary debates within political theory around how they can best be secured for 
minority communities. I will argue that Muslim identity politics in contemporary British 
history has invariably been underpinned by a call to some understanding of ‘equality as 
recognition’. I will propose that this, coupled with an understanding of ‘equality as 
redistribution’, provide a theoretical basis from which attempts to redress imbalances in the 
type of access British Muslims have had to equality and justice can be understood. This 
theoretical survey, together with the preceding survey of historical and cultural background 
in Chapter 1, will constitute a comprehensive background to the remainder of the thesis, 
which will trace and examine the development of British Muslim identity politics from the 
1970s through to 2010.  
 
The third part of this chapter will consider the idea of identity politics, and specifically in 
relation to Britain’s Muslim communities. Here I will look at definitions of the term – both 
in academic literature as well as popular usage. I will examine the merits of academic 
arguments in support of a politics of recognition and difference, for minority and 
historically disadvantaged groups. I will also consider how the idea of misrecognition can 
be used to explain and justify the need for a politics of identity. Further, I will note that 
Muslim identity politics has evolved alongside the evolution of British Islam(s) itself. I will 
point out the impact of internal debates, disagreements and rivalries within Muslim 
communities, the influence of representative communication and negotiation – whether 
with the government or with other public bodies, and the role of wider contemporary 
socio-political debates in shaping the priorities, style and nature of British Muslim identity 
                                                          
21 See also Humberto Garcia, Islam and the English Enlightenment, 1670-1840 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2012). 
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politics. This will be a recurring theme throughout my thesis as I trace and critique the 
simultaneous development of British Muslim identity politics on each of these three fronts. 
Finally, I will close this chapter by providing a detailed outline of my thesis, including its 
aims and objectives, structure, chapter summaries and end with anticipated conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
1.1 Free speech in British and Muslim traditions 
As with any immigrant or ‘new’ community, there was a certain inevitability that areas of 
misunderstanding and even conflict between Muslims and wider society would arise, as 
efforts were made to settle, to come to terms with the new home and to build relations of 
trust and friendship while looking to the future. Appearance, culture, tradition and language 
were obvious markers of difference for recent immigrants. This was true on a day-to-day 
level of course, but was sometimes particularly significant at moments of negotiation. 
Prejudice and xenophobia were also present in their various forms and did not fail to make 
their impact on the level and quality of relationships (or lack of it). This is not to mention 
the colouring of perspectives from both sides by the legacy of colonialism and the 
relationships of power that existed between the UK and countries of origin.22  
 
But apart from the serious complications and difficulties in communication that these 
factors would cause, there were also obstacles in communication of a more nuanced nature 
which affected the level and effectiveness of conversation. The Rushdie affair shed light on 
one important source of dissonance in perspectives when it came to understandings and 
expectations around the freedoms and limits of expression. Even a cursory survey of the 
language and logic behind arguments used by Muslim activists and commentators, and 
responses that they received from the government and the ‘liberal establishment’, gives 
sufficient indication as to serious differences in the origin and nature of the cultural and 
political development that this value had undergone in British political/constitutional 
history on one hand, and in the political experience of the South Asian countries from 
whence a majority of Britain’s Muslims traced their origins, on the other. The latter is 
arguably more complex since it encompasses influences from Islamic theological tradition 
as well as political history and of course colonial influences which in many cases played no 
small part in shaping and formalising the constitutions and legal frameworks of many (then 
still relatively young) Muslim nations. In the following section, I will look briefly at each of 
                                                          
22 On this cf. Talal Asad, ‘Multiculturalism and British identity in the wake of the Rushdie affair’ in Politics and 
Society Vol. 18:4 (1990), pp.455-480. 
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these trajectories and refer where relevant to illustrative aspects of The Satanic Verses 
experience to demonstrate how a failure to grasp these different formative pathways can 
(and quite spectacularly in this instance, did) lead to a sharp intransigence and unhelpful 
polarisation of positions. 
 
1.1.1 The social contract, natural rights and freedom of expression: 
The development of the British constitutional political system and the highly valued place 
of freedom of expression as a fundamental liberty in British politics and thereby in the 
public mindset have important origins in the thinking of Enlightenment philosophers – 
notably Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. As contemporaries of the English Civil War, the 
short-lived Cromwellian republic and the fraught restoration of the Stuart monarchy, they 
witnessed a time when security and liberty as values were uppermost in people’s minds, as 
they had recently experienced a great deal of instability in respect of both. 
 
Hobbes and Locke had strong, if divergent, views about the place and proper extent of 
political authority. Hobbes argued in favour of the necessity of arbitrary rule, as a way of 
keeping in place a system that would control the innate tendency in individual human 
beings to pursue the satisfaction of their desires, and thus to, if left unchecked, fall into a 
‘natural state’ of conflict and competitive destruction. Such was the nature of humanity that 
it could only be tamed by the force of a powerful civil-state entity. Hobbes recognised that 
religious and clerical authority had also sought to keep arbitrary control over mankind, but 
rather than the separation of powers, favoured the civil-secular model which, on the basis 
of a social contract, would provide citizens with order and protection and the scope for 
self-preservation, while they in return would accept its control and authority. Rights and 
freedoms were therefore enjoyed by individuals at the discretion of the ruler. While 
obviously this position does not sit at all well with the present-day understanding of 
freedom of expression, and indeed more generally, of freedom and the relationship of the 
individual with government, Hobbes has been credited for setting a foundational precedent 
for modern thinking on the nation-state and its functions. In addition, the staunch defence 
by Hobbes of centralised arbitrary rule can be understood to have set some momentum for 
the oppositional idea of natural rights and freedoms in the context of a more representative 
and more accountable style of government as elucidated by John Locke.23       
                                                          
23 Of course it was as a reply to Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha that Locke wrote his First Treatise of Government. 
However, Locke was obviously aware of the work of Hobbes and his work since the two were 
contemporaries.   
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 From Locke’s Protestant perspective, the Stuarts’ unpromising interest in Catholicism – in 
particular the prospect of a Catholic James II succeeding Charles II to the throne – 
presented to him the unattractive image of a return of the sort of arbitrary monarchical 
power for which Charles I had been executed and the monarchy abolished. Thus it was 
something to be deeply wary of, since both Catholicism and arbitrary rule shared worrying 
propensities to impose undue restrictions upon the individual’s liberty and to curtail the 
power of parliament which, to Locke, represented the people’s will.24 Locke’s view of the 
social contract which bound political communities together had as central to it the idea of 
individual natural rights. It was the sovereign’s duty to safeguard these rights, and whilst 
there is some disagreement around where Locke placed the limit of the individuals’ 
obedience to the sovereign should be drawn,25 Locke nonetheless advocated the necessity 
of protecting the individual’s natural rights, and the importance of accountability of the 
sovereign to the people (e.g. through parliament) when decisions about such rights needed 
to be made. 26 Such a position relies importantly on there being access to free expression 
and this principle ties in with Locke’s writings on the subject of toleration – which includes 
the toleration of religious and political dissent. Criticism has been levelled at Locke for his 
failure to go far enough in matters of toleration, for instance his view that government may 
not afford toleration to Catholics and atheists for reasons of the potential political damage 
that they might cause.27 However what is of more importance to the discussion at hand is 
the spirit of Locke’s perspective on toleration and its longer-term impact on the evolution 
of British political norms and values. Locke’s support for the notion of toleration and the 
right of resistance against tyranny gave reasons for the perspective that dissent and 
difference had a value and that the undue stifling of them may provoke legitimate 
responses of protest or rebellion. This notion of inviolable individual rights was later 
developed by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and can be seen to have historically 
developed and according to some accounts to have influenced the modern understanding 
of ‘human rights’ – which, as enshrined in present-day international and European Union 
human rights agreements and instruments, includes the right to free expression. 
 
                                                          
24 Iain Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp.69-72. 
25 J W Gough, John Locke’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp.27-28. 
26 Alex Tuckness, ‘Rethinking the Intolerant Locke’ in American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46:2 (2002), 
pp.288-298. 
27 Ibid. 
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Mill’s writings on freedom of expression have proved both seminal and influential in the 
evolution of the English legal system. Mill defended the idea that expressive acts should be 
immune from restrictions on the basis of two main points. The first was the danger of 
‘assuming infallibility’ – that as compelling and persuasive an opinion (or the falsity of an 
opposing opinion) might be, the curtailing of an opponent’s free expression would amount 
to an assumption of infallibility.28 Secondly, that the free expression of all opinions, 
whether true or false, was vital to the formation of an ‘intellectually active people’.29 
However, he also articulated the exceptional grounds upon which he felt that restrictions to 
expression could be justifiably placed – and at the foundation of these grounds was his 
‘harm principle’, which remains a legislative cornerstone as well as a widely accepted and 
hotly defended concept in British public political culture. To quote Mill: ‘that the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exerted over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’30 
 
This principle has continued to have a profound impact on the modern British political 
psyche and informs the spirited defence of free expression that has regularly been invoked 
to rebut calls from minorities for censoring or indeed censuring of material that has caused 
deep offence. However, what has often not been fully appreciated is the way in which the 
impact of offence caused by such material can have the potential to cause harm, and 
particularly because it is directed at aspects of identity that have already been subjected to 
some form of public disadvantage or misrecognition. Brown argues that there is some 
room for an effective response to racial and religious hatred that draws upon Mill’s work. A 
political, even a ‘sparingly used’ legislative response that ‘balances freedom of speech 
against future possible harms’ can go some way towards redressing discrimination and the 
potential resultant inequalities, with minimal impact on freedom of expression.31 
 
Of course there are and always have been legal restrictions to freedom of expression in the 
UK – well known examples include libel, privacy and blasphemy laws.32 However, these 
have not existed without contention and dispute over their validity or over the 
appropriateness of where exactly to place boundaries. More recently, anti-terrorism 
                                                          
28 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government (London: Dent, 1972), p.92. 
29 Alex Brown, ‘The Racial and Religious Hatred Act: A Millian response’ Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy (CRISPP) Vol. 11:1 (March 2008), p.7. 
30 Op. cit., p.78. 
31 Ibid. 
32 More will be said about blasphemy laws, the historical background to them and their relation to this debate 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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legislation has included controversial restrictions on speech that ‘encourages’ or ‘glorifies 
terrorism’, or expresses support for proscribed terrorist groups. However, this last example 
is a case in point, as the unease with which it has been received by so many, from experts in 
law and civil liberties to ordinary members of the public, is demonstrative of just how 
cherished and sacrosanct freedom of expression is regarded.  
 
1.1.2 Freedom of expression in Islam and Muslim tradition: 
Many Muslim immigrant communities, whether arriving from the Indian subcontinent, 
other commonwealth countries or from areas in the Arab world and the Middle East had 
experiences and expectations on the  issue of freedom of expression that carried 
remarkably different historical and cultural meanings and often owed their provenance to a 
wholly different set of values.  
 
In terms of faith and theology, there have been some characterisations of Islam which 
argue that the concept of freedom of expression is alien to Muslim tradition, and that 
instead, a focus on the community as the source of individual identity and fulfilment is 
given far greater importance by Muslims. The notion of Islam as a ‘communitarian’ faith 
suggests that greater value is placed on the protection of the faith community’s honour, as 
well as that of its revered figures, than on the concept of individual freedom. Indeed, this 
has been argued by several authors, including some Muslims.33 I contend that such a 
portrait is rather too simplistic to do justice to the reality of how choices are made and 
priorities are ordered by ‘the average’ Muslim citizen (if indeed, such a person can be said 
to exist). Even if all Muslims regarded their affinity to their faith to carry such weight that it 
overrode their understanding of individual freedoms, this argument also assumes that for 
all Muslims, their faith somehow automatically trumps other aspects of their identity, such 
as liberalism or even secularism, for example – values which hold freedom of expression in 
unquestionably high regard. 
 
Yet while I accept that there might be some Muslims whose worldview might closely match 
the ‘communitarian’ characterisation mentioned above, it is important to also point out 
that, even so, the idea of free speech is itself not wholly absent from Islamic sources and 
tradition. Muhammad Hashim Kamali argues that freedom of expression is absolutely 
                                                          
33 M M Slaughter, ‘The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy, Honor and Freedom of Speech’ Virginia Law Review 
Vol. 79:1 (February 1993), pp. 153-204. Also Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad! : The Salman Rushdie 
Affair (London: Bellew Publishers, 1989). 
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intrinsic to the Islamic faith, as a right, and that on occasion, its exercise also becomes 
analogous to a duty. Kamali cites two objectives that are directly served by the value of free 
speech – the discovery of truth and the upholding of human dignity.34 These objectives 
mark out important distinctions in the conception of free expression from an Islamic 
theological perspective, and from the present day ‘western’35 conceptions of free expression 
as a basic individual right and guarantor against tyranny – be it from a regime or from a 
religion, or for that matter, from a theocratic regime. This last possibility carries acute 
resonance with Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa sentencing Rushdie to death, which seemed to 
symbolise everything that was to be abhorred and feared about the arbitrary theocracy that 
the Islamic Republic of Iran was popularly perceived to be - the prioritising of religious 
dogma and obedience to a religious authority over freedom of expression and the life of an 
individual. 
 
Kamali’s two free speech objectives fit well with the overall project of the shari’a36 of which 
the ultimate objectives are the protection of belief, life, intellect, honour and property. 
From an individual perspective, these objectives can be approximated into the language of 
rights without much difficulty, in the sense that the individual has a right that the state 
provides adequate protection of these aspects of their self. And while speech and/or 
expression are not individually mentioned, there is clearly scope for their inclusion in at 
least two of the above categories – namely belief and intellect. In fact, it could be said that 
any understanding of these two categories would be crucially deficient without provision 
for free expression. 
 
More recently, a number of Western Muslim thinkers have taken these ideas further, and 
promulgated Islamically inspired cases in favour of free expression and critical thinking, 
defending the rights of others to criticise and even insult Islam, while at the same time 
insisting that such a right should be exercised in a multicultural, multi-religious society with 
caution and respect – indeed that it should not be wrongly construed as a duty. For 
example, Usama Hasan has presented a theologically grounded argument against 
blasphemy legislation, which insists that Islam does not prescribe any earthly punishment 
                                                          
34 Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997), p.8. 
35 I am aware that ‘the west’ is a hugely generalised term, and my use of inverted commas here and later on is 
to indicate appreciation that just as Islam and Muslims are not monolithic entities, neither is ‘the west’.  
36 In this instance I am referring to shari’a as a legal framework, as potentially, the basis for authority in a 
political community, and not to its meaning on the more day-to-day level, as a personal path informing an 
individual’s citizenship as inspired by her faith. 
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for blasphemy. Violations of respect for sacred symbols are to be punished in the spiritual 
and other-worldly realms, not through any worldly legislation or penalties. Hasan observes 
that in the contemporary context, it is extremely difficult to define blasphemy, especially on 
the type of global level that recent controversies have played out. Moreover, he notes that 
in the Qur'an and Sunnah, there is an absence of ‘explicit sanction… for the criminalisation 
and punishment of blasphemy’,37 and that those sources which are used to support such 
measures are often ‘misquoted’, since they all refer to wartime situations.38 In an 
appreciation of cultural nuance, Hasan acknowledges that instances in Islamic tradition of 
wartime retaliation against poets who had mocked the Prophet Muhammad had occurred, 
but that ‘in the 7th Century Arabian culture (was) dominated by an oral tradition, (and) 
poetry was used for propaganda and psychological warfare’.39 As a general rule, however, 
particularly in this globalised age, he maintains that blasphemy legislation is not called for, 
nor does it fulfil any specific role that is called for by Islamic sources and scriptures.  
 
Interestingly, it is the potent impact of offensive speech freely expressed that has been the 
source of representations from Muslims for protection. The extensive reach of powerful 
media outlets and influential artists can encourage or give added legitimacy to anti-Muslim 
sentiment, and as a minority group, with a comparatively far more limited voice, there is 
less opportunity to counter such offensive speech on a similarly large scale. So while 
defending the right of free expression, some thinkers have called for caution, 
understanding and empathy in good measure, because of the potentially substantial harms 
that unfettered free expression in this area can cause.  
 
Tariq Ramadan is one example – at a recent PEN International gathering in New York, he 
argued that freedom of expression should not be restricted by law to protect minorities 
from offence. However, he also acknowledged that this offence was often deeply and 
genuinely felt, and often had complex and far-reaching consequences. Instead he called for 
sensitivity, and ‘intellectual empathy’ with those in the Muslim world who had been so 
deeply offended by recent controversies. Additionally he argued that a commitment to 
                                                          
37 Usama Hasan, ‘No compulsion in religion: an Islamic case against blasphemy laws’ Quilliam Foundation 
(London, 2012). 
38 It is worth pointing out here Talal Asad’s observation that Muslims objecting to the Danish ‘Muhammad 
cartoons’ published in 2005 did not use the Arabic equivalent of ‘blasphemy’ (tajdif), rather they preferred the 
term isa’ah, meaning insult, harm or offence. Cf. Talal Asad, ‘Free Speech, Blasphemy and Secular Criticism’ 
in Talal Asad et al, Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury and Free Speech (Berkley: University of California Press, 
2009), p.38.  
39 Op. Cit.  
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consistency and even-handedness was needed when it came to free speech. It was 
inconsistent, he maintained, for certain European countries to continue to criminalise 
Holocaust denial, whilst simultaneously displaying incredulity at Muslim calls for 
censorship and complaints of offence at mockery of their faith.40 
 
A similar position was taken by Tariq Modood in the wake of the Danish ‘Muhammad 
cartoons crisis’ of 2006. He argued that the cartoons occupied ‘an entirely different league 
of offence’, since they constituted a comment on Muslims as a whole rather than only the 
Prophet Muhammad as an individual. As such, the portrayal in one cartoon of the prophet 
as a terrorist was effectively a racist stereotype of Muslims collectively. But rather than 
banning or censorship, society should respond to such racist and/or Islamophobic 
expression with protest or censure, in a similar fashion to what has become the norm with 
most racist expression.41 
 
Talal Asad invites a critical consideration of liberal/secular responses to Muslim offence, 
by asking whether ‘modern secular aversion to the category of blasphemy derive(s) from a 
suspicion of political religion.’42 This aversion, he argues, is specifically focused on Islam, 
and is combined with latent paranoia, ‘loathing and fear’ of Muslim immigrants to manifest 
an intolerant hostility towards any (violent) protests against religious offence. Thus, 
‘aggression in the name of God shocks secular liberal sensibilities, whereas the art of killing 
in the name of the secular nation, of democracy, does not’.43 Without absolving the 
violence perpetrated by Muslim protesters, Asad argues that the shrill defence of the value 
of free speech at all costs by vehement secularists against ‘Muslim rage’ might actually have 
more to do with their own prejudices than they might like to admit.   
 
A substantial difficulty when it comes to reconciling the ‘eastern’ and western’ traditions, is 
the location of acceptable boundaries in free expression. I have already illustrated examples 
of where limits of expression in British legal and public norms lie. In the case of Muslim 
tradition, legal restraints have been placed primarily where the objectives of the discovery 
                                                          
40 Tariq Ramadan, speech delivered at PEN America Conference – Faith and Free Speech: defamation of religions 
and freedom of expression, UN Headquarters, New York, 16th September 2010. 
41 Tariq Modood, ‘The liberal dilemma: integration or vilification?’ Open Democracy 8th February 2006. 
Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-terrorism/liberal_dilemma_3249.jsp [accessed on 15th 
February 2013]. 
42 Talal Asad, ‘Freedom of Speech and Religious Limitations’ in Rethinking Secularism ed. by Craig Calhoun, 
Mark Jurgensmeyer and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (New York: OUP, 2011), pp.282-297. 
43 Ibid. 
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of truth and upholding of human dignity are deemed to be at threat of being seriously 
undermined. In particular, restrictions placed on expression that is considered to equate to 
apostasy or blasphemy have been notoriously troubling to the ‘western’ mind, conjuring 
unpalatable images of violence and capital punishment. Notwithstanding the fact that there 
is a range of scholarly opinion regarding the applicability of any official punishments for 
either,44 (let alone any applicability of capital punishment), there has historically been a 
widespread sense of reverence and sensitivity around the character and person of the 
Prophet Muhammad among Muslims, a sentiment which to a large extent remains to this 
day.45 It was this sensitivity that was aroused by the publication in 1988 of Salman 
Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, and the nature of the reaction to it was to a substantial 
extent an expression of this reverence. The inviolability of honour (‘ird) in shari’a is a 
concept which Shabbir Akhtar utilises to supplement the greater (blasphemous) charge of 
sabb al-nabi (insulting the prophet) in his spirited case for the proscription of The Satanic 
Verses.46 Interpretatively, this is something of an attempt to bridge the two pathways, by 
approximating the harm caused by blasphemy against the prophet (which the ‘western’ 
mind might struggle to understand the gravity of), with the more familiar charge of 
personal attack – libel or defamation.47 
 
Apart from this cultural and religious reverence for the Prophet, there were of course other 
factors which caused reaction to intensify and escalate. Two of the most important include 
an international dimension, and the response and attitude of ‘the other side’ to initial 
objections. With respect to the international factor, this is best detected in the stance of the 
Muslim Institute and its leader Kalim Siddiqui, who positively celebrated the Iranian 
Revolution and argued that Muslims in the UK could draw strength and support from the 
                                                          
44 Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997), p.213. 
45 Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad! (1989), Ch.1. 
More recently the international furore in the wake of Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten’s publication of satirical 
cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in 2005, is demonstrative of how the Prophet remains highly 
revered and respected by Muslims worldwide. Granted, the escalation of both this and the Rushdie affair 
were given substantial impetus by political forces, but nonetheless, they both drew highly-charged and 
indignant protest from Muslims from all backgrounds across the world who expressed a sense of deeply felt 
offence and grievance. 
46 Shabbir Akhtar quoted in Sacrilege Versus Civility: Muslim Perspectives on the Satanic Verses Affair ed. by M. 
Manazir Ahsan and Abdur Raheem Kidwai (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1991), pp.52-3. Akhtar links every 
Muslim’s personal ‘ird with the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad and thus argues that insulting the 
prophet is enough of a deep and hurtful affront to each and every Muslim who aspires to his example and 
leadership, for it to be banned.  
47 Tariq Modood and Bhikhu Parekh each make some case for understanding a notion of ‘group libel’ with 
respect to this issue. Modood in ‘Muslims, incitement to hatred and the law’ in Liberalism, Multiculturalism and 
Toleration ed. by John Horton (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993) and Parekh in his Rethinking 
Multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). 
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new Islamic republic, as well as assurance from the defence that the fatwa provided in the 
face of Rushdie’s ‘attack’.48 As for the second factor – the manner and tactics that were 
chosen by government representatives appear to have only fuelled resentment and 
frustration among Muslim protesters. Talal Asad remarks that they were both ‘lecturing’ 
and ‘colonial’ in tone and in content.49 Judging by the correspondences and commentaries 
that were written during this period, this was certainly a widespread feeling.50 And while the 
above at least explains the frustration of Muslim groups at the apparent futility of their 
efforts at explaining their position and defending their ‘rights’, it was perhaps this very 
insistence by Muslims to overwhelmingly use blasphemy as the main reason for their 
campaign for the book’s recall which so riled the ‘liberal establishment’ and caused them to 
dig their feet in hostility further still. How could the precious and hard-won value of free 
expression, particularly of artistic expression, be permitted to be threatened with such 
tremendous force merely on the grounds that it offended the religious sensitivities of 
members of a minority faith? 
 
In a sense these different pathways so coloured attitudes and expectations on both sides, 
that the dialogue which took place during and in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair can 
very well be characterised as both sides talking at one another rather than with each other. 
 
1.1.3 Cultural disorientations and the need to adjust: Why have Muslims taken 
such deep offence to attacks on their faith? 
Differing understandings of rights, freedoms and different ways of relating to government 
are of course not the only areas where culture and mindset between east and west have 
their divergences. For many of those communities who arrived as part of the chain 
migrations of the mid-20th Century onwards, they experienced major lifestyle changes on a 
number of levels. Apart from linguistic differences, there was the contrast between the 
close-knit rural life, to which many (especially South Asian immigrants) were accustomed 
to – and the more individualistic and obviously unfamiliar lifestyle of the city. More 
specifically, the role of religion and religious/cultural influences in each of these lifestyles 
differed greatly. Many of these immigrants were coming from environments where religion 
formed much more of an integrated, very spiritual backdrop to everyday life – a norm 
                                                          
48 Kalim Siddiqui, ‘Generating “power” without politics’, speech delivered at Muslim Parliament’s London 
conference - The Future of Islam in Britain on 14th July 1990 (London: Muslim Institute, 1992). 
49 Asad, ‘Multiculturalism and British identity in the wake of the Rushdie affair’ (1990), pp. 456-457. 
50 Cf. Sacrilege Versus Civility ed. by Ahsan and Kidwai (1991) and UKACIA, Muslims and the Law in Multifaith 
Britain (London: UKACIA, 1993). 
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which contrasted with the evermore detached understanding of religion in relation to daily 
life that was more prevalent in the urban contexts that they were joining. So while it may 
have been very natural in rural Kashmir, for example, to understand religion through its 
manifestation in day-to-day rites of passage, through family and tribal relations and 
folklore; in the new context of Britain, religion necessarily had to fit into not only a new 
template of meaning and even practice, but also had to deal with the fact that it (Islam) was 
a minority and perceptibly ‘foreign’ religion. As a consequence, the experience of adjusting 
and finding a place in their new home was made additionally unsettling when access to and 
relationships with religion were abruptly altered.51 
 
Even the very actions used to express feelings of dissent and protest were infused with 
cultural baggage. To return to the Rushdie affair, the decision of a Bradford protester from 
the Bradford Council of Mosques to set fire to a copy of The Satanic Verses was intended to 
be a dramatic publicity stunt which would force the media and establishment to step away 
from their apparent lack of empathy and their disdain towards the deep offence and hurt of 
which Muslims were complaining. The idea was that by burning the book, the complaints 
and representations that had been made by Muslim representatives would finally be 
afforded the seriousness and attention that they deserved. Yet, as Zaiba Malik, a British-
Pakistani journalist who grew up in Bradford, describes in her memoirs, while the book-
burning certainly bagged countless newspaper headlines for the Bradford Council of 
Mosques, they weren’t so successful at garnering compassion for the cause: 
Journalists, writers, commentators and thinkers were appalled 
and shocked at what had happened at the Tyrls [the location in 
central Bradford where the first book-burning took place]. 
Don’t these Muslims understand that we believe in freedom of 
expression in this country, that free speech is a cornerstone of 
our democracy, that it is a right we have had to fight long and 
hard for and is one we will absolutely defend – even if it causes 
offence?52 
 
She further quotes Eric Pickles, the then (Conservative) leader of Bradford Council who 
later argued that ‘Of all the symbolic actions, setting fire to a book was probably the worst 
thing to do. It looked like something out of Nuremburg’.53 Such was the centrality of the 
impact of culture on creating and sustaining a harsh dissonance between two parties that so 
                                                          
51 A good overview of the features and challenges of this adjustment experience is found in ‘Mind the gap’ 
Ch.2 in Lewis, Young, British and Muslim (2007). 
52 Zaiba Malik, We are a Muslim, please (London: William Heinemann, 2010), pp.197-199. 
53 Ibid. p.198. 
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desperately needed to be understood by one another. For the Muslim community, the 
book-burning was more than a plea to be heard by those in positions of power; it was a 
symbol of just how much the crime of sabb an-nabi was considered to be a red line that 
must not be crossed at  any cost. Yet for the politicians and the media, who the Muslim 
community were so desperate to convince, the act of book burning represented the 
epitome of backwardness and intolerance.  
 
I would take this notion of cultural dissonance even further and argue that understandings 
of honour in many parts of the Muslim world are coloured more by traditional and cultural 
norms than by religion per se. Cultural practices and customs in many Muslim majority 
countries, and specifically the Indian sub-continent, are often infused with a strong 
understanding of familial or tribal honour and loyalty. These are historically enshrined 
values, which often enjoy a somewhat fabled status in public consciousness. Perhaps these 
have come to be most infamously (mis)understood in the west through the unfortunately 
titled crimes of ‘honour killing’, which have been rationalised and/or justified by 
perpetrators using the notion that the victims’ ‘sinful’ or ‘shameful’ actions are directly 
linked to the honour and reputation of her family, clan or community.  
 
But the ‘eastern’ conception of honour that I refer to has wider and deeper significance 
than this. The dense literature and poetry of pre-Islamic Arabia is rife with references to 
tribal and familial honour, revenge on behalf of scorned or slighted fellow-tribesmen and 
family feuds that continued for generations. The Arabic word ghira, - which connotes an 
ardent or jealous guarding/protection of honour – is a central notion to be understood, 
and one which has a place not only in the Arabic speaking countries but in the Muslim 
communities of South Asia as well. It is most often expressed in connection with religion 
and familial honour especially relating to females. While clearly not something exclusive to 
the east, an appreciation of this aspect of cultural background and heritage can contribute 
to a more informed understanding of seemingly (to Western eyes) exaggerated Muslim 
responses to offensive criticism of their faith.  
 
To illustrate, let us look at more recent controversies such as the 2006 Danish cartoon 
crisis and the 2012 ‘Innocence of Muslims’ film – both have drawn ire and criticism from 
western Muslims, but protests have not reached anywhere near the scale of those that took 
place in the Muslim world. Notably, any protests that did take place in Britain were peaceful 
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and far removed from the violent mobs that took to the streets of various Muslim-majority 
countries. A common refrain of protesters in Muslim countries was the phrase ‘illa 
rasulallah’ – ‘(anyone/thing) but the messenger of God’, emphasising how the person of the 
Prophet Muhammad was directly and inextricably tied with their personal honour and 
reputation – they could bear any insult but criticism or ridicule of this most revered figure. 
 
And finally, it would be short-sighted for us to fail to recognise the role that geopolitical 
factors have also played in exacerbating sensitivities and pushing many in the Muslim world 
to protest with such heated fervour at what are considered to be deeply offensive and 
sacrilegious depictions of their faith in the public sphere. To return to the ‘Innocence of 
Muslims’ film, angry, riotous protest in the Muslim world can only be comprehensively 
understood in its proper and complete context. For many protesters in the Muslim world, 
the film was indeed considered to be highly insulting, but as many have noted, it was often 
more of a final straw that set off riots that were waiting to happen anyway.54 US military 
presence, political intervention and deadly drone attacks are just some of the reasons why 
ordinary people in countries such as Libya, Pakistan and Afghanistan have, in recent times, 
had plenty of reasons to harbour hostility and resentment towards Western countries, and 
the USA in particular (where the film originated). To quote the words of one commentator 
on the affair: ‘Broken by poverty, threatened by drones, caught in the war between al Qaida 
and the US, to many ‎Arab Muslims, the film represents an attack on the last shelter of 
dignity - sacred beliefs - when all ‎else has been desecrated.’‎55‎ 
 
Additionally, the impacts of highly restrictive political regimes in many of these countries 
meant that mass dissent and protest directed at domestic issues, such as political corruption 
and economic deprivation was often not a safe option, as opposition activists could suffer 
heavy penalties for their views. Instead, pent-up public anger was more readily vented 
against less locally contentious foreign ‘enemies’ who had slighted religious sensitivities.56 
 
                                                          
54 Myriam Francois-Cerrah, ‘Demonstrating for Dignity: why are Muslims so enraged?’ Huffington Post 18th 
September 2012 available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/myriam-francois/demonstrating-for-
dignity_b_1885020.html [accessed on 30th September 2012]. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Although a wave of protest and revolution had brought about the fall of dictatorships in the Muslim world 
in 2010/11 in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the political landscape in these countries is still very 
unstable. While their populations are gradually experiencing greater political freedoms, the effects of decades-
long authoritarian regimes are still present. 
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There were elements of all of these factors present in 1988 when the Rushdie affair first 
broke out. Thus it was that while both the Muslim communities of Britain, and the British 
political and media establishments of the time, were not seeking to conflict or to clash with 
one another – a clash nonetheless occurred. I shall return to look at the Rushdie affair in 
greater depth in Chapter 3, from the perspective of its role in igniting Muslim identity 
politics in earnest. For now, suffice to say that the affair offers a clear illumination of how 
significantly the different cultural and political experiences of British Muslim communities 
and British public and political institutions affected each of their respective approaches to 
communication, as well as their senses of priorities when it came to negotiation, with one 
another.  
 
Moving on from the contextual background to Muslim claims-making and the 
development of their political agency, I will now look at the theoretical background to    
equalities policy, exploring the justifications from a theoretical perspective for Muslim 
identity politics, with a view to understanding the way in which it was articulated by Muslim 
advocacy groups, as well as the government’s approach to Muslim claims-making. 
 
1.2 Equality in the theoretical terrain 
A common motivating factor behind active political engagement for any individual or 
group is a sense that some form of injustice or inequality has been felt and is in need of 
being rectified. The case with minority communities is often that politicisation and political 
organising is related to experiences of poor treatment or marginalisation in different 
spheres of life – be they the economic, for instance through poor working conditions or 
aspects of social and political life, where legal arrangements might affect minorities unfairly 
or disproportionately – either by deliberate design or through inadvertent omission of 
factors relating to difference. In what follows, I will look at how this pursuit of equality on 
a policy level is justified through a theoretical framework, looking specifically at arguments 
for equality as recognition which have been the key theoretical underpinning for 
multiculturalism and race relations policy in the UK, and more recently, for policy efforts 
to tackle Islamophobia. 
 
1.2.1 Equality as recognition: 
The question of how to deliver equality through the law to all citizens is one that is of 
primary concern to any liberal society. Debate around the nature of equality and the 
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priorities that political communities must deal with in order to achieve it is wide-ranging 
and intense. The term 'equality' is both broad and contestable; and continues to be the 
focus of both agreement (in terms of its importance) and debate (in its definition). A major 
feature in this debate has centred on where to measure equality. Should we be satisfied as 
long as equality of opportunity is available to all or is it also important to look at how 
‘equal’ the outcomes of any institution or process are? The relevant distinction here lies in 
the first of these, equality of opportunity, being concerned with redistribution - how well the 
opportunity for equality is distributed among individuals; and the other, with recognition – an 
attitude that is concerned with aspects of social and political relations that cannot be 
‘quantified’ in the same way that distributive and economic inequalities can, and which 
seeks to seriously incorporate into the political community a fair and sustainable manner, 
groups that visibly or perceptively differ from the mainstream. 
 
In what follows, I will concentrate on how the idea of recognition has come to be understood 
as a method through which aspects of equality can be secured, in particular for members of 
minorities within society, for whom there might be the experience of unjustifiable, added 
disadvantage. This could be either as a result of social norms and preferences being 
predominantly aligned in favour of (or shaped by) the majority; and/or as a result of 
historical injustices (or, on some accounts, continued injustices) that they may have 
suffered. Additionally, these injustices could take the form of oppression or suppression on 
account of their difference and/or on account of their minority status. The concern of the 
state with these kinds of challenges can be informed by a broader range of matters, but the 
importance of seeking to eliminate inequality remains a valid and central justification that is 
used for public policy efforts to pursue measures that will target the particular 
disadvantages that are considered to disproportionately or specifically affect minority 
groups. 
 
Before moving to examine the trajectory of relevant policy that has evolved in the UK over 
the course of recent decades, I will first devote some attention to illustrating some key 
theoretical arguments. Prominent among writers concerned with the notion of equality as 
recognition of difference are theorists such as Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth and more 
recently, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti. While there exist numerous disagreements and debates 
between recognition theorists as to the role and scope of recognition, all are identifiable by 
their advocacy of this idea that recognition is a crucial aspect of equality in a pluralist 
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political community. A central feature of any politics of recognition is the idea that 
individuals are in need of a certain level of recognition from those around them in their 
communities and groups, and in wider society and the political domain, in order to fulfil 
their true potential and to be able to function on a satisfactory level – one which all 
individuals should be in a position to expect for themselves.  
 
Speaking in positive terms, a politics of recognition espouses that individuals are in need of 
recognition from those around them in order to fully function and truly realise themselves 
and their aspirations. Members of minority or disadvantaged groups who are denied such 
recognition are therefore seen to be lacking in necessary tools for attaining genuine equality 
with the mainstream, and are denied an important aspect of their personal well-being. 
Without adequate recognition, individuals are potentially deprived of the basic resources 
and opportunity with which to define and project themselves to those around them in a 
way that is aligned with their personal volition and self-understanding. Thus recognition is 
a fundamental and powerful aspect of an individual’s relationship with themselves, and 
with society around them.  
 
1.2.2 From recognition to parity – Three approaches: 
The works of Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth have served as focal points for what is 
now a wide-ranging and extensive literature on recognition. Both are critical of what they 
see as the ‘conventional’ liberal framework’s rigidity toward individuals and in particular 
those who are stigmatised or form part of a minority, and both take inspiration from the 
Hegelian tradition.57 Taylor articulates a ‘deeply-rooted’ desire, which all human beings 
possess, for recognition by others of their unique and distinctive identity. Difference-blind 
liberalism, in its insistence to overlook diversity as either irrelevant or peripheral to the 
concern of the political community, does not deliver this. Instead, it invariably succumbs to 
the very state of bias or partiality which it claims to avowedly shun. This is because true 
(complete) neutrality does not exist in any political community since the political structures, 
institutions and the norms of public life of each are inevitably shaped by its historical 
experience as well as the culture, tradition and even preferences of the majority. In 
restricting itself to ‘recognising’ only those qualities that are universally shared among 
individuals, Taylor argues that there is a failing which renders ‘difference-blind liberalism’ 
incapable of genuinely accommodating the notion of authenticity. An individual cannot be 
                                                          
57 Axel Honneth, ‘Recognition and Moral Obligation’ in Social Research Vol. 64:1 (1997), pp.16-35; Charles 
Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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true to herself if those around her in society do not give due recognition to aspects of 
herself that do not happen to conform to the predominant/preferred norms, practices and 
values in society.  
  
Honneth, as a critical theorist, places emphasis on recognition less as an aspect of identity 
politics than as a tool with which to critique injustice that exists in the realm of 
communication, as observed in intersubjective relationships (as distinct from injustice in 
the realm of production – which redistribution seeks to put right). In focusing on 
intersubjectivity, he identifies three strands through which social attitudes and interactions 
can disrupt a subject’s relationship to herself. These are love (where physical integrity is 
violated through ‘practical maltreatment’ – such as physical abuse which can destroy a 
person’s self-confidence and underlying trust in herself), rights (where basic respect and/or 
legal protection for it, on a level with that enjoyed by other members of society are denied 
– thus damaging a subject’s moral self-respect by signalling that her status is somehow 
below that of others around her) and solidarity or esteem (denigration of certain individual 
or collective ways of life as inferior or deficient – depriving a subject from social support 
and thus impacting eventually on the opportunities that she has for self-realisation).58 These 
strands constitute a ‘denial of recognition’ and as such the injustice they cause is 
significantly weighty in gravity ‘not simply because it harms subjects or restricts their 
freedom to act, but because it injures them with regard to the positive understanding of 
themselves that they have acquired intersubjectively’.59  
 
Another theorist – one whose work tackles ‘hard case’ problems that bear similarities to 
ones that I will be examining – is Anna Elisabetta Galeotti. Her ‘toleration as recognition’ 
thesis defends the view that, especially for minorities, recognition in the public sphere is 
the most effective and fairest way with which toleration (the widely cherished principle of 
‘live and let live’) can be practised. That toleration itself is an essential value to be pursued, 
especially within a pluralist context, is a matter of broad general agreement60. The object of 
toleration as recognition is to achieve equal and fair treatment in the public realm for 
minorities that are (or have been) ‘occupying unequal positions in relation to social 
standing, public respect, social and political power’, due to the dominance and power of 
                                                          
58 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p.134. 
59Ibid., pp.131-135. 
60 See Catriona McKinnon, Toleration: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), Ch.1. Also Monique 
Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 67-72 
discusses the origins of and connections between the liberal principles of neutrality and toleration. 
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force and quantity that majority preferences can deliberately or inadvertently give rise to. 
What recognition achieves, either through gesture and symbolism or through ‘literal’ 
(actual) policy changes, is a readjustment of existing political arrangements in such a way 
that redresses the social and political marginality that some minorities would find 
themselves experiencing.61  
 
At this point it is also important to note objections that have been made to the sometimes 
popular idea that recognition is profoundly in competition with or irreconcilably distinct 
from a politics of redistribution. In this respect, the later work of Nancy Fraser goes some 
way to showing how the idea of recognition is more closely connected with redistribution 
than is often assumed to be the case. In criticising Axel Honneth’s account, for example, 
she highlights how a politics of recognition implies and relies upon a certain understanding 
of redistribution as a partner in the same ‘two-dimensional’ conception of justice.62  
 
Similar points are made by Bhikhu Parekh, albeit from a different perspective, when he 
asserts that ‘the politics of recognition remains impotent unless it is embedded in the 
politics of redistribution’.63 An important concern of his is to defend the idea that cultural 
injustice among and between citizens and groups (as distinct from the state-centred locus 
of justice and injustice that redistributive politics might tend to focus on) is of great 
significance. Parekh is of the opinion that the traditional preoccupation with a ‘statist view’ 
of justice has limited its own vision and scope in its disregard for the vital experiences of 
injustice that are suffered in the realm of intersubjective relations. And so while the 
emphases and preoccupations of their positions differ, Parekh, like Fraser, argues that both 
recognition and redistribution must be understood and deployed in tandem. 
 
1.2.3 Misrecognition as a motivator for political agency: 
Another important factor to consider when discussing the theoretical foundations for 
Muslim political agency as a community is the notion of misrecognition, sometimes 
                                                          
61 Anna E Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.10-12. 
62 Nancy Fraser with Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A political-philosophical exchange trans. by Joel 
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described as the ‘sister concept’ of recognition.64 The experience of misrecognition for 
Muslims in the UK has been portrayed by Wendy Martineau as  
(having) to do not with overt forms of discrimination or prejudice that 
lead to explicit claims-making but involves a more subtle form by 
which the dominant social imaginary constructs some citizens’ degree 
of ‘belonging’ in society as more complete than others, and that places 
subtle restrictions on some people’s ability to participate equally in 
society.65 
 
So by this line of argument, the Equality Gap would not only be based on claims-making 
and actual changes to the law, but also a more subtle complaint of misrecognition. 
Martineau follows Taylor, Honneth and other recognition theorists in arguing that 
misrecognition occurs as a failure in the ‘communication of meanings’ between ‘ordinary 
agents’. This ‘partial non-communication’ is what causes a polarisation between cultural 
identities and can give way to a sense of conflict, as well as breeding feelings of 
defensiveness by those groups who feel that they are under attack. The impact of these 
processes leads to the oppression of the less-powerful cultural group by the one wielding 
more power, as exemplified by the feelings of acute powerlessness which, as I describe 
above, drove Muslim protesters to burn The Satanic Verses during the height of their 
frustration at the impasse they were experiencing with the British government and the 
disdain with which the media were treating their anguish. 
 
Proponents of a Muslim identity politics, especially of the sort that emerged in the latter 
part of the 20th Century, would most likely have differed with Martineau on the appropriate 
solution to the problems caused by misrecognition. Martineau is wary of settling for a 
recognition of cultural identities as a solution to the harms caused by misrecognition, since 
‘conceiving multicultural recognition in terms of the affirmative recognition of identities 
both detracts attention away from the processes that produce misrecognition and may in 
fact be unhelpful in rectifying this’.66 Instead she favours a ‘hermeneutic approach’ – one 
where calls for recognition are viewed within the context of the very struggles for 
recognition that are taking place. This, she contends, will allow for greater dialogue to take 
place, both between different groups (the majority and the minority/ies), as well as 
                                                          
64 Nasar Meer et al, ‘Misrecognition and ethno-religious diversity’ Ethnicities Vol.12:2 (January 2012), pp.131-
141. 
65 Wendy Martineau, ‘Misrecognition and cross-cultural understanding: Shaping the space for a ‘fusion of 
horizons’’ Ethnicities Vol.12:2 (January 2012,) p.166. 
66 Ibid. p.162. 
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‘minority voices within minorities’,67 voices which can easily be drowned out or sidelined 
under the type of system that typically relies on ‘community leaders’ to represent the 
interests of minority groups.68 
 
In contrast, the early pioneers of contemporary Muslim identity politics were very keen on 
securing group rights and exemptions, in addition, of course, to securing even-handed legal 
treatment when it came to recourse to certain legislation – specifically blasphemy and anti-
discrimination legislation. This approach was primarily about group recognition. As I shall 
show in the course of this thesis, Muslim identity politics in Britain grew and evolved 
around a yearning to make Muslims ‘count’, calling for ‘affirmative recognition’ rather than 
a desire to ‘fuse cultural horizons’.69 Of course such an approach was in no small part 
influenced by the precedents that had been set by pre-existing models for identity politics – 
notably the arena of race-relations and the representation of the British Jewish community. 
This is not to mention that successive governments have themselves actively encouraged 
the ‘affirmative recognition’ model for their official dealings with minority groups.70 
 
There are merits to Martineau’s critique. Detractors of multiculturalism policy often draw 
attention to the ‘competition’ for recognition and resources that it allegedly breeds.71 By 
focussing on what she sees as the root causes of misrecognition – divergence and poor 
communication between different ‘cultural horizons’ – it would seem that, while Martineau 
does not rule out a place for recognition, that her approach would at least lead towards a 
viable solution. In doing so, she theoretically avoids a descent into Nancy Fraser’s ‘practical 
recognition-effect’,72 where an official encouragement of individuals to self-identify with a 
group leads to a continual clamouring of groups, and groups within groups, for some 
elusive ideal of equal recognition, thus creating something of a self-perpetuating cycle that 
is never truly satisfied.  
 
                                                          
67 Ibid. p.173. Author’s own emphasis. 
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71 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism (London: Polity, 2001). 
72 Nancy Fraser, ‘From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a ‘post-socialist’ age’ New Left 
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With respect to the specific case of Muslim identity politics in Britain, I will argue that after 
examining its birth and development over the past three to four decades, that affirmative 
recognition on its own will not provide an adequately robust solution to the issues at the 
heart of Muslim political engagement. Martineau’s idea of ‘fusing horizons’ offers a helpful 
and more nuanced way forward, and I submit that a combination of both can provide a 
chance for genuine progress. Having said this, I will also point to other compelling reasons 
as to why there remains room for the continuation of a Muslim politics of identity, albeit in 
a revised form to the one that we have come to know over recent decades. 
 
1.3 Identity Politics – definition, theory and practice 
The term ‘identity politics’ has come to signify any political participation that is based 
around the self-interest, or the specific perspective, of a particular group within society. 
Usually, this group will be a minority, or one that has suffered (or continues to suffer) 
particular injustice or inequality. Examples include disability, ethnicity, gender, race, religion 
and sexual orientation. Historically, the second half of the 20th Century has witnessed 
successive waves of political movements seeking to rectify injustices that had been suffered 
by disadvantaged or minority groups.73 These have given rise to the practice of identity 
politics in various wide-ranging formats across liberal democracies, where it is sought to 
remedy perceived injustices or disadvantages, often through challenging the dominant 
culture’s account about the inferiority of the identity in question, and redefining it on its 
own terms, often through raising consciousness within the various communities associated 
with the identity. Political claims are put forward to the state, proposing remedial measures 
to secure equality and tackle disadvantage. Alternative methods of campaigning and 
political action have also been pursued.  The development of liberal democracies in 
modern times has been credited with enabling the rise of identity politics, in the sense that 
it provides individuals with the opportunity to freely group with those who share their 
identities and collectively put forward their claims.74 However, proponents of identity 
politics have also criticised liberal democracy as being incapable of catering sufficiently to 
identity politics.  This is because they have tended to be organised around a system of 
political parties, interest groups and lobbies that individuals can join or leave at will, rather 
than identity groups. Moreover, the conventional style adopted by liberal democracies in 
respect of interest groups, lobbies and political parties can easily overlook and thus exclude 
                                                          
73 Cressida Heyes, ‘Identity Politics’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. by Edward N. Zalta, (Spring 
2012 Edition). 
74 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995). 
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marginalised or minority (identity) groups, thus perpetuating their marginalisation and not 
allowing their minority views or preferences to be heard.75  
 
In the course of this thesis, I will look at some of the arguments around the validity of 
politics based around religious identity, as well as the practical meaning that Muslim 
identity politics held for those who were engaged with it – including their key concerns and 
aspirations.  However, at this introductory stage, I will briefly address some of the main 
charges that have been made against the impacts of identity politics on communities, 
society and the general political climate. 
 
As a form of political engagement and lobbying, identity politics is nothing new, and it is 
certainly something which citizens of a liberal democracy have every right to engage in. 
However, it has been the subject of much contention over recent years, particularly in 
respect of Muslim communities and the debate on multiculturalism. Detractors argue that 
New Labour excessively fostered identity politics, and in doing so, cultivated an unhealthy, 
divisive political landscape whereby minority groups competed with one another for the 
largest portion of official attention, funding, and privileges. According to Amartya Sen, this 
climate should more accurately be described as ‘plural monoculturalism’,76 since actual 
meaningful interactions between different communities are few. Rather, identity politics 
promotes the side-by-side existence of a diversity of discrete communities, to the extent 
that they ‘might pass one another like ships in the night’.77 
 
An additional charge that has been made against identity politics is that rather than 
providing an authentic space for minority or disadvantaged groups to be heard in the 
public sphere, the types of community groups and forums that governments are likely to 
engage with have had a tendency to be hijacked by individuals resembling the archetypal 
‘community leader’.78 In such a scenario, there is a danger that minority voices within 
minority communities are overlooked and organisations become preoccupied with 
furthering the political agendas or pet projects of those at their helm.  
                                                          
75 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp.54-5. 
76 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: the illusion of destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2006). 
77 Amartya Sen, ‘The uses and abuses of Multiculturalism’ The New Republic 27th February 2006. 
78 By this I mean the dominant stereotype of minority community leaders – male, middle aged, self-
appointed, self-inflated, out of touch and unrepresentative of his community. This image has been recently 
caricatured in popular culture by the BBC TV sitcom Citizen Khan, which features a Mr Khan who self-
identifies as a ‘community leader – they all know me!’ but is barely recognised in public and is out of touch 
with even his own immediate family’s concerns.  
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Moreover, the continued exercise of identity politics is blamed for encouraging 
governments to address communities, and communities to view themselves, in a 
compartmentalised fashion, through the lens of their identity, as opposed to simply as 
citizens. So rather than appreciating the diversity of perspectives and aspirations within 
communities, identity politics can generate and entrench reification. This, in turn, promotes 
an inaccurate and unfair picture of the lived realities of citizens, as well as acting as a 
general barrier to integration and social cohesion.79 There is some element of truth in this 
argument – no representative body can ever hope to accurately speak for its community. 
Indeed, the proportions of individuals who will identify with, let alone engage with such 
organisations are a minority within their communities.80 However, in the case of British 
Muslims, as with other minority groups, the growth and development of identity politics 
cannot be attributed to a desire to self-segregate, as much as it can be to a deeply felt need 
to make their voices heard, against a background culture which had not taken into account 
cultural and religious differences and thus not delivered equal treatment to these 
communities.  
 
Finally, as this thesis shall go on to show, British Muslim identity politics and community 
representation developed in recent times in conscious emulation of previous paths that had 
been trodden by both race relations campaigns, and the experience of the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews. By this token, regardless of the flaws or merits of identity politics, 
in the interests of even-handedness, it is hardly fair to deny such an opportunity to 
Muslims. For better or for worse, it is indisputable that identity politics has been an 
absolutely crucial issue for British Muslims in particular over recent decades. Whether this 
has been as a platform from which community concerns and demands for equal treatment 
have been articulated, or whether it has been as a site for intra-community interactions and 
the evolution of identity and political engagement through debate and disagreement, or, 
indeed, whether it has been as a government-driven strategy through which to more 
coherently and effectively engage in dialogue with Muslim communities. On each of these 
                                                          
79 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture (Princeton, NJ.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007) 
presents one such argument where she makes the case for a multiculturalism that is focused on individuals 
and individual rights, rather than one with groups and cultures as its primary concern.  
80 For instance, a 2006 poll found that less than 4% of British Muslims felt that the MCB represented them, 
and 12% felt that it represented their political views. NOP/Channel 4, ‘Dispatches Muslim Survey’ results 
were broadcast on ‘What Muslims Want’ Dispatches, Channel 4, 7th August 2006.  
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levels, Muslim identity politics has been a topic worthy of close examination and critical 
analysis. 
 
I aim to look chronologically at developments and thus will introduce and discuss the 
myriad of groups that have played a role in British Muslim political engagement and 
representation, as they appear and feature. Britain’s Muslim communities are exceptionally 
diverse in terms of culture and ethnicity, as well as religious practice and political 
perspectives. This diversity has been reflected in the myriad of organisations and platforms 
that, together, have made up Muslim identity politics over recent times. Each has engaged 
with the issues of the day in its own way, and approaches have ranged from political 
isolationism to active lobbying of the state, to involvement in party politics and standing 
for political office. They have included participation in state-sponsored schemes, the 
development of cross-community civic partnerships, but also a preoccupation with 
international affairs and a subsequent disengagement from an ‘un-Islamic’ British civic life. 
All of these facets of Muslim identity politics will be surveyed, and aspects of their interplay 
with each other examined. I will however devote some specific focus to the Muslim 
Council of Britain since, as I demonstrate, they have proven to be more consistent, more 
long-lived and more representative than other Muslim advocacy or representative groups. 
Moreover, they enjoyed a short period of exceptional primacy in the field of Muslim 
representation between the late 1990s until 2005.  
 
With this historical and theoretical background in mind, I will proceed in the following 
chapter (Chapter 2) to chart how and why the preservation of religious identity became a 
central preoccupation for budding Muslim community organisations in the UK from the 
1960s onwards. The chapter after that, (Chapter 3), will discuss how an idea of recognition 
as parity has developed in practical terms in the context of British race relations and 
integration policy – in the specific case of British Muslims and the arguments presented for 
parity of recognition. It will also look at the budding organisational structures and lobbying 
techniques that were emerging within British Muslim identity politics, and discuss how they 
were influenced by the antecedent experiences and established institutions of British Jewish 
identity politics. 
 
In doing this, I aim to have made a foundation for the remainder of my thesis, which will 
look at how the Muslim identity politics that grew out of this call for parity of treatment 
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and recognition has developed over the past few decades, which key moments have 
influenced and shaped it, its challenges, successes and failures and finally, its prospects for 
the future.  
 
1.4 Methodology: 
Before proceeding to the thesis outline, I will first elaborate upon the methodology that 
was used for my research, in particular for the fieldwork that I conducted. The thesis is first 
and foremost a work of historical analysis, relying on a wide range of primary and 
secondary source material as the basis of its research. With project’s the time-frame (1960-
2010) being so recent, I found that there was great benefit in utilising oral history as an 
important source of information, analysis and perspective. To this end, I conducted 
interviews with a number of individuals who have been involved with the events and 
developments that I have considered in my thesis. Some of these came from the various 
community organisations that feature in my research, while others were selected on the 
basis of long-standing involvement in Muslim community representative and advocacy 
initiatives. I also spoke with people who have been part of government-sponsored Muslim 
community initiatives, as well as individuals with a background in the Muslim media sector. 
Additionally, I spoke with a couple of individuals from British Jewish community groups, 
as part of my comparative research into communal organising among British Jews in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The style and format of my interviews varied – from extended face-to-face interviews, to 
extended telephone conversations, email conversations and more informal discussions. The 
type of approach I used depended on a number of factors, including the availability and 
preference of the interviewee, the level of involvement that the individual had in events 
that I was covering, and therefore the amount and nature of subject matter that I wished to 
discuss with them in an interview. I prepared for interviews beforehand by considering the 
topics that I wished to cover and preparing some central questions. However, I maintained 
a flexible approach to interviews, allowing space for my interviewees to speak openly and at 
length. Most of my interviewees were specifically selected on the basis of my background 
research and knowledge. Nonetheless, I occasionally used a ‘snowball’ sampling method, 
whereby my interviewees recommended to me further people that I should approach for 
interview. When it was used, I found this method to be appropriate as it allowed me to 
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hear alternative perspectives on issues or events, and to corroborate or verify information 
that I had obtained from other sources. 
 
I must also mention here that I benefited significantly from my own personal position with 
respect to the British Muslim community landscape. Being a British Muslim myself, and 
one who has experienced close interaction and engagement with a number of the groups 
and individuals that I study, I had the important advantage of ‘trusted insider’ status, in the 
sense that I possess extensive familiarity with the context and development of British 
Muslim community organisations. I was also previously acquainted with some of my 
interviewees. In some cases, I did find this background to be of additional advantage, since 
a certain level of trust was already in place, interviewees did not find it difficult to ‘open 
up’. However, once or twice I felt that my background may have contributed towards an 
atmosphere of guardedness, whereby interviewees were perhaps suspicious of my motives 
in conducting what may have been perceived as overly critical research about certain 
Muslim groups and organisations.  
 
Reflexivity was important to me in the course of my fieldwork, as my familiarity with the 
contexts and subjects that I was studying meant that I had to continually reassess my 
position in the course of my interviews. I took extra care as I framed my interviews and 
questions to search for accuracy and detail, and was acutely aware that my findings might 
be politically skewed if I allowed my own views to permeate into my interview style. I 
therefore made a conscious effort to remain unbiased and objective in my approach to 
interviews, allowing space for my interviewees’ views and perspectives to authentically 
come through. 
 
I took matters of research ethics very seriously and ensured that my fieldwork complied 
with the university’s guidance notes for research ethics. In particular, this involved that my 
interviewees were not made vulnerable in any way as a result in their participation in my 
research. It included outlining clearly to them the nature and scope of my research, the 
details of what their participation would involve and making clear that they were free to 
withdraw their participation at any point if they so wished. Additionally I explained to my 
interviewees that their conversations with me were being recorded and that they would be 
treated with confidentiality. Those interviewees who did not wish to be identified in the 
thesis were given the option of anonymity. 
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Finally, I should make mention of the specific parameters within which this study is 
located. In looking at the development of British Muslim identity politics, a central 
contribution of my thesis will be an articulation of what I have termed the Equality Gap, 
and its role in Muslim claims-making. To be clear, this Gap has been defined specifically 
with reference to political engagement and political claims-making. That is to say that it 
refers to a gap in equality as perceived and articulated by Muslim communities and 
representatives, in terms of their public and political engagement. Needless to say that there 
are cases to be made for the existence of other equality gaps between Muslims in Britain 
and other sections of society – for example gaps in social and economic equality. There are 
also arguments to be made that there exist equality gaps within some of Britain’s Muslim 
communities, most obviously perhaps relating to inequalities that are faced by some 
Muslim women. However, while each of these highly viable and extremely interesting lines 
of research, this thesis will not delve into them so that focus can be maintained and space 
constraints can be observed.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline: 
The thesis will be divided into four sections – consisting of an introduction, a conclusion 
and two main parts. Each of the two main parts will be framed by a broad area of research, 
and will contain two smaller chapters which will hone in on specific aspects. They are 
outlined with brief summaries below: 
 
Chapter One - Introduction: 
This chapter will present the context of the overall study, its aims and objectives and the 
theoretical framework within which the key concepts that I shall be working with are 
situated. It will look at a number of themes, including free speech, equality, and identity 
politics; and consider their varying definitions and meanings both in Muslim religious and 
political history and in the tradition of western political thought. A consideration of the 
different expectations and approaches to these themes that different historical experiences 
have helped to engender in both ‘Muslim’ and ‘western’ traditions will be coupled with a 
look at the nature of contemporary legal and political debates on the limits and safeguards 
on freedom of expression and other civil liberties. These have often constituted the key 
triggers to formative debates and initiatives in Muslim community organising and 
conversation with government and the wider establishment. 
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Historical background 
 
Chapter Two – Identity preservation and the birth of modern ‘Muslim 
consciousness’: 1960s – 1980s 
 
This chapter will chart a narrative of modern British Muslim political history by looking at 
a selection of moments where significant strides in political interaction and engagement 
took place. Particular cases will include some political and social initiatives of Muslim 
convert communities and immigrants during the late 19th and the first half of the 20th 
centuries. These will provide a window into the nature of issues and concerns as well as 
into the discussions and platforms for conversation and claims-making with government 
and authorities that were utilised – including institutions, personal relationships, media and 
other ventures.  
 
After looking at key episodes during the period prior to mass-immigration (pre-1960s), it 
will, by drawing several comparisons, demonstrate how the emergence of a palpable shift in 
outlook, aspiration and prioritisation of issues of importance coincided with the 
commencement of mass-immigration, the arrival of families and the increasingly 
permanent settlement of Muslim communities in various parts of the country.  This shift, 
in addition to the influence of push factors, such as the role and impact of concurrent 
political trends, in particular the debate and development of a race relations policy and 
campaigning agenda will be assessed, arguing that it was to leave an unmistakeable effect 
on the future shape and trajectory of British Muslim identity politics. 
 
In order to do this, I look at the growth of national and regional organising in Britain 
around the idea of a shared Muslim identity, which was gaining increasing credence among 
British Muslims as foreign Islamist movements were gaining a stronger foothold in Britain 
through the establishment of various associate- or satellite- bodies. I conduct a brief survey 
of each of the major attempts at creating Muslim advocacy and unity organisations, from 
the early political endeavours of the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) in the 
1960s through to the Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO) in the ‘70s. I consider these 
to be the first forays into organised claims-making on behalf of the Muslim community on 
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a co-ordinated and national scale, for which the preservation of religious identity remained 
a central concern. 
 
Finally I survey the various Muslim identity-based organisations that were set up from the 
1960s onwards, all of which were inspired and/or connected with trans-national Islamic 
movements from the Muslim world. I then show how these movements set in motion the 
idea of large-scale organising around the notion of preserving and promoting religious 
identity within Muslim communities, and point out how many of these organisations later 
provided support as well as personnel for the Muslim umbrella and representative bodies 
that were later formed.  
This leads me to Chapter 3, which will look at the formalisation of Muslim identity politics 
through the institutionalisation of national communal advocacy and representative 
organisations. 
 
Chapter Three – The formalisation of Muslim identity politics: Responses to hate 
speech, discrimination and the Equality Gap.  
Foundations of a government-community ‘conversation’ (1980s – 1997 and 1997-
2001) 
 
This chapter begins by looking at national communal organising among British Muslims in 
the final two decades of the Twentieth Century. This phase is distinguished from the one 
preceding it by the prominence of efforts that were made in coordinating Muslim 
communities on a national level with the ultimate purpose of actively representing them, and 
securing their rights by vocalising their needs whether politically or in other aspects of the 
public sphere.  
 
I view the year 1989 as a pivotal watershed moment. Ignited by what became known as the 
Rushdie affair, this year witnesses the beginnings of what I will view to be modern, 
formalised Muslim identity politics. It was marked by an unprecedented combination of 
each of the following factors: intra-community, national- and regional- level communal 
coordination among Britain’s Muslims; high profile and consistent media coverage and 
public interest in British Muslim affairs; serious conversation and negotiation with 
government at the national level; as well as significant international attention (and even 
intervention). Examples to be studied will be the political work of the Muslim Parliament, 
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the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA), the National Interim Council for 
Muslim Unity (NICMU), and eventually in 1997, the establishment and early years of the 
MCB as illustrative of the institutionalisation both within the community and by 
government/establishment of Muslim identity politics. 
 
Briefly revisiting my surveys in Chapter 2 of early Muslim communal advocacy and 
organisation in the 1960s and ‘70s together with the experience of the Rushdie affair, I will 
contend that the central notion upon which Muslim identity politics was to develop can be 
described collectively as an Equality Gap. This refers to the idea that Muslims in Britain did 
not have the same access to equality as their fellow non-Muslim citizens. This was partly 
because of the privileged legal status of the Anglican religion that had evolved over time, 
which effectively placed followers of Islam (and technically, followers of other non-
Anglican religions) at a disadvantage when seeking legal redress against cases of blasphemy 
for example. It was also due to the greater ease with which other religions were able to 
appeal to anti-discrimination legislation on the basis of racial identity, something which 
Muslims were not able to do. The issues which were taken up by Muslim advocacy groups 
were not limited to this gap, however, it encapsulates their strongest source of legitimacy 
and constituted a reference point which was consistently used to justify their continued 
work.  
 
For purposes of comparison, I will then cast a glance at the historical development of 
Jewish communal organising and claims-makings, specifically the development of the 
Board of Deputies of British Jews. Through various thematic comparisons, I will show 
how conditions for the development of communal representation for Muslims presented 
unique challenges, and that this, in part, can explain why so many attempts had to be made 
before, through something of a trial-and-error process, the MCB was developed. 
Additionally, I show where and how Muslim organisations consciously sought to emulate 
their Jewish predecessors and how the path trodden by Jewish community offered a model 
which the government and political establishment at large often held up for Muslim 
community leaders both as an example and as a structure within which to develop their 
political demands. 
 
Finally, recognising the MCB as the culmination of many of these earlier efforts, I will look 
at the development of it early relationship with the government and the dynamics of this 
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first firm point of access to the political establishment which British Muslims had managed 
to secure. I will show how the initial period between 1997-2001 saw significant advances to 
the causes which were championed by the MCB and how its relations with the government 
were at their most stable, and most productive. 
 
Two turning points 
 
This section will contain two chapters – each focusing on a particular period which I have 
identified as a ‘turning point’, where significant change of thought, direction and method 
took place. In looking at each of these phases, I will demonstrate the overall level of 
progress that has taken place in the field of Muslim identity politics since 2001, taking note 
of and analysing areas of regression. I will show how the experience of each of these to 
turning points was different, and also draw out aspects of continuity. This will lead me 
towards my concluding section where I will put forward my reflections, assessments and 
recommendations.  
 
Chapter Four – Post-11th September 2001 
This period is characterised by a sharp increase in the level and intensity of community 
organising, much of which came about as a direct response to the rapid alterations which 
were taking place in the global, and national arenas in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th 2001, and the subsequent fallout. The introduction of heightened security 
measures and the style, discourse and thinking behind the ‘war on terror’ provoked 
concerns in many quarters about silencing, restricting and/or channelling of expression and 
dissent as effects of: 
a) The extent of restrictions and proscriptions imposed by recent anti-terror laws,  
b) A widespread disenchantment with perceptions of attitudes and motives in the 
government’s foreign and domestic policies among British Muslims.  
Urgent security concerns played a notable role in framing the relationship between the 
government and the MCB, which, by now was virtually exclusively the contact point for 
organised communal representation of Britain’s Muslim communities. This resulted in 
inevitable strains and challenges to the relationship between the two parties. At the same 
time, there was an (also essentially reactive) drive among Muslims to denounce and state 
clearly their positions on matters which they felt they were being misunderstood and 
seriously misjudged on – including terrorism and violence, issues of loyalty and citizenship 
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and the notion of separate cultures and the irreconcilability of Islam with ‘western 
democracy’ – often characterised as a ‘clash of civilisations’. 
 
This drive saw a growth in Muslim involvement with broad-based social and political 
coalitions, such as the anti-war movement. For the first time, an official involvement in 
such initiatives from Muslim organisations indicated a substantive ‘mainstreaming’ of 
Muslim community interests. The mobilisation of confident and vocal 2nd and 3rd 
generations which looked beyond ‘Muslim’ issues was reflected in the language and type of 
discourse that was employed, style and choice of issues to be pursued. Even the renewed 
calls and campaigns for outlawing religious hate speech were framed around new terms to 
those that had been used during the Satanic Verses crisis, with the focus more on parity of 
treatment with other minorities as a matter of rights within the race relations framework, 
and on Islamophobia as a real form of discrimination and prejudice; and less on the idea of 
blasphemy and offence to religious sensitivities. Coinciding with an increasingly vocal far-
right which exploited the law’s helplessness against incitement to religious hatred by 
running ‘anti-Islam’ campaigns, coupled with a volatile backdrop of unease and community 
tensions that had been fed by the terrorist attacks; maturity and sophistication in political 
claims-making from a Muslim identity perspective could not have come at a better time.   
 
Another arena where the arrival of this new phase became visible was in the choices and 
styles of self-expression that were utilised by Muslims – both in their quantity and in the 
range of their backgrounds and leanings, in the spectra of religion, culture and politics. 
There was an expansion and widening of interests in the ‘Muslim press’ – one might expect 
that the speed of events and their urgency in a post-9/11 Britain would have demanded no 
less. This raises the question of how far their reach and influence was in responding to 
events, and/or in actually motivating and deciding the ‘Muslim agenda’. 
 Self-expression in the non-conventional sense was also on the increase – through various 
artistic and creative forms. One example is the diversification of the popular nasheed genre 
(religious songs), to include songs with a focus on emphasising the centrality of peace to 
the Islamic faith, as well as a sense of pride in Muslim identity, and spirituality. These 
became a popular way of tackling the effects of a backlash of stereotype and hostility in the 
wake of 9/11, as well as communicating a developing sense of modern Muslim identity.  
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Chapter Five – Post-7th July 2005  
Although precipitated by ‘similar’ circumstances (‘another’ terrorist attack), I will argue that 
7th July 2005 constituted another important turning point for British Muslim identity 
politics. That the attack took place in London and was carried out by British Muslims was a 
significant reason for introspection of a new kind both in government circles and within 
the Muslim communities. The new realities posed by the threat of terrorism on home soil 
to the sense of everyday safety and security meant that fresh (some previously un-ask-able) 
questions were being asked. At the crux of these lay a debate on the success or otherwise 
of the way that multiculturalism policy had been hitherto understood, as well as the viability 
of the goal of integration that was being pursued.  
 
The Labour government’s policy since this point followed a two-pronged approach with 
regard to security and community cohesion – a ‘hard’ approach, consisting of new and 
updated anti-terror legislation, and a ‘soft’ approach of community engagement which 
endeavoured to ‘win over (Muslim) hearts and minds’ in the fight against terror, and what 
became commonly referred to as ‘violent extremism’. 
 
The ‘hard’ approach included an update of the UK’s anti-terror legislation to reflect the 
now much graver appreciation that recruitment to violent extremism was taking place in 
the UK, specifically within Muslim communities. One key aspect which I will look at more 
closely is the introduction of ‘encouragement offences’. These made the ‘glorification’ of 
terrorism a criminal offence and allowed for the prosecution of individuals, and 
proscription of organisations which were found to have engaged in such activity. As I will 
show, this law proved widely controversial and difficult to implement. It also backfired 
onto the government’s aims of preventing radicalisation by contributing to a feeling of 
isolation and victimisation among young Muslims – thus further increasing a sense of 
frustration and detachment from the government and the political process that had been 
exacerbated by the continuing involvement of the UK in the war on terror.   
 
With regard to the ‘soft’ approach, there was a focus on developing new and effective 
understandings and ways of combating radicalisation and extremism among British 
Muslims (in particular young men). Additionally, the government took steps to pay more 
serious, direct attention to the ‘Muslim question’ – through the setting up of a number of 
dedicated working groups and earmarking funding for community initiatives through the 
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Prevent strategy – all of this marking a re-categorisation of Muslim community 
engagement. There was a departure from previous tendencies to treat it as part of the more 
general area of race relations and a greater inclination towards linking it to the securitisation 
agenda.   
 
Within Muslim circles, denial- and conspiracy theory- type explanations for radicalisation 
and terrorism – which had been relatively widely expressed in the wake of 9/11 – almost 
instantly held much less purchase. This change was also symptomatic of the stark and 
sudden realisation of the gravity of the radicalisation problem, and that it was not 
something which could be dealt with ‘internally’. Neither could it be simply brushed under 
the carpet and explained (or wished) away. Among the significant implications of this 
mood change has been a more proactive readiness to engage in serious intra-community 
debate, dialogue and cooperation on the part of many community organisations, including 
the MCB. There was a sense that the stakes had become too high to squabble over the 
future, and/or to allow it to be decided externally, leading to a drive for unity between 
groups of different political and theological leanings. This sense of a shared future also led 
to a fresh drive for openness which has in some ways replaced the suspicion and scepticism 
that the establishment and members of other faiths may previously have been met with.   
‘Muslim issues’ now affect everyone, to some extent or other, and so now the conversation 
that is being had about the future of Islam and Muslims should encompass much more 
than just Muslim voices.  
 
The MCB in particular developed a more independent line as the government’s new 
strategic focus further tested their previously strained relationship. The government’s 
dogged refusal to acknowledge the contribution of its foreign policy to disaffection within 
Muslim communities and the increasing securitisation of community cohesion efforts 
meant that the MCB took a critical stance towards government policy more often than 
either of them might have hoped. In 2008, it became subjected to a period of ‘silent 
treatment’ from the government, and although it survived, it nonetheless emerged with a 
permanently weakened relationship with state officials, although arguably a buoyed 
credibility among the Muslim grassroots.  
 
A final aspect that I will look at is how this turning point has affected the evolution of 
Muslim identity politics and the development of community organisations. I will show how 
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this phase has underlined the need for the younger (second and third) generations to come 
increasingly to the forefront of debates and decision-making. Figures for the composition 
of Muslim community groups and leadership positions show that they are still 
overwhelmingly dominated by older, first generation immigrant men. For many, this 
remains a source of the stifling, stagnation or rigidity in many respects, of Muslim identity 
politics – in the sense that turnover is minimal or absent, and consequently, so are new 
ideas. The younger generations have made their voices heard either through the 
establishment of new organisations and initiatives – many with a focus on critical thinking 
and a questioning of orthodoxy/convention – seeking to engage with (and thus gain 
legitimacy from) large sections of the Muslim population who may have been detached 
from existing representative groups. Some of these have been more pliant to the 
government’s objectives of securitisation and its foreign policy ambitions, and others have 
taken a far more critical role than the MCB.  
 
Ultimately, this evolving landscape has contributed towards raising the bar in the level of 
organisational transparency and efficiency across the board. As an ever increasing range of 
voices emerged to speak for Britain’s Muslims, not only did they have to learn to work with 
each other, but also work on becoming more relevant and more representative to those 
they sought to represent. 
 
Chapter Six - Conclusions 
This final section will consist of a concluding chapter which will draw together and 
summarise the findings of the research questions that have been investigated through the 
course of the thesis. Additionally, it will offer assessments and recommendations – both 
those emerging from the study itself, and with respect to where it can potentially be taken 
further, for example through making policy recommendations and through suggesting 
suitable pathways and strategies for community leaders, groups and advocacy bodies to 
follow.  
 
I will present my conclusions under a series of headings that will help to tease out the 
pertinent issues emerging from this thesis: 
1- A summary of the trajectory that British Muslim identity politics has followed from 
the 1970s through to 2010, highlighting key developments. 
2- The role and fate of perspectives and understandings of freedom of expression 
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through this trajectory. 
3- The Equality Gap – has it been filled? 
4- Muslim identity politics – end of the road? 
I will contend that although a number of substantive developments over the past few 
decades have considerably narrowed the extent of the Equality Gap, certain aspects of it 
still remain. Additionally, developments in the 2000s have led to a change in the Gap’s 
focus. Together, I classify these remaining and additional aspects as:  
1- Legal – primarily this relates to the limitations of Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
2006 and the case that I will discuss for its potential strengthening. 
 
2- Applicative – this relates to the application of security measures in post-9/11 and 
post-7/7 Britain, which has been shown to contribute to the victimisation of 
Muslims as a community. This feeds into the third and final category: 
 
3- Cultural – this relates to the persistence, and growth of cultural anti-Muslim 
sentiment and Islamophobia. Modern concerns surrounding terrorism and security, 
the war against terrorism and debates on multiculturalism and immigration have all 
fed into the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the far-right. That anti-religious hatred legislation 
has been a weak weapon against Islamophobia has given room for its spread to go 
comparatively unchecked.  While this is not a trend which emanates directly from any 
section of the government, I will discuss how official inaction or indifference 
towards Islamophobic discourse has contributed towards this trend. And although 
this problem is not one that can be appropriately solved by hard legislation, it 
nonetheless provides a strong reason for the continuation of Muslim identity politics 
into the future.  
 
All three of these factors present together a strong case for the continuation of Muslim 
identity politics in the UK. However, the format of this identity politics needs to change in 
adaptation to the changing nature of the Equality Gap.  
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Chapter Two 
Identity preservation and the birth of modern British Muslim identity politics 
(1960s – 1980s) 
 
Beginning with a glance at some early examples of political awareness and organising 
among Muslims in the UK, I will show how during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, 
there was a varied degree of Muslim political activity encompassing individuals as well as 
institutions and communities. Arguing that it was to set the scene for the growth of 
centralised Muslim identity politics, I will then move on to analyse the history and 
development of race identity politics, alongside that of the UK’s race relations strategy, 
following important features of their evolution over the second half of the 20th Century. 
After highlighting the major legal and institutional achievements that were made in 
measures to support race equality and outlawing race discrimination, I will consider the 
later genesis and development of a distinct Muslim identity politics, which, it has been 
argued, had been previously subsumed under the broad categories of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’.81 
It wasn’t until the 1980s, with the emergence of local Muslim campaigns and identity-
focused organisations that this began to be challenged and Muslim-specific demands were 
more assertively articulated. 
 
A concern with ‘cultural’ identity preservation began to gain momentum in the early 1970s 
with the growth and development of community organisations, and reached a major 
watershed with the outbreak of the Rushdie affair (from 1988). I will look at how prevalent 
attitudes, aspirations and priorities in Muslim identity politics started out; and I will 
propose that with the increased permanence of their settlement, the identity politics of 
British Muslims came to mature and undergo a process of refinement in terms of these 
attitudes and priorities.  
 
I will then look at the growth and development of an array of different identity-focused 
Muslim community organisations from the 1960s through to the 1980s and beyond. These 
reflected and often replicated the spectrum of religious tendencies that existed in the 
‘Muslim world’, and were responsible for a wave of community organising that was focused 
primarily on the preservation and revival of religious identity among Britain’s Muslims. 
                                                          
81 Tariq Modood, ‘Being Somebody and Being Oppressed: catching up with Jesse Jackson’ in Tariq Modood, 
Not Easy Being British: colour, culture and citizenship (London: Runnymede Trust and Trentham Books, 1992), 
pp.47-59. 
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This was as distinct from previous efforts which had been much more preoccupied with 
laying practical foundations for settlement and community infrastructure. 
  
Another factor influencing developments in Muslim identity politics was the antecedent 
emergence of a (race-focused) equalities agenda in the political sphere, and the founding of 
an established place for multiculturalism in national politics and policy-making. Using case 
studies to illustrate how the trajectory of Muslim identity politics took its course, I will 
show how the recently formed institutions for race relations paved the way for the shape 
that Muslim identity politics was to take.  
 
2.1 Muslims, Identity and ‘Britishness’ 
In more recent decades, the idea of a British Islam has been highly topical, as originally 
immigrant Muslim communities have entered into their third and fourth generations, and 
public debates around loyalty, identity and integration have become more and more 
pervasive. With the increasingly permanent establishment of various organisations and 
bodies within the UK’s Muslim communities, there has been an ongoing evolution of 
structures, discourses and trends across social and political spectra. This, coupled with both 
local and international political priorities around terrorism and security, has made the 
impetus for a vocal, more mainstream conversation on British Islam more visible. Many 
British Muslim communities and organisations have tended to reflect religious, social, 
cultural and political trends from ‘back home’ – in some cases imitating their foreign 
forebears in structure, politics, language, aims and objectives. Inextricable to this phase was 
the experience of identity formation which crucially included coming to terms with a new 
context and climate – an experience which is undoubtedly shared by all immigrant 
communities, to one degree or other. The question of what to adopt from the cultural 
norms and values of the new home and what to retain from the immigrants’ country of 
origin has, in no small part, fed into the evolution of conceptions around ‘British Islam’, in 
a way that in many respects has not been dissimilar to the experiences of other immigrant 
groups.82  
 
An array of approaches and solutions to these questions has been evident from the diverse 
range of mosques, local and regional associations and then representative and advocacy 
                                                          
82 I look at areas of similarity and overlap with experiences of African-Caribbean communities in Section 4 of 
this chapter, and will give more attention to those with Jewish communities in Chapter 3.  
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bodies, the establishment of which began in earnest from the 1960s onwards,83 
demonstrating how the notion of British Islam (just as the notion of ‘Britishness’ itself) is 
both broad and variable in its meanings and connotations.84 This is not least because non-
religious factors that feed into identity and self-perception have been and continue to be so 
varied. There have been several sketches of the range of Islamic groupings and socio-
political trends in the UK (and more generally, Europe).85 Varying from the religiously 
ultra-conservative to the more liberal, and encompassing an innumerable range of sects and 
theological groups, political radicalism/extremism and passivity, British Muslim self-
identity has notoriously found it difficult to divorce itself from vestiges of overseas ‘back 
home’ influence. This situation is only complicated by the fact that Islamic cultures and 
beliefs are understood and practiced in a multitude of different ways across the globe.  
 
In analysing these influences, many will point to the ‘South Asian factor’, which I have 
alluded to in the previous chapter. However, there are also more ‘generic’ factors which 
have influenced a wider range of British Muslim communities – for instance the fact that 
many have their origins in post-colonial nations in Africa and Asia where democratic 
government and civil society politics are present only in part, if at all; and very recently so 
at that. The replication of political trends that have emerged over recent decades in 
countries of origin has been another feature of this situation – whereby Islamist, tribal and 
theological shades of community organising have all played a part in shaping opinion and 
preference on the ‘British Muslim street’. Philip Lewis illustrates this point well with his 
observation of a group of councillors in Birmingham who were ‘voted in on the back of a 
discrete Kashmiri political party’.86 
 
This debate and discovery associated with Britishness and British Islam is ongoing and 
highly topical at the moment. My later chapters will hone in on chosen aspects of its 
evolution in much more detail, but for the purposes of this chapter, it is necessary for there 
to be an appreciation of the complexity and intricacy that the matter has continued to have 
                                                          
83 Particular aspects of this phase will be highlighted further on in this chapter. 
84 Dilwar Hussain, ‘British Muslim identity’ in M S Seddon, D Hussain and N Malik, British Muslims Between 
Assimilation and Segregation: Historical, Legal and Social Realities (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 2004). 
85 The most comprehensive would include Tariq Ramadan’s in his Western Muslims and the Future of Islam 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp.24-30; more empirically Jytte Klausen’s in The Islamic Challenge (2006), pp.87-94 and 
more historically, Sean McLoughlin’s in ‘The state, ‘new’ Muslim leaderships and Islam as a ‘resource’ for 
public engagement in Britain’ in European Muslims and the Secular State ed. by Jocelyn Cesari and Sean 
McLoughlin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
86 Lewis, Young, British and Muslim (2007), p.23. 
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over time – and how this has played out in the formative moments of an ‘officially 
recognised’ identity politics for British Muslims, which I shall now move on to look at. 
 
2.2 Muslims in the ‘pre-multicultural’ Britain 
Although the most numerically significant waves of immigration that have gone on to form 
the UK’s Muslim communities occurred during the mid-20th Century’s chain migration 
period of South Asians; these were by no means the first Muslim communities to settle and 
to publicly organise and identify themselves by their religious affiliation. Any history of 
Muslim presence in the British Isles will trace it back to at least 1,000 years prior. However, 
with the development of identity politics being of foremost concern to our study at this 
point, I will limit this section to illustrating a few of the most relevant of the earlier 
examples.  
 
Apart from lascars (maritime workers), recruited on East India Company ships from the 17th 
Century onwards), servants and members of Anglicising Indian elites settling in various 
parts of London, the UK’s South Asian Muslim communities were also preceded during 
the 19th Century by large numbers of Yemeni and Somali sailors who settled in areas such 
as South Shields in the north and in Cardiff, in Wales.87 These settlers differed from the 
post-World War II waves of immigrants in that many did not bring their wives and families 
over from their countries of origin. However, a sizeable proportion did marry and/or enter 
into relationships with locals,88 and in this way, families and communities did come about. 
These new families and their children, who were of mixed race and culture, continued to 
experience difficulties in matters of social integration, acceptance and equality of treatment 
right through to the interwar period. This was partially due to factors of lesser economic 
and social class, as well as outright racism and prejudice.89 Efforts were made to organise 
communities together for cultural purposes, including cultural and religious activities for 
children. Where difficulties and discrimination were encountered in working conditions 
and other aspects of social life, efforts were made to organise and represent these 
communities, putting forward relevant complaints and demands.90 
 
Mention must also be made of the Liverpool Muslim Institute and its founder – Abdullah 
(William) Quilliam. Founded in the late 19th Century, Quilliam and his Institute engaged in 
                                                          
87 Ansari The Infidel Within (2004), pp.41-44, Halliday, Britain’s First Muslims (2010). 
88 Ansari, The Infidel Within (2004), pp. 98-103. 
89 Ibid., Ch.4. 
90 See Fred Halliday, Britain’s First Muslims: portrait of an Arab community (London: IB Tauris, 2010). 
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numerous social and philanthropic works including the establishment of schools, an 
orphanage, congregational religious services, and publishing a journal – The Crescent.91 
Quilliam’s story is particularly interesting as his legacy has enjoyed longevity and as well as 
a recent surge in interest;92 and although some efforts have been made to portray Quilliam 
and his community of British Muslims as a historical model for an active yet 
quintessentially ‘native’ Islam, all evidence points to Quilliam and many of his 
contemporaries not only being highly politicised and overtly self-conscious about their 
identities as British Muslims, but also rather upfront about their not so ‘British’ political 
views and affiliations.93 Quilliam even fulfilled something of an ambassadorial role in his 
relations with the Ottoman Sultan as well as with dignitaries in various other Muslim lands 
– earning from the former the accolade of ‘Shaykh ul Islam of the British Isles’.  
 
Other personalities included Lord Rowland Headley who served as president of the British 
Muslim Society and who travelled for Hajj with an Egyptian delegation94 yet (perhaps 
understandably given his position in politics) was not as strident as Quilliam was in his 
criticism of the Empire’s overseas policies. Nonetheless, he did make representations to the 
government on behalf of British Muslims. In 1916 he petitioned Austin Chamberlain, the 
Secretary of State for India requesting that a mosque be built in London ‘at the country’s 
                                                          
91 Op.Cit., pp. 35-6.  
92 Quilliam and many of the endeavours with which he was associated are often cited as among the first 
British Muslim communities which organised and identified collectively on the basis of their shared faith; 
including among them prominent numbers of (native) converts. An Abdullah Quilliam Society has been 
active in Liverpool since 1998, with the aim of restoring and making functional once again the site of 
‘England’s first historical mosque and Islamic institution’ cf. the society’s website: www.abdullahquilliam.com 
[accessed on 11th June 2013]. From an altogether different perspective, Quilliam’s name has been adopted by 
a recently-established ‘counter-extremism think tank’ – The Quilliam Foundation (est. 2008) which sees him 
as a figurehead emblematic of a ‘genuine British Islam, … free from the bitter politics of the Arab and 
Muslim world’ cf. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/about-us.html [accessed on 15th September 2008], 
this last assertion drawing some objection from those pointing to Abdullah Quilliam’s quite overt affiliations 
with politics and political leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, and his moments of open criticism of the 
British Empire and support for the Khilafa cf. Yahya Birt ‘Abdullah Quilliam: Britain’s first Islamist?’ 
http://www.yahyabirt.co.uk/?p=144 (25th January 2008) [accessed on 10th June 2013]. In support of this 
view, Geaves, Islam in Victorian Britain: the life and times of Abdullah Quilliam (2010), the only comprehensive 
biographical monograph on Quilliam, devotes two chapters to Quilliam’s international politics and activism. 
He argues that ‘Quilliam is being reinvented in some circles to provide narratives of integration’, and that far 
from eschewing Arab and Muslim politics: ‘when it came to conflict between the West and the Islamic 
Majority world, … He (Quilliam) was not beyond threatening the British governments of his time with the 
prospect of inciting the Muslims of the Empire to rise up in the cause of injustices inflicted upon fellow 
Muslims. It is unlikely that his fatwa could have achieved this but he was ready to do it. Such behaviour, if 
undertaken by a Muslim leader today, would be labelled extremism’ pp. 306-7. Interestingly, the updated 
version of the Quilliam Foundation website now omits any mention of Abdullah Quilliam [accessed on 11th 
June 2013]. 
93 Lengthy articles in The Islamic Review (archives at: www.wokingmuslim.org ) are devoted to debating the 
rights and wrongs of the empire’s policies abroad and the nature of loyalty to the ummah. 
94 A collection of archives relating to Lord Headley is available at the website of the Woking Muslim Mission: 
http://wokingmuslim.org/pers/headley/ [accessed on 15th May 2013]. 
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expense… in memory of the Muslim soldiers who have died fighting for the Empire’,95 and 
later travelled to various Muslim countries seeking contributions and support towards the 
London Mosque Fund.  
 
Abdullah Yusuf Ali, a lawyer in the Indian Civil Service (better known for his widely 
published English translation of the Qur’an) exemplifies a British Muslim who’s political 
stance was one of almost unquestioning loyalty to the government and crown. Although a 
British subject (not citizen), Yusuf Ali married and settled in England and maintained close 
ties with the establishment through correspondence and personal relationships with key 
figures. During the Great War, his enthusiasm for assisting the war effort, and answering 
‘the call of the Empire’96 was warm and eagerly expressed. Indeed his dedication was 
rewarded when he was later chosen on several occasions to join international government 
delegations and to represent the government. For instance in a 1918 mission to Scandinavia 
and at the post-World War I Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Here and in several speeches 
and writings, Yusuf Ali expressed at times a reverential, even jingoistic admiration and 
loyalty to the British Empire,97 a stance which was unpalatable to many of his 
contemporaries, given misgivings among Muslims in Britain about supporting the war 
effort against the Ottoman Empire.98  
 
During the interwar period, there were notable moments of significant political 
mobilisation among Muslim communities in other parts of the UK. Arab Muslim seamen 
in South Shields organised to protest against rife discrimination and vilification both from 
among co-workers, and the communities in which they lived. When the Muslim seamen 
regularly demanded representation within the National Union of Seamen, they were faced 
with refusal and the union indulged in further attacks using popular derogatory stereotypes 
to further victimise them.99 Ali Said was one key figure who was vocal in making the case 
for the Arabs’ ‘right to employment on equal terms with white sailors’.100 Facing similar 
challenges, Arab and Somali seamen in Cardiff also organised to campaign against racist 
discrimination and to demand equal treatment. Some Muslim seamen collaborated with 
                                                          
95 Lord Headley to Austin Chamberlain 23rd March 1916, quoted in Ansari, ‘Introduction’ in The Making of the 
East London Mosque ed. by Ansari (2011), p.11. 
96 M A Sherif, Searching for Solace: A biography of Abdullah Yusuf Ali (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1994), 
p.45. 
97 Ibid. for instance cf. p.46 which mentions Yusuf Ali’s lavish praise for ‘the admirable manner’ in which 
accommodations had been made, and care taken of the welfare of Indian soldiers on the European fronts. 
98 Ansari, The Infidel Within (2004), p.103. 
99 Lawless, From Ta’izz to Tyneside (1995), pp.167-8. 
100 Op. Cit., p.113. 
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other ‘black’ seamen, joining the Cardiff Coloured Seamen’s Committee, and later the 
South Wales Association for the Welfare of Coloured People. Others made representations 
from within Muslim or Somali groups such as the Islamia Allawia Friendly Society, holding 
public meetings and running poster campaigns.101 
 
Each of the above examples illustrate together how the existence of a self-ascribed, 
politically and socially active British Muslim identity dates back to the 19th  and early 20th 
centuries – and that the nature and form of their politics was remarkably diverse, following 
no single pattern and reflecting the diversity of each of their other origins, affiliations and 
relationships both in Britain and abroad. In the sections that follow, I will show how the 
second half of the 20th Century was decisively formative in determining the driving issues 
behind the nascent Muslim identity politics. 
 
2.3 Identity politics, race relations policy and equality in the UK 
2.3.1 Politics of religious identity: 
It seems appropriate here to reiterate my understanding and usage of the term ‘identity 
politics’.102 It refers to the use of identity as a primary or defining characteristic for 
individuals or groups in the sphere of politics. It sees identity as a factor that is separate 
from self-interest when it comes to political negotiations103 in its nature as an integral, or 
‘constitutive’ aspect of a person’s being.104 Identity can also be considered as something 
worthy of special respect or recognition, either because it is an unchosen aspect of 
someone’s existence (such as gender or race), or because it relates to conscientious 
decisions (such as religion) which are widely thought to deserve special respect due to the 
gravity/importance that they command. The obvious difference between these two 
descriptions is that in the case of race and gender, disadvantage and discrimination 
experienced on account of these unchosen characteristics is, in the most part, more readily 
apparent and easier to prove. As for religion, there are both practical and theoretical 
obstacles that arise in the articulation of a politics of identity. Practically speaking, there is 
far greater room for debate as to where to set definitions and boundary lines. Moreover 
there are also a number of theoretical hurdles. Noteworthy among these are: firstly, the 
apparent paradox between a ‘religious politics of identity’ and the age-old liberal principle 
                                                          
101 Ibid. 
102 There have been numerous definitions put forward for the term ‘identity politics’, as discussed by Mary 
Bernstein, ‘Identity Politics’ Annual Review of Sociology Vol.31 (2005), pp.47-74.  
103 Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p.9. 
104 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
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that conviction and belief should be firmly matters of choice, beyond official control or 
restriction105 – be it by a state, or by group or community hierarchies which have often 
been observed to flourish and benefit from the cultivation of such politics.106 Secondly, 
there is a subsequent question: granted that freedom of belief is to be considered as 
‘special’, can the wider political community be required to assist a religious citizen in 
bearing any consequences of their belief – ones which prove particularly cumbersome 
against a backdrop of contrasting/opposing socio-political norms?107  
 
Supporters of identity politics vary in the role that they see for it, ranging from those who 
envisage it to be of temporary necessity, until sufficient headway is made in rectifying 
present injustices, to those who look to an ‘ideal of diversity’,108 where political recognition 
for identity is available .  
 
2.3.2 Race relations policy in the 1960s and 70s: 
The practical problem at the heart of the question of equality as has been outlined in my 
introductory chapter, is that of how to facilitate a pluralist polity where the gradual 
establishment of ‘newly arrived’ minority groups has prompted a fresh look at existing 
political set-ups and raised questions as to how well they may (or may not) serve the cause 
of equality in this context. In the UK, it was this sort of concern that played a decisive role 
in pushing forward impetus for a race relations strategy among liberal (Labour) politicians 
during the late 1960s.109 With the increasingly permanent settlement of the UK’s African-
Caribbean and South Asian communities, both regions formerly linked to the British 
                                                          
105 Of course there is a whole debate to be had as to whether, and the extent to which, beliefs and belonging 
to religious or cultural groups are ‘chosen’. The question is addressed in some detail by Susan Mendus in ‘The 
tigers of wrath and the horses of instruction’ in Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration ed. by John Horton 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993); Bhikhu Parekh, ‘The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political 
Philosophy’ in The Rights of Minority Cultures ed. by Will Kymlicka (Oxford: OUP, 1995) and Modood, 
Multiculturalism: a civic idea (2007), Ch.2. 
106 Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture (2007). 
107 I take this terminology from Peter Jones, ‘Bearing the Consequences of Belief’ in Contemporary Political 
Philosophy: An Anthology ed. by Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). Jones draws a 
distinction between burdens of belief and consequences of belief. The former comprising of ‘demands intrinsic to 
a belief system’, invariably personal in nature, and ones for which the bearer would not suggest/request 
assistance from others in society. Consequences, in contrast, are more far-reaching in their impact [e.g. faith 
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those of the majority.  
108 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990), p.158. 
109 Erik Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France: ideas and policymaking since the 1960s (Cambridge, New York, 
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Empire and now part of the Commonwealth,110 the sentiment that policy needed to 
consider the implications of how these new communities and their members were to be 
best catered for by the state in view of the specific challenges of discrimination and 
inequality that they faced became more widespread and accepted.  
 
It was in this spirit that the first race relations legislation was passed in 1965, in the wake of 
notable incidents of racial strife and heated public debate on matters of immigration and 
race relations. Central to the emerging race relations strategy during this ‘liberal hour’ of 
British politics was the increasingly apparent fact that contemporary legal and social norms 
did not make illegitimate the arbitrary differential treatment or discrimination against 
certain sections/members of society on the basis of their race or ethnicity. As a result, the 
direction of policy development was deeply concerned with managing in tandem the two 
related challenges of immigration and of race relations. Both those on the left and on the 
right of British politics were increasingly aware of the need to rectify features of unfair 
differential treatment in each of these two areas.  
 
As for immigration, by this point there was a clear sense that during the 1950s and 1960s 
there had passed unchallenged discrimination with respect to members of the ‘New 
Commonwealth’. One illustration of this type of attitude was the visible use of the 
‘pressure to emigrate’ argument in public (immigration) institutions, differentiating between 
white and non-white immigrants and suggesting that the latter were ‘more likely’ to utilise 
illegitimate methods of gaining entry into the UK on the basis of the greater political and 
economic incentives that they had to leave their home countries;111 an argument which with 
time was identified by both the political right and left to be indefensible. On the other 
hand, it was becoming much more widely felt that tangible measures needed to be taken 
(and needed to be seen to be taken) in order to minimise any possibility for social conflict 
or disturbances to public order. The development of a race relations strategy was to keep in 
check any potential threat of such disturbances to public order with its goal of facilitating 
the integration of the newly arrived immigrant communities. An important factor to the 
achievement of these goals was to place some limit on immigration numbers, so as to allow 
(already arrived) new migrants the space to settle and establish some ‘demographic 
                                                          
110 This point being relevant to the understanding of historical connections between these newly arrived 
communities and their home in the UK, their reasons for settlement there (post-war labour market) and the 
relationships and perceptions of power between them and the UK. 
111 Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), p.111. 
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stability’, and to allow the majority the space and time to adjust. In this way, it was argued 
that conditions for more lasting integration of immigrants would be better facilitated.112 
 
That instances of discrimination such as those mentioned above could (and did) pass 
unchallenged by the law was considered problematic, and is indeed problematic by the 
standards of the perspectives on equality that I have discussed above. The professed aims 
and objectives of the race relations strategies that successive governments pursued naturally 
varied and fluctuated in their emphases, just as they were coloured by the perspectives of 
different key players and the prevalent tone, discourse and pressing issues of politics. 
Nonetheless, we can with some accuracy extract a sense for the main ideals that policy-
makers argued they were working towards. Key to these ideals was the goal of cohesion in 
community relations,113 and that of the integration of newly arrived minorities into the fabric 
and machinery of British politics and society.114 In the articulation and understanding with 
which both of these goals were presented, the achievement of equality for individuals from 
the minority groups in question with those who were part of majorities in society was held 
as central, and legislation sought to lay down specific expectations and legal norms in this 
regard.115  
 
It has been argued that much of this new political attitude to racism and discrimination was 
informed on one hand by the successive Labour governments’ concerns with the direction 
that the immigration debate was taking and their anxiety to be seen to be ‘balancing’ 
apprehensions on immigration which called for limits on it, with efforts to tackle racial 
discrimination.116 Race relations were the subject of intense political and public attention 
during this period, as racism, biological or cultural, at various levels in British society in the 
1950s and 1960s engendered resistance to it by those groups at its receiving end. Out of 
these antagonistic interactions emerged a certain kind of race/ethnic politics of identity. 
The outbreak of race riots in the Notting Hill area of London in 1958 only intensified racial 
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tensions in the eyes of many.117 Occurrences such as these which grabbed national 
attention gave politicians no choice but to make efforts to deal with some of the grievances 
that fuelled them.  
 
The establishment of race relations legislation was one way of doing this, and the laws that 
were passed outlawed discrimination that had been occurring in areas of public life 
including education, employment, housing and public services, as well as covering 
incitement to racial hatred.118 Such measures were not introduced all at once and there were 
several revisions and developments on the initial Race Relations Act (1965) – perhaps the 
most notable being the 1976 Race Relations Act which established the Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE). In the discussion that preceded the 1976 Act, the government made 
clear that its aims were achieving equality of opportunity and integration for the ‘older’ first 
generation ethnic minority immigrants to the UK as well as for their children who as the 
second and third generations, it acknowledged, were facing challenges of their own, despite 
their having been born, brought up and educated in the UK.119 
 
With this formalisation of race relations strategy through statute and the establishment of 
specialist institutions, UK equalities policy entered a new era. Whereas previously issues 
around race were largely only discussed in connection with immigration (and often 
negatively, in relation to concerns around immigration), this new era saw race relations and 
the tackling of discrimination emerge as a permanent and pressing domestic issue. This 
development was paralleled by a growth in the number and prominence of civil society and 
campaigns groups with race at the heart of their agendas. While many of these groups 
developed organically out of genuinely held experiences of prejudice and discrimination 
that existed at a grass roots level in their respective communities, it can also be observed 
that they could not but have been influenced and encouraged, at least in the way that they 
were framed, by the pursuance of a race relations strategy in government circles. 
 
Thus began the development of race identity politics in government-community relations. 
It was recognised by actors on both sides that, up until this point, little had been done to 
                                                          
117 David Cesarani, ‘The Changing Character of Citizenship and Nationality in Britain’ in Citizenship, 
Nationality and Migration in Europe ed. by David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook (London: Routledge, 1996), 
pp.57-73 and p.65. 
118 The specified categories of discrimination that were mentioned were those on the grounds of ‘colour, race, 
or ethnic or national origins’. However, none of these categories were defined in the legislation, leaving 
judges to define how they would be understood in the courts. Race Relations Act 1968. 
119 Sooben, The Origins of the Race Relations Act (1990), pp.9-10. 
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incorporate the newly settled communities of the UK into the nation’s political structures 
and public life, and many people attributed the realities of discrimination and inequality 
among citizens to this absence.120 By this argument, the equality of citizens from minority 
groups remained only a distant aspiration so long as they could still (legally) suffer on one 
hand from the effects of prejudice and discrimination in areas of public life (such as 
allocation and treatment in employment and housing) and on the other, were structurally 
disadvantaged when it came to engagement with political institutions and articulating their 
viewpoints and concerns on a par with other citizens who ‘fitted’ much more easily into the 
majority background culture and norms. The unacceptability of the first of these is hardly a 
matter of much disagreement among theorists – this sort of discrimination is unjustifiable 
by any sound conception of equality. As for the second, the arguments of recognition 
theorists would strongly advocate that measures should be taken to equalise conditions and 
to enable minorities in their civic participation by means of their representation or wider 
‘presence’. In this light, the proactive efforts of government to invest energy and resources 
into the development of race relations and integration policy was seen as commendable – 
since it signifies a deliberate step towards recognising and thus assisting otherwise 
unjustifiably disadvantaged sections of society in attaining parity with a majority who are by 
‘default’ in a more advantaged position when it comes to articulating their concerns and 
engaging with the state and its related institutions.121  
 
2.3.3 A changed political agenda for equality: 
The establishment of race identity politics represented a key milestone in the path towards 
equality for newly arrived minorities in the UK. The placing of race relations firmly on the 
political agenda had the trickle-down effect of setting standards and influencing a sort of 
‘culture change’ in national government across the board as well as local government in a 
way that meant that racial discrimination could no longer be overlooked, and that 
concerted efforts were made to assess the exclusion of minority communities (either in 
presence or in perspective) from the political arena, since this was deemed to be a 
contributory factor to inequality, or at the least, a reason for the belated action from 
authorities to tackle it. Naturally, it was an evolving field and policy developed over time in 
its scope and the extent of the protection from discrimination that it established for 
minorities. Back in the 1960s, the initiation of a race relations strategy was considered a 
milestone in itself. Four decades later, the Race Relations Amendment Act of 2000 which 
                                                          
120 Modood, Multicultural Politics (2005), Introduction pp. 1-26. 
121 Favell, Philosophies of Integration (2001), pp.111-116. 
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followed the 1999 Macpherson Report122 was hailed as a landmark step forward, 
significantly in its singling out of ‘institutional racism’ as a major obstacle to the realisation 
of equality for minorities. This was defined as ‘the collective failure of an organisation to 
provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture 
or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which 
amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and 
racial stereotyping’.123 The significance of this definition and its application to the 
Metropolitan Police in the wake of the Report cannot be overstated. For the first time, a 
major state  institution was taken to task for discriminating against minorities, and made to 
bear collective responsibility, thus preventing shortcomings from being blamed on a few 
‘bad apples’. This acknowledgement is credited with precipitating a cultural shift within the 
police service,124 as well as providing strong grounds for accountability and criticism in the 
future. To what extent this cultural shift has actually taken place remains questionable given 
the recent media disclosures regarding the efforts of Metropolitan Police officers at 
concealment of information regarding their ‘spying’ of the Stephen Lawrence’s family and 
friends.125 
 
The route of multiculturalism that Britain followed was one which differed from the 
approach of some of her neighbours on the continent. For example, France, during this 
time (and enduringly) placed emphasis on the integration of minorities into a more rigid 
conception of a national culture. In the UK, the race relations agenda had as its goal a 
‘multicultural nationalism’.126 This is to say, a vision of a nation where a common 
understanding of civic rights and responsibilities and an idea of a shared future would keep 
the nation together.  
 
Once the race relations agenda had become an established part of the political arena, it set 
a precedent, almost as a model for community-government/establishment relations – one 
                                                          
122 Sir William Macpherson et al., The report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, into the murder of the black teenager 
Stephen Lawrence in 1993 (London: The Stationery Office, 1999). 
123 Ibid. 
124 Trevor Phillips, giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on 28th April 
2009 said that the term ‘institutional racism’ ‘was absolutely critical in shaking police forces up and down the 
country out of their complacency’. Home Affairs Committee ‘The Macpherson Report – ten years on’ (14th 
July 2009), available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmhaff/427/42702.htm#evidence 
[accessed on 5th August 2013].  
125 Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, ‘Police ‘smear’ campaign targeted Stephen Lawrence’s friends and family’ The 
Guardian 23rd June 2013. 
126 Phrase taken from Favell, Philosophies of Integration (2001), p.116. 
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against which all future endeavours in addressing equality for minority communities would 
frame their claims. Once certain standards of protection from discrimination and equal 
treatment became established for racial/ethnic minorities, future claims for equality for 
religious minority groups (namely Muslims) were able to ground their arguments not just in 
the ‘difference/recognition’ philosophical justifications that have been discussed, but also 
more practically in the argument for parity of treatment with other minorities, within this 
model of equalities strategy that was being developed. 
 
2.4 Muslims and Identity Politics – from subsistence as a primary concern, to the 
longer view 
 
Although the presence of Islam in the UK can historically be traced back to over a 
thousand years ago, the settlement of substantial Muslim populations in Britain is a fairly 
recent development. The first consistent and sizeable waves of immigration began in the 
post-war period, during the 1950s and 60s, and included groups of young (male) manual 
labourers from Yemen and the Indian subcontinent who after initially coming over to 
work, settled in the UK as economic migrants. In time, there grew a trend of chain 
migration as these first migrants were joined by their families and began to establish 
themselves more permanently. For these early communities, the preoccupation was to 
secure the basic necessities of life such as a steady income and a roof over their heads. 
Settling in industrial towns or the inner-city areas of larger cities, many first generation 
immigrants maintained links with their countries of origin, through family members that 
had remained to whom they might pay visits or send financial assistance and through the 
fairly concentrated settlement patterns that they had happened to follow upon immigration 
– whereby whole sections of communities from ‘back home’ settled in close proximity to 
one another, sometimes in near-replication of their original neighbourhoods.  
 
At this stage, interaction for these early communities127 with the ‘public sphere’ was limited 
in a large part to the relevant authorities and institutions providing for the needs of work 
and very basic housing.128 Permanence of settlement did not feature strongly in the initial 
aspirations of these first migrants. Concurrently, on the part of the ‘host’ authorities and 
                                                          
127 I use the term ‘communities’ wherever possible throughout this thesis, in preference to ‘community’ which 
gives inaccurate impressions of artificial homogeneity. However I am also conscious of the possible 
connotations of ‘communities’ as plural monolithic blocs and of the fact that there will be many Muslim 
individuals relevant to my discussion who will not want to associate with any ‘community’ at all. 
128 Jorgen Nielsen, ‘The Impact of Islam in Contemporary Western Europe’ CSIC Occasional Papers 
(Birmingham, 2004), pp.1-3. 
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the state, there is little to suggest much expectation that these new immigrants would 
eventually settle permanently or that if they did, that much would be needed in the way of 
discussion regarding whether any strategy of integration might be required, what shape it 
should take and how it might be pursued. The impression that their stay in the UK would 
be a temporary one was an underlying assumption, one that was often expressed explicitly, 
and certainly implicitly, in the notable sparseness of any policy attempts to address the 
needs of these growing Muslim communities;129 or any serious efforts to study how things 
might progress into the long term. Indeed there are indications that in contrast to other 
large European states which were also in receipt of Muslim immigrant-workers during this 
period,130 no comparable British efforts were made to encourage it. On the contrary, there 
were expressions of hostility and unease in Whitehall, from both Labour and Conservative 
administrations regarding this latest wave of non-white immigration.131 
 
This is not to say that political interaction and engagement on the part of these emerging 
communities were entirely absent. On the contrary, a number of concerted campaigns are 
recorded to have taken place, which sought to highlight discrimination and unfair 
disadvantage that was present in areas such as employment and housing conditions, even 
from as far back as the early 20th Century.132 In addition to this, there were also a wide 
range of Muslim personalities who achieved considerable and often distinguished successes 
in public life, public service as well as in establishing business and professional ventures, 
quite often attaining consultative status and maintaining good relationships with key 
sections of government and the establishment. However, as noteworthy as these 
advancements were, they nonetheless should be differentiated from the type of identity 
politics which concerns the discussion at hand. The main difference being that they were 
conducted largely on a more localised, or micro-political level,133 whereas Muslim 
community organising in the later 20th Century featured a growth in focus on macro-
politics.  
                                                          
129 I refer here to their needs as immigrants/newcomers to the UK. Muslim/Asian or any other specific 
identity is not necessarily of significance at this point. 
130 Such as France and Germany, where incentives and specific ‘guest-worker’ programmes were instituted. 
131 Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain (Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp.4-5. 
132 For instance, campaigns by lascars (seamen) and other manual workers in the early 20th century on matters 
of their discriminatorily poor and unequal employment status and working/living conditions. Cf. Ansari, The 
Infidel Within (2004), Ch. 4 ‘Being Muslim in early twentieth-century Britain’. Note that the chosen names for 
workers’ societies and organisations more commonly reflected ethnic rather than religious identities – e.g. the 
Somali and Arab Clubs and the Indian Workers Association. Ibid., pp. 115-117. 
133 See Pnina Werbner, Imagined Diasporas among Manchester Muslims: the public performance of Pakistani transnational 
identity politics (New Mexico: School of American Research Press, 2002), and Alison Shaw, A Pakistani 
Community in Britain (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) for in-depth studies of micro-political engagement of 
Pakistani Muslim communities in the cities of Manchester and Oxford respectively. 
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Indeed, by the mid-late 20th Century, macro-politics became of increasing importance, as I 
shall explore later on in the following section. As with any cultural minority, questions of 
longer-term self-preservation inevitably arose, and these went hand in hand with instinctive 
concerns of how to secure interests which appeared not to be recognised by the state 
(who’s appreciation of their permanence was also belated). As we have seen, earlier efforts 
by the state to accommodate permanent settlement of new communities, through race 
relations legislation or through political inclusion initiatives were framed primarily in ethnic 
terms. These did not preclude the palpable feeling (by at least some) that an Islamic identity 
of some kind was worth cultivating and preserving as a positive value and a key component 
of identity and lifestyle. While of course there was inevitable overlap between culture and 
religion, and it is impossible to demarcate clear lines between experiences/perceptions of 
‘ethnic difference’ and ‘religious difference’; the religious component did feature to some 
noticeable degree even at the earliest stages – with importance being attached to the 
development of makeshift mosques and prayer rooms as well as arrangements for the halal 
slaughter of meat as possibly the two most noticeable of Muslim communal organising 
efforts during this time.134 During the later decades, as priorities began to shift, one key area 
where micro-level Muslim identity politics was initially most conspicuously played out on 
the ground was that of education. 
 
2.5 The first phase of community organising in the 20th Century 
2.5.1 Education and local Muslim identity politics – two Bradford case-studies: 
Thus the entry of these Muslim communities (as ‘Muslims’) into the political ‘public sphere’ 
was in effect a matter of circumstance rather than any intricately planned and executed 
strategy. One important factor in propelling this development forward was the emergence 
of the second generation, who in their own right markedly modified the scale, type and 
urgency of the primary concerns that their parents had held as newcomers to the UK. 
Children went to school and thus interacted with the ‘mainstream’ in ways that their 
parents may not have done. Other spheres of interaction that were necessarily entered into 
with the arrival and growth of families included the healthcare system and other public 
services. This demographic development coupled with the belated realisation and 
acceptance by many that they were now to be permanent residents of the UK led to a shift 
                                                          
134 The importance accorded especially to both of these primarily religious (although functionally more than 
‘just’ religious) features is demonstrated in the urgency with which new immigrants set about making 
arrangements for securing them, even before the arrival of family members. 
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in the self-perception and in turn, the aspiration of these communities. Whereas the first 
wave of worker-immigrants might have been content with the basic essentials of working 
and living, these new families now had changed priorities and sought to consolidate 
communities and consider their long-term survival in their new home.  
 
A key indicator of this new situation was the prevalence of education and education-related 
issues as the centre of Muslim political activism. The first coordinated efforts that were 
organised in this respect began during the 1960s. The Muslim Educational Trust (MET) 
was set up in 1966, and based in London to represent and cater for Muslim needs in 
national educational matters and curricula, as well as in areas of schooling where norms, 
practices and expectations were considered to pose difficulties or additional hurdles for 
observant Muslims. This ranged from providing guidance to parents on their rights in 
matters where there was some cultural apprehension,135 to the production of textbooks and 
school resources on Islam and Muslims that remain in use to this day.136 Increasingly 
emotive areas of contention relating to the educational and schools system included 
collective religious worship, physical and religious education, the provision of halal food, 
school uniform regulations and of course faith schools for Muslims. That these issues 
attracted both sufficient attention and determination for advocacy bodies, coordination and 
a degree of longer term vision to develop is evidence of the rising change in mindset and 
aspiration within Britain’s Muslim communities.  
 
Two examples can be used to illustrate that this heightened level of commitment to 
educational issues was significant of a shift in vision and priorities. The first is that of the 
Bradford Muslim Parents Association (BMPA), which along with the MET, in 1974 
fronted the campaign against the closure of Bradford’s last remaining girls-only secondary 
school.137 This campaign was prominently identified in the press with the case of an 
Abdullah Patel who withdrew his teenage daughter from full-time education at the co-
educational school that she was allocated to, in protest, and out of religious conviction – 
that ‘When a Muslim girl reaches puberty, she is not allowed to mix with males other than 
close relatives’. Both the understanding of the cause in question and the style of discourse 
that was used by the BMPA to articulate their position were essentially framed by an idea 
                                                          
135 For instance, the right to withdraw children from religious education lessons/assemblies, or to request 
adjustments to school uniform in compliance with Islamic dress. 
136 Ghulam Sarwar, Muslims and Education in the UK (London: MET, 1983). 
137 ‘Bradford Muslims’ 5-point plea on children’s schools’ The Times, 7th January 1974 and ‘Muslim girls’ 
schooling’ in Letters to the Editor, The Times, 18th January 1974. 
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of an ‘Islamic’ culture and identity – one which in this context, it was imperative to protect 
and nurture as far as possible in the younger generation. Moreover, the very idea of a 
‘Muslim community’, although by no means new,138 was being used to mobilise a fresh and 
enthusiastic new constituency which was increasingly aware of the potency of manpower 
that it had the potential to tap into. This notion was to prove both necessary and 
instrumental in shoring up legitimacy for both the existence of Muslim representative and 
lobby bodies, and for the claims that they argued for.  
 
Later on in 1984, the Honeyford affair also sparked off heated campaigning and activism as 
an expression of strongly felt views on education and schools from Muslim parents. This 
widely reported affair involved Ray Honeyford, the head teacher of Drummond Middle 
School in Bradford, a school attended overwhelmingly by Muslim pupils. His writings on 
race and education, most prominently those in the right-wing Salisbury Review, took a highly 
critical position on what he perceived as regressive accommodations that were being made 
in Bradford schools towards large Asian Muslim populations, including the provision of 
halal meat in school meals, religious instruction by Muslim leaders, as well as claims from 
the BMPA for single sex schools and the conversion of five state schools into Muslim 
voluntary-aided schools.139 
 
Honeyford’s writings provoked heated protest and local unrest among parents and the 
community, in response to his criticism of unfair ‘accommodations’ that were being made 
for Muslim and Asian children in schools and more generally of what he clearly saw as 
regressive and intrinsically inferior immigrant cultures.140 With Honeyford seen to be 
personifying opposition to the very concerns that many Muslims had for their children in 
the education system, the level of organised and vocal objection to his continued position 
as headmaster – through political campaigns in school and local government, boycotts, 
picketing and the media – was telling of a confident solidarity in the community that had 
found cause in defending and nurturing what were understood to be Islamic aspects of 
                                                          
138 Of course there were self-conscious ‘Muslim communities’ in various parts of the UK during the 19th 
Century, as evidenced for example by the Liverpool Muslim Institute (1887), the Woking Mosque (1889). 
Additionally, a glance at any early copy of the Woking Muslim Mission’s The Islamic Review (first published in 
1913) will demonstrate how the idea of an Islamic community and indeed of a wider ummah were often 
popularised and widely used concepts, that had been functioning for the preceding decades . 
139 Halstead, Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity (1988). Cf. pp.56-71 especially for fuller details of the 
contents of Honeyford’s articles. 
140 Ibid. In fact, Honeyford had been writing articles in various publications on the topic of multiculturalism 
and education since 1982, and the offending Salisbury Review article did not provoke protest until it was picked 
up by the press two months after its publication. (cf. Halstead, 1988, pp. 237-247) 
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identity that were felt to be under threat – either through external hostility (as with 
Honeyford) or through their own previous lack of adequate attention towards its 
preservation. Significantly, one of the leading opposition groups to Honeyford was the 
Bradford Council for Mosques which claimed wide representation of the city’s Muslim 
population and commanded a certain ‘pressure group’ authority, and the campaign was also 
supported by the (Muslim) Lord Mayor of Bradford, Muhammad Ajeeb. The campaign 
grew quickly, attracting some support from other Asian and ethnic minorities, but also 
drawing some opposition, to the extent that it soon dominated much of Bradford local 
politics and gained significant coverage in the national mainstream media, including a BBC 
Panorama documentary. Honeyford’s critics accused him of ‘cultural chauvinism’ and 
mobilised parent governors at the school, organised petitions, and withdrew their children. 
Honeyford, on the other hand, protested that his free speech was being curtailed and 
strongly resisted calls to resign.141 By the close of 1985, Honeyford had been suspended, 
with the whole episode turning him into something of a martyr for free speech in the eyes 
of his supporters,142 and while it is not clear that the Muslim campaigners considered the 
Honeyford affair in quite the same light, the controversy was definitely a major 
demonstration of the organising power that Muslim identity politics could have, and in this 
sense, it could be considered to have been a pre-cursor to the Rushdie affair. 
 
With the state also waking up to the new multicultural realities in the country’s population, 
a revision of aspects of the education system was ushered in via the Swann Report of 1985. 
Boldly entitled ‘Education for All’, it looked (among other things) into the various 
challenges relating to religious, cultural and linguistic diversity in schools, and made 
recommendations as to which avenues would be most appropriate for schools and 
government to pursue. Among the increasingly customary ‘Muslim community responses’ 
which were put forward to the report’s findings by bodies such as the Muslim Educational 
Trust and the Union of Muslim Organisations, there was a clear sense that the report had 
hardly gone far enough. For example, there was consternation regarding a lack of uptake 
on requests for Islamic religious instruction for Muslim pupils and ‘official’ adjustments to 
uniform.143 This is not to mention the growing momentum in calls for the establishment of 
government-funded Muslim faith schools – the earliest of which seems to have come in 
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143 UMO National Muslim Education Council, ‘Religious Education: a Muslim perspective’ (NMEC, London, 
1997) and Ghulam Sarwar, ‘British Muslims and Schools: proposals for progress’ (MET, London, 1991). 
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1975, in Bradford.144 However, there was progress in that the report itself was 
commissioned, and that it seriously considered these issues, leaving (at least overtly) flexible 
recommendations for community cooperation and dialogue with schools and for 
community use of school buildings out of school hours for cultural/religious 
supplementary education. This was a sure sign that the landscape was beginning to change 
and that Muslim community groups were making some, even if minimal, headway as 
recognised interlocutors and stakeholders in the formulation of policy – a theme that I shall 
return to in greater detail Chapter 3. 
 
Parallel to developments in local campaigning for ‘Muslim’ issues, attempts were also being 
made to establish unity organisations with a national focus that sought to bring together 
Muslims from across the UK, and to represent them. This was also a period when Islamic 
movements with their origins in the Muslim world began to build a visible UK presence. In 
seeking to cater to their members who had by now settled with their families in the UK, 
they were significantly concerned with the notion of preserving and promoting Muslim 
identity, as they understood it. In remainder of this section, I will look at these two 
developments in further detail. 
 
2.5.2 In search of unity in the 1960s and 70s: 
 
i. Federation of Student Islamic Societies of the UK and Ireland (FOSIS): 
Formally established in 1963, FOSIS can claim to be the oldest continuously established 
British Muslim community organisation. Although its focus was on unity of student bodies, 
in its earlier years FOSIS also fulfilled the role of voicing community concerns and 
aspirations in a range of forums. The demographics of Muslim students in Britain during 
the 60s and 70s contrasted with the present day in that a far greater proportion of them 
were foreign students.145 Some of these made their stay in the UK temporary, whilst others 
eventually chose to settle with their families. There was also the notable difference of an 
older age profile, since many were postgraduate students who had already completed 
preliminary degrees. These characteristics had an impact on the key priorities and concerns 
of the organisation. Finally, the fact that FOSIS was the main and only national Muslim 
community organisation in Britain during this early period meant that inevitably there were 
                                                          
144 Halstead, Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity (1988). 
145 Dr Hany El-Banna, founder of Islamic Relief and early FOSIS alumnus, quoted in ‘Taking a Smile to the 
World’, an interview with him in emel issue 5, May/June 2004. 
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non-student individuals who got involved, if only for the lack of other available avenues 
towards community service and activism. 
 
The early FOSIS grappled with issues such as the preservation of Islamic culture in a 
‘hostile’ and ‘permissive’ environment.146 A survey of speeches from the organisation’s 
annual conferences as well as articles from its magazine, The Muslim, offers an insight into 
some of the issues with which FOSIS membership were preoccupied. Among the most 
popular themes was that of an ‘Islamic movement’, which although rarely defined, was 
understood to imply international efforts to establish Islamic governments in the Muslim 
world, or at the least to oppose the various post-colonial dictatorial regimes in the region 
which were largely seen as being puppets of ‘the West’. Additionally, the Islamic education 
and upbringing of children,147 and the role of women were occasionally discussed in its 
publications, with attitudes tellingly in favour of the more ‘traditional’ roles for men and 
women.148  
 
Thus priorities that were advocated in speeches and articles included the Islamic education 
of children and the preservation of culture and religious values. There were also examples 
of political activism and efforts at representing the community’s demands at times when it 
was felt that it had been slighted. In 1970, FOSIS along with others organised a protest 
march to Trafalgar Square, objecting to an offensive portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad 
in an article in The Times newspaper.149  
 
FOSIS also maintained working links with a range of community initiatives that were on 
the increase during this period. These included the Muslim Students Society, the UK 
Islamic Mission, and the London Islamic Circle, amongst others. Additionally, FOSIS 
engaged in criticism of what it perceived to be corruption and indolence on the part of out 
of touch community leaders – a key example being the London Central Mosque. The 
Mosque was a regular target in the Federation’s publications and its director and trustees 
were chastised for being aloof towards the community’s needs and aspirations. Calls were 
regularly made for the replacement of its foreign-appointed staff with people who were 
actively involved in the community’s day to day life, who would be able to run the 
mosque’s affairs with more faithful reference to the community’s needs and aspirations.  
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ii. Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO): 
Perhaps the earliest effort at creating a comprehensive nationwide platform for unity and 
representation, the UMO was originally set up in 1970 by Dr Syed Aziz Pasha, a lawyer of 
Indian origins. This was the first organisation of its kind in bringing together Muslim 
bodies from a range of focuses and geographical bases.150 It appears to have been inspired 
by, or at least had some very initial involvement from diplomatic personalities, specifically 
the Egyptian government and its diplomatic representatives in the UK, who were 
reportedly very keen to get some sort of unifying project off the ground.151 However, it was 
not long before Dr Pasha himself firmly took the reins of the organisation and he was to 
dominate it for the next four decades. 
 
As an idea, it appears to have fairly advanced thinking for its time. In fact it has been hailed 
as ‘premature’ by some, a nod to the limited enthusiasm that the organisation received 
from within the Muslim community. The UMO, and specifically Dr Pasha, tirelessly pushed 
for a ‘Muslim Bill of Rights’ throughout the 70s and 80s, at a time when many other British 
Muslim organisations were preoccupied by foreign Islamist causes or at least substantially 
influenced by personalities from abroad.  
 
However, despite its comparative foresight, sources suggest that the UMO made very 
limited headway – even at two and a half decades old, it seemed to have made little 
progress in bringing together any significant range of community efforts. At the same time, 
its main campaign causes were very slow to progress during this time period, indicating that 
its achievements were scarce. For example, the organisation’s Silver Jubilee publication 
showcases the highlights of its first 25 years. The section on ‘national issues’ includes a 
campaign agenda with priority issues on which the UMO sought to lobby government and 
                                                          
150 While FOSIS [est. 1963] technically preceded the UMO as an umbrella/unity group, its remit has officially 
been limited to student Islamic societies. Although, as I illustrate above, its interests did often extend beyond 
this, to family issues, education and international politics for instance, nonetheless, its reach and ambitions 
did not seek to concentrate on community leadership and representation in the same way that the UMO and 
its successors did. If anything, it became more focused and specialised over time on its student constituency, 
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remit. 
151 Cf. ‘A Propaganda Exercise’ in The Muslim (October 1969) p.24, where claims are made that plans were in 
place to establish a Muslim unity organisation with Dr Pasha as its head, modelled on the Cairo-based Young 
Men’s Muslim Association.  
Also cf. ‘Changing schemes for unity: ‘leaders’ left groping’ The Muslim (October 1970) pp.22-23 on the 
eventual withdrawal of Egyptian officials, and of initial support from the London Central Mosque from the 
scheme. The position of Secretary General then went to Dr Pasha who then proceeded to establish the 
organisation along with a handful of other individuals. 
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the main political parties. A 1979 letter sent to the leaders of all main parties outlines this 
agenda in the run up to the general election – a similar letter was circulated before the 1983 
election with practically identical wording and contents to the 1979 letter - giving the 
impression that achievements during the period in between had been too few to 
mention.152 
 
By the 1990s, the UMO had proved consistency and commitment through its regular 
community activities, which included conferences, youth excursions, celebrations of eid and 
milad ul nabi (the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday) - all of which took place annually. On the 
political engagement front its work also continued, with the most persistent campaign issue 
being a call for the application of Muslim family law as an option for British Muslims, as 
well as provisions for exemptions in matters of religious practice or sensitivity at school 
and the work place.153 Such representations were regularly rejected by the government 
officials and political figures to whom they were addressed, often on the grounds that they 
were unreasonable demands and a call to some sort of exceptional or separate treatment 
for Muslims.154  
 
The UMO’s potential to make progress in the political arena was marred by the limited 
scope of its appeal and outreach both within the various Muslim communities and towards 
government itself. Heavily dominated by the personality of Dr Pasha, there was little 
opportunity for the engagement of others beyond a small circle of individuals. Thus the 
organisation’s priorities and strategy were rarely revised, and often repetitive. Consequently, 
it became gradually clear that government officials and civil servants were seeking to build 
relations with a more contemporary, dynamic representative body that was more attuned to 
the grass roots. 
 
2.5.3 Organising centrally to preserve and promote identity: 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned locally-based campaigns, and early initiatives to unite 
and represent Muslims on an official level, there were also an increasing number of 
organisations on a grass-roots level that were established, for whom Muslim identity was a 
central focus.  These were without exception organisations that were heavily influenced, if 
                                                          
152 UMO, Union of Muslim Organisations of UK and Ireland, 1970 - 1995: a record of achievement (London, 1995). 
153 These included requests for official annual public holidays for Muslims on the two ‘Eid festivals. Cf. ibid. 
p.22. 
154 Cf. correspondences with the three main political parties reproduced in UMO 1970-1995 (1995), pp.29-39. 
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not directly linked with, Islamic political movements abroad – specifically in South Asia, 
and also in the Middle East. While they were not set up to formally represent Muslims as 
such, in the same way that the UMO or even FOSIS did, they did share a common 
preoccupation with Muslim identity – and with preserving it (especially among the younger 
generations), as well as promoting it (in the form of da’wa – the evangelical call to Islam). In 
doing so, several of these groups did occasionally venture into the field of political 
representation, even though this was not their primary or main purpose. When a second, 
and later, a third umbrella organisation were set up in the late 1980s and the late 1990s 
respectively (see Chapter 3 of this thesis, on UKACIA and the MCB), a great many of 
these Muslim community organisations threw their weight behind them, recognising the 
benefits of collective representation and a unified voice to the furtherance of claims-
making and engagement with the government. Moreover, many individuals from these 
various organisations later graduated on to hold leading roles in UKACIA and the MCB, 
having been primed through their involvement with several of these community 
organisations to then take on positions of communal leadership and representation. 
 
Trans-national Islamist movements, their UK branches and offshoots: 
To facilitate the profiling of these organisations, I will cast a brief glance at their origins, 
which, for the most part, were in Islamist movements from South Asia and the Middle 
East. A number of movements had been established in the post-colonial Muslim world to 
address what was felt to be a decline in the proper understanding and practice of faith. 
There were variations between them, but what they shared in common was an 
understanding that the faith of Islam and Muslim identity deserved, indeed demanded, a far 
greater centrality to society and every day life than they were being afforded. For purposes 
of clarity and space, I will group them into three broad categories: those which had 
minimal political engagement, those which sought to be actively engaged in the existing 
political system, and finally, those wanting to set up a separate or alternative political 
system. It is worth mentioning here that Sadek Hamid has conducted a useful illustration 
(and more elaborate mapping) of the various Muslim organisations in Britain, applying to 
them a typology set by Tariq Ramadan to reflect the spectrum of tendencies within 
contemporary Islamic activism.155 Following Ramadan, he places contemporary Muslim 
organisations under six categories: salafi literalism, scholastic traditionalism, political salafi 
                                                          
155 Ramadan’s typology is found in Tariq Ramadan, To be a European Muslim (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 
1999), and Hamid’s application of it to the British Muslim context is made in Sadek Hamid, ‘British Muslim 
young people: facts, features and religious trends’ Religion, State and Society (2011) Vol.39:2-3, pp.247-261. 
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literalism, salafi reformism, Sufism and liberal rational reformism. While Hamid’s analysis is 
of the contemporary landscape of British Muslim organisations, many of the groups he 
assesses were established during the period under discussion (1960s-1980s), hence it is 
useful to use his application as a starting point, and I will reproduce his visual 
representation of it here, for ease of reference. Hamid’s analysis156 can be roughly 
correlated to my three broad categories of political engagement, and I demonstrate this in 
Figures 1 and 2 (pages 222 and 223). However, it is important to point out that these 
classifications are not discrete, and that within these broad categories, there were cases of 
overlap, for instance, where certain puritanical organisations adopted radical methods or 
terminologies, as well as more intricate distinctions and differences within the broad 
categories. 
 
i. Puritanical – minimal political engagement: 
Those which I class as puritanical felt that for many Muslims, the understanding of piety 
had lapsed into a ‘blind’ adherence to rituals and cultural practices from which the faith of 
Islam needed to be ‘purified’. These included the Wahhabi movement of Saudi Arabia, 
which was at the forefront of modern Salafism. Salafism calls for a return to the two 
primary sources of Islam – the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and claims to follow al salaf al salih 
– the ‘pious predecessors’ – the earliest three generations of Muslims whom they regard to 
have practiced an Islam that was yet uncorrupted by cultural influences, in particular what 
was viewed as innovation and excess in the area of spirituality. In the UK, the pre-eminent 
salafi organisation was JIMAS (Jam’iyat Ihya Minhaj asSunnah), which translates to The 
Society for the Revival of the Prophetic Way. It was founded and led by Manwar Ali in 
1984 (throughout the 1980s and 1990s he was more commonly known by his kunya, as Abu 
Muntasir) and for the best part of a decade could claim to be the hub of Salafism in the 
UK.157 Taking off from foundations which had been laid by the Ahle Hadith movement158 
JIMAS attracted and brought together the younger generations of British Muslims who 
were drawn to the same theological positions. Salafism was defined by a ‘back-to-basics’ 
approach to religious practice and an ideal of Islam that was unadulterated by ‘innovation’ 
                                                          
156 Hamid, ‘British Muslim young people’ (2011). 
157 Sadek Hamid, ‘The Attraction of “Authentic” Islam: Salafism and British Muslim Youth’ in Global Salafism: 
Islam’s new religious movement ed. by Roel Meijer (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), pp.386-7. 
158 A network with its origins in 19th Century India, which (through settlement in the UK) had established 
mosques and headquarters in Birmingham.  In keeping with Salafi norms, the Ahle Hadith placed emphasis 
on reforming ‘innovated’ ‘Sufi practices and beliefs common among British Pakistanis’. Cf. Jonathan Birt, 
‘Wahhabism in the United Kingdom – manifestations and reactions’ in Transnational Connections and the Arab 
Gulf ed. by Madawi Al-Rasheed (Oxon: Routledge, 2005) pp.168-171. 
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such as the practice of following a madhab (Islamic jurisprudential school of thought),159 as 
well as a preference for stricter understandings of Islamic practice. For example some 
Salafis continued to consider music, various art forms and even photography or filming to 
be forbidden in Islam. But JIMAS were keen to make their discourse more relevant to the 
UK, for instance by adopting the English language in their meetings, rather than Urdu 
which had been preferred by their elders.160 JIMAS attracted many of the British Muslims 
who had studied at the Islamic University in Medina, and through this, a direct channel 
from the UK to Saudi state-sponsored theology in the form of heavily subsidised 
publications, religious preachers, and ultimately funding for mosques, was firmly 
established.161 This subsidisation of institutions, publications and preachers helped the 
influence of JIMAS and salafi thought to reach far wider audiences than their limited 
numbers would otherwise have allowed.162 
 
From 1995, schisms began to emerge within JIMAS, reflecting ongoing factionalism among 
Salafis in the Gulf region, and this led to the formation of breakaway groups.163 The most 
prominent of these was the Organisation of Ahl asSunnah Islamic Societies (OASIS), led 
by the Birmingham based Abu Khadeejah, (Abdul Wahid).164 OASIS took to siding with 
the official line of Saudi government scholars, which was loath to criticise corrupt regimes 
in the Muslim world, promoting instead the notion of ‘loyalty’ to the Muslim ruler. They 
argued that there was a more pressing need to correct ‘deviant’ beliefs and practices among 
Muslims that were rooted in culture, rather than to call for political reform. This led to 
their being dubbed rather dismissively as ‘Saudi Salafis’ or ‘Super Salafis’ by their 
opponents.165 Notwithstanding this criticism, ‘Saudi Salafis’ have also been credited with 
running important local community projects that have challenged the radicalisation 
narrative of Al Qaeda and drawn vulnerable youth away from it.166 This is a feature that is 
                                                          
159 Annabel Inge, Salafism in Britain: the new generation’s rebellion (unpublished MA thesis, 2008). 
160 Hamid, ‘The Attraction of “Authentic” Islam’ (2009). NB: Exception was made for the Arabic language, 
which, as the language of traditional scholarship, was given great reverence since it conveyed authenticity and 
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163 Op. Cit. p.172, and Inge, Salafism in Britain (2008). 
164 Hamid ‘The Attraction of “Authentic” Islam’ (2009), pp.384-403. 
165 Ibid. p.361. 
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 85 
shared with some Islamist groups,167 and shows that while general theological and political 
trends can be delineated within British Muslim communities, they are not discrete and just 
as there can be overlaps among them, there can also be political contestations within them.  
 
Another trend which also placed emphasis on puritanism, as well as scholarship, was the 
Deobandi tradition. With its origins in Indian religious seminaries, it came to be represented 
among Gujarati Indian communities in the UK by the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) movement.168 
The Deobandis eschewed what they considered to be excessive and innovative devotional 
practices favoured by the Barelwi tradition, a South Asian form of popular Sufism which 
placed great emphasis on the performance of traditional customs and rituals as well as the 
reverence of saints. It was a religious missionary movement which invested a great deal of 
resources into developing religious training through schools and seminaries (Darul Ulooms), 
which have gone on to graduate probably the most consistent stream of British-trained 
imams and religious leaders. Among the more prominent of these have been Shaykh Abu 
Yusuf Riyadh ul Haq, one-time Imam of Birmingham Central Mosque and currently 
director of Al-Kawthar Academy in the same city; Mufti Muhammad ibn Adam al-
Kawthari, who runs Daruliftaa (the Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence) in Leicester; as well 
as Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra, a Leicester imam, veteran interfaith activist and current 
Assistant Secretary General of the MCB. 
 
ii. Reformist – active engagement in existing political structures: 
The reformist strand owes its origins and inspiration overwhelmingly to Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), 
a major reformist Islamist movement in the Indian subcontinent.169 JI followers were 
critical of weak political stances taken by ‘puppet’ leaders who had been installed or 
propped up by the western colonial powers, and thus called for Islamically inspired political 
reform. They also engaged in Islamically inspired social welfare schemes with the aim of 
encouraging people to see religion as a key aspect of their identity which could give 
meaning and solutions to everyday challenges and issues. Members of the JI who had 
settled in Britain initially set up the United Kingdom Islamic Mission (UKIM) in 1962. The 
idea behind the organisation was to provide a base and an outlet for workers of the JI to 
                                                          
167 Ibid. Such as the Muslim Association of Britain’s role in working with the police to ‘purge’ the North 
London Central Mosque of the influence of Abu Hamza and his associates.  
168 It should be noted that Deobandi mosques in other parts of South Asia are independent of the TJ, even 
though the TJ utilise Deobandi mosque networks to further their missionary activities. 
169 Ron Geaves, ‘The reproduction of Jamaat-i Islami in Britain’ Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations Vol.6:2 
(1995), pp.187-210.  
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continue with their activism in the UK. Thus the structure of the UKIM broadly reflected 
that of the JI, concepts and key texts were the same as those which were used by the JI 
(prominently featuring the works of Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, the JI’s founder). In fact, in 
the early years, the UKIM was widely referred to informally as ‘the Jamaat’. Over time, the 
UKIM set up mosques and Islamic centres across the UK. These provided a range of 
services, including supplementary Islamic education for children through an extensive 
madrassa system, regular Islamic teaching for men and women, and charitable work.170 To 
this day, the UKIM still boasts a wide network of well-established mosques including 
several in London and all the major UK cities.  
 
By the late 1970s, encouraged by the settling of a new wave of Bangladeshi exiles in the 
wake of the 1971 War of Independence – and in a bid to counter the emergence of 
nationalist and secular Bangladeshi-identity groups in the East End of London171 – the 
Bangladeshis within the UKIM formed their own group. Dawatul Islam (The Call of Islam) 
had its own youth organisation, the Young Muslim Organisation (YMO), and for a period, 
took on the role of running the East London Mosque, especially after the opening of the 
Mosque’s new purpose built premises in 1985.172 Divisions among the Mosque’s trustees 
eventually led to those who were affiliated with Dawatul Islam leaving the Mosque, and 
many of the remaining trustees forming a new organisation, Islamic Forum Europe 
(IFE).173 All of these groups functioned within, and primarily served the Bangladeshi 
community, with their inspiration, focus and personalities still very much grounded in the 
JI framework. 
 
In 1973, leading figures of the JI set up the Islamic Foundation in Leicester. This was a 
research body and publishing house which has been credited with successfully bringing the 
works of major reformist ideologues of the JI as well as of the Muslim Brotherhood174 to a 
worldwide English-speaking audience. Additionally, it spearheaded the first contemporary, 
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171 David Garbin, ‘A Diasporic Sense of Place: Dynamics of spatialization and transnational political fields 
among Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain’ in Transnational Ties: cities, identities and migrations ed. by M P Smith and 
J Eade (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009). 
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Ansari (Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp.65-67. 
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colourful and accessible collection of children’s books on Islam and Muslim tradition in the 
English language.  
 
A further development to the growing list of JI-inspired reformist groups was the 
establishment in 1984 of the Young Muslims UK (YMUK), the brainchild of Khurram 
Murad, a previous leader of the JI’s student wing and then a deputy-leader of the JI itself. 
YMUK was constitutionally linked to the UKIM at its inception, intended to cater for the 
younger generation of British Muslims, and was pioneering in its commitment to the use of 
English as its language of operation. It also benefited from a cohort of highly competent 
and motivated youth leaders who were personally trained by Murad to deliver activities that 
were dynamic, in-touch with everyday social and political issues and conversant with 
Islamic beliefs and teachings of which they were unashamedly proud.175 However, its 
affiliation to the UKIM was short-lived as by the late 1980s YMUK eventually asserted its 
independence, and it was not until 1994 that it then became attached to another ‘parent’ 
organisation, as I will go on to discuss. 
 
Also within the reformist trend were organisations established by members and 
sympathisers of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The Muslim Students Society (MSS) was 
set up in the 1960s and catered for a growing number of Arab and Arabic-speaking 
students in the UK. Many of these had prior involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood 
back in their home countries, and the MSS was a facility both to keep them in touch with 
the MB networks, to cater for their spiritual and religious development, as well as providing 
a social and community support mechanism.176 As I have mentioned earlier, when FOSIS 
was set up in 1963, the MSS affiliated with it. Another notable establishment of the MB 
was the Muslim Welfare House. This was set up in 1970 as a support and community 
facility for Arab students who had come to the UK, and for many years, its building in 
Finsbury Park in London acted as a base for MB members, hosting visiting personalities 
from abroad. Its role has since changed and developed considerably, now serving as a 
community and service centre for its immediate area. 
 
iii. Radical – seeking an alternative political system: 
The final category, the radicals, aspired to overturning what were deemed to be ‘un-Islamic’ 
governments and establishing a Khilafa – an nostalgic vision of the prophetic system of 
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176 Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: the burden of tradition (London: Saqi, 2010), pp.150-153. 
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government instituted by the Prophet Muhammad and his successors (the khulafaa’). Hizb-
ut-tahrir (‘The Party of Liberation’, HT) was the main purveyor of this thinking in the UK. 
The movement itself was founded by the Palestinian Taqiuddin Nabhani in 1953, as he 
broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood. It adheres to a rather polarised worldview that 
calls for the establishment of an Islamic state (or khilafa) in the mould of the imagined 
heritage of the Ottoman Caliphate that fell in the early 20th Century. HT was brought to 
Britain in the 1980s by exiled members of the group who arrived from the Middle East, 
initially working with foreign students in the hope that they could then take their message 
with them on their return to their home countries.177  
 
By the 1990s, HT had begun to organise openly within British Muslim communities. It 
functioned as a vocal mouthpiece criticising governments and leaders of Arab and Muslim 
countries, in particular accusing them of corruption and straying from the imperative to 
establish and rule by the khilafa. HT in Britain agitated for the return of this khilafa and 
anticipated that its establishment would bring an end to all forms of Muslim suffering and 
oppression. In the 1990s this was frequently pursued using daring and provocative 
language and techniques. Actual acts of violence have never been claimed or endorsed by 
the group, however, it has been argued that HT was guilty of ‘cultivating the right 
conditions’ for violence178 – although this analysis is only directly linked with a single 
incident, namely the murder of a Nigerian Christian student in 1995, in which it has been 
claimed that drug dealing, gang violence and rivalry also played a key part.179 There is 
stronger evidence to suggest that HT splinter groups such as Al Muhajiroun (est.1996) and 
its later offshoots such as Al Ghurabaa, The Saviour Sect, and Muslims Against Crusades 
have been responsible for inciting/encouraging violent crime. This will be discussed in 
more depth in the following chapter. 
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By the 1980s, the various groupings that constituted these three broad strands had played a 
significant role in energising a sense of Muslim consciousness,180 increasingly among the 
younger generations. These strands and their respective organisations may have been 
established to provide familiar havens for activists among first-generation immigrants, but 
by the 1990s, their differences began to be played out as rivalries, as each trend sought to 
attract as many recruits from the second and third generations as possible. This rivalry was 
especially noticeable on university and college campuses,181 where the dynamics within and 
between many of these groups have been likened to those of football teams.182 While this 
period might be accurately characterised as a time of tribalistic ‘struggle for hegemony in 
the field of Islamic activism’ between these groups,183 the experience also showed that the 
young people were taking greater ownership of their Muslim identity and while parent 
organisations from abroad were still revered, they were beginning to also assert their own 
views and preferences.184 
 
As a final note, and perhaps as a premonition of these movements increasingly developing 
and adapting in their own ways to the UK, it is worth highlighting a few developments 
within some of these trends during the 1990s. The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) was 
established in 1990 as a joint endeavour by individuals from JI and MB heritage with the 
aim of catering to the growing numbers of second and third generation British Muslims, as 
well as converts, to whom an ‘indigenous’ Islamic movement would most appeal. It grew to 
attract many graduates of youth groups within the reformist strand, particularly of YMUK 
which in 1994 took the step of merging with the ISB and thus becoming its official youth 
wing. The early ISB was distinguished by a discourse that was clearly and comfortably ‘at 
home’ in Britain, which, back in 1990 was in sharp contrast to various other movements 
that were regularly preoccupied with agitating for international change abroad, or simply 
for ‘Muslim rights’ at home.185 This is exemplified by its Islam Awareness Week project 
which was initiated in 1994 as an annual nationwide campaign ‘to raise awareness and 
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remove misconceptions surrounding Britain’s second largest faith group’.186 In 1997, the 
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) was set up as a hub bringing together various MB 
members and groupings that existed around the country, again with a focus on Britain as 
home, but also with a proud connection to the international MB, something which, 
especially after 2005, it has since taken steps to play down.  
 
Within the radical strand, Al-Muhajiroun was set up in 1996 by Omar Bakri Mohammed as a 
splinter of HT. Mohammed had been expelled from his leadership of HT in Britain in the 
same year, allegedly for displeasing the movement’s central leadership in the Middle East 
with his outrageous and confrontational tactics, which ‘it was felt distracted focus from the 
party message’.187 Following the departure of Mohammed and his followers, HT in Britain 
underwent a ‘stage of re-groupment’, with Al-Muhajiroun continuing to occupy the more 
extreme and confrontational end of the spectrum, and HT itself re-emerged projecting a 
more serious image of itself as an organisation with its concerns grounded in mainstream 
domestic issues as well as international affairs, especially with respect to Britain’s role in 
them. 188 
 
All of these examples together serve to illustrate how the various groups that owed their 
provenance to trans-national Islamic movements abroad were already in flux by the 1990s, 
and that they were, albeit in different ways, beginning to engage with the realities of a 
permanent and indigenous presence of Muslim communities in the UK. In the following 
chapter, I will move on to look at the early initiatives to unite, and eventually, to represent 
different Muslim organisations around the UK – firstly for better co-ordination, but soon 
after also for the purposes of more effective claims-making. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The period between the 1960s-80s was characterised by a drive towards identity 
preservation in various quarters of Britain’s Muslim communities. This was manifested on 
a local level through a broadening of community interests from more functional issues such 
as the establishment of mosques, prayer congregations, and the provision of halal meat, to 
concerns around the preservation and promotion of religious identity among the younger 
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generation. This preoccupation clashed with more right wing, conservative and arguably 
racist perspectives; and one key location where these concerns were played out was in the 
arena of schooling and education. The experience of Black community organising to 
confront racism and to call for the recognition and rectification of racial inequalities and 
discrimination provided inspiration and a reference point for increasingly identity-
conscious Muslims. From a policy perspective, it also served as a useful precedent, whose 
institutions could be utilised by emergent Muslim community organisations. 
 
As I have shown, a series of different UK-wide groups emerged from the 1960s onwards, 
with the aim of organising and, occasionally representing Britain’s Muslim communities. 
These were each dominated by different political and/or theological groupings within the 
community and their strengths and weaknesses have been reflected in their ultimate 
successes or failures in being effective. Some have survived while others have been short-
lived. The UMO in particular was a pioneer in the field of communal representation to 
both the government and to the wider public, however its progress and development was 
hindered by an inability to broaden its reach to become more inclusive of the extensive 
theological, cultural/ethnic and geographical spread across Britain’s Muslim communities. 
This shortcoming was compounded by its failure to develop an open, modern, and 
transparent structure, which would in turn have invited broader participation and input. 
 
FOSIS has lived on and developed apace, but its focus became increasingly refined around 
the needs of a fast-expanding domestic Muslim student population, while other community 
organisations took on the role of centralised representation. However, as I shall go on to 
mention, FOSIS was to prove a crucial starting point for many British Muslim activists and 
community leaders. Additionally, it regularly provided support and input into future unity 
and representation initiatives. Similarly, the wide range of Muslim community organisations 
that developed in the period between 1960 through to the 1980s  played an important role 
in engraining a sense of Muslim-consciousness, which proved foundational for the 
formalised identity politics that came about in the next decade. They also gave ample 
opportunity for community leaders to emerge and develop, particularly on a local level, 
through the building of campaigns and alliances. This too was to prove useful in the 
coming phase of formalised identity politics. However as the following chapter will show, 
an important difference was that these local campaigns generally related to single issues of 
concern to a local community, whereas the centralised formal identity politics of the later 
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1980s onwards sought to build a national consensus and a unified voice representing a 
whole range of Muslim communities from across the country. 
 
  
 93 
Chapter Three 
The formalisation of Muslim identity politics: Responses to hate speech, 
discrimination and the Equality Gap 
Foundations of a government-community conversation [1980 – 1997 and 1997 – 2001] 
 
This chapter takes a look at the formative years that led to the emergence of modern 
British Muslim identity politics, in the format that we are familiar with today. We have seen 
in the previous chapter how the first attempts at uniting Muslims across the UK through 
communal organisations date back to the 1960s, here I will argue that the decisive shaping 
of the basic structures and channels of communication through which this identity politics 
was to be conducted, commenced in the 1980s - 1990s.  
 
Revisiting my earlier overview of the umbrella organisations which emerged in the 1960s-
70s, namely the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) and the Union of Muslim 
Organisations (UMO), I recall why they eventually proved unsuited or unable to carry 
forward the role of representation and advocacy for Britain’s Muslim communities, while at 
the same time, Muslim identity organisations with links to international Islamist 
movements (such as HT) were gaining increasing publicity and media exposure. Following 
this, I will profile the numerous efforts at unity and representation that developed in the 
1980s, these include local and regional campaigns that articulated growing tensions between 
aspects of aspiration and self-identity of groups among British Muslims, and wider society, 
specifically relating to social and cultural issues of mutual concern. Most notable among 
these were the numerous community advocacy and representation initiatives that emerged 
in the wake of the Rushdie affair. I argue that it was at this moment when Muslim activists 
began to consistently present claims that could be articulated as what I term an Equality 
Gap. 
 
I then show how by the mid-1990s, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) (and the 
preparatory committee which preceded it), emerged as the pre-eminent representative 
body, and remained so through to 2001. Although, for this period, the MCB was the main 
player in this field, it was nonetheless not the only one. Accordingly, I shall also look where 
relevant at the role played by other organisations and their respective impacts upon the 
direction of political engagement.  Since the period preceding the MCB’s official launch in 
1997 is essential to understand for a fuller and more rounded overall picture of this phase, I 
will provide a brief overview of it, followed by a more detailed account of the MCB’s 
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establishment. I will assess how it came about to occupy a position of primacy, the key 
issues that framed its relationship with government and mainstream politics; and how and 
why this relationship developed over the time period under discussion.  
 
In doing this, I will argue that the nature and form of the MCB was heavily influenced by 
an aspiration to learn from, and, in many respects, to emulate, the greater experience and 
superior political leverage that was enjoyed by institutions at the helm of British Jewish 
identity politics – primarily the Board of Deputies of British Jews (the Board), and, in 
specific contexts that I shall elaborate on, the position of Chief Rabbi. I will show how 
British Muslim community leaders expressed clear ambitions to achieve this, and how the 
government also encouraged this, since it made the practicalities of its relations with 
religious minority communities more manageable.  
 
I will then consider differences and similarities between the British Muslim community’s 
experiences of political engagement and those of the British Jewish community, illustrating 
how a straightforward emulation of the ‘Jewish model’ was not easy. In a large part, this 
was down to different migratory conditions, and subsequently, a different ‘migratory 
mindset’, that accounted for the key differences between each community’s experiences of 
settlement in the UK, and, in turn, of political engagement. Ultimately, Britain’s Muslims 
benefited greatly from the Jewish community’s antecedent successes – in terms of acquiring 
‘staple’ legal exemptions and recognition necessary for religious observance; and the MCB 
benefited from the Board’s model of communal representation and lobbying. However, the 
MCB found that it had to make its own way in some areas – due to the contrasting 
features, and the differing circumstances facing both communities. I will sum up by 
showing how over the past decade the fortunes of both Jewish and Muslim community 
organisations have been affected by both the changing nature of community politics as well 
as the government’s approach to them – a theme which I will return to in more detail in 
the ensuing chapters where I examine turning points in the development of British Muslim 
identity politics over the past decade, as well as in the concluding chapter – when I look to 
the future of British Muslim identity politics in light of the point that it has reached today. 
 
In my final section, I will look closely at the key argument at the centre of the new Muslim 
identity politics – the argument that ultimately represents a major justification for the 
continued existence of Muslim identity politics. I refer to it as the Equality Gap, since it 
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essentially hinges on the notion that the structure and mechanisms for equality and 
recognition in the British legal and political systems suffer from a gap with respect to the 
treatment of Muslim minorities on a par with other minorities. I will examine the basis for 
the argument that this Equality Gap exists, in light of the Rushdie affair – this being the 
crisis under which it was first articulated. I will conclude by looking at how it has continued 
to be articulated, the contexts in which it has been called upon in politics and by 
mentioning how the gap has had continued implications on the nature and style of Muslim 
identity politics since the late 80s. 
 
3.1 Muslims and race relations policy – the Equality Gap 
 
In Chapter 2, we saw how efforts to represent British Muslims from a central platform 
through FOSIS had been only occasional, and how the UMO had made initial progress as 
an umbrella body, but eventually was met with limited success. In this chapter, I will show 
how despite being best known for the fiery mass protests that it ignited, the publication in 
1988 of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses was to prove an instrumental moment in the 
eventual development of formal and centralised British Muslim identity politics, as well as 
an important milestone in coherent claims-making to the government. This was because it 
brought together a potent combination of factors – the outrage of so many British Muslims 
at the offending novel, the interest of foreign nations, the highly sensitive nature of the 
very subject of freedom of expression in public and political consciousness all forced 
Muslim community organisations to seek a united platform from which to make their 
representations. 
 
In many respects, this experience of community self-expression, engagement and 
representation did not differ very much from that of other ethnic minority immigrant 
communities to the UK from the Commonwealth. But while a race relations agenda was 
evolving in the sphere of policy, it ultimately took circumstance more than strategy to 
propel Muslims into the mainstream political sphere and trigger off the growth of collective 
identity politics for them that was based around religion. Several chronological accounts 
have been drawn which trace this development,189 some varying in the emphasis and 
importance that they place on different aspects. However it is virtually unanimous that the 
                                                          
189 For instance: Steven Vertovec, ‘Muslims, the State, and the Public Sphere in Britain’ in Muslim Communities 
in the New Europe ed. by Gerd Nonnemann, Tim Niblock and Bogdan Szajkowski (London: Ithaca, 1996); 
Jorgen S Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004); Mohammad 
Siddique Seddon, ‘Muslim Communities in Britain: A Historiogaphy’ in Seddon, Hussain and Malik British 
Muslims Between Assimilation and Segregation (2004); Lewis, Islamic Britain (1994). 
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single most formative event in the political development of the UK’s Muslim communities 
during the late 20th Century was the Rushdie affair and its aftermath. The publication of The 
Satanic Verses triggered off (in retrospect, predictable) uproar among Muslims in the UK 
who, among other emotions, felt outrage and deep hurt at what they understood to be a 
gratuitous and insulting attack on the Prophet Muhammad and other deeply revered 
personalities as well as on the Qur'an – the sacred scripture of Islam.  
 
Responses varied but two particular products of this affair are of relevance to the 
discussion at hand. The first is that it brought about a sense of urgency and momentum for 
unity and representation through the creation of civic organisations as channels for the 
articulation of a ‘Muslim viewpoint’ or response to what was felt in many ways to be an 
attack. The organised response that was made to the affair by community groups and 
spokespeople took very seriously the precedent that was laid for it in terms of 
representations made to government and the press by race relations bodies that had grown 
over recent decades. This development of a conscious Muslim identity politics – one that 
articulated a sense of grievance in not being given equal treatment by the law, and not being 
treated on a par with other minorities190 was both unprecedented and was to have an impact 
that long outlived the Rushdie affair.191 Secondly, and partly as a consequence of the first 
product, was the also unprecedented scale of scrutiny and debate to which the UK’s 
Muslim communities were subjected in the public domain – including academia, political 
commentary, public discourse, the media, the arts and eventually even in diplomatic 
relations. Both of these proved instrumental in shaping a new landscape against which 
Muslims came to view themselves and be viewed, and a new approach that was adopted in 
                                                          
190 It is important to stress here that my account of the development of Muslim identity politics in the wake 
of the Rushdie affair and beyond will focus primarily upon the public articulation of grievances by individual 
and group actors in the political arena – these were largely framed in the discourse of recognition and 
equality. This is not to ignore the very real (and perhaps at times far more vocal) expressions of outrage and 
hurt which were grounded in a feeling that blasphemy had been committed. Of course this was widely felt 
and expressed, but of more direct relevance to the discussion at hand is the way in which this experience 
triggered off both an awareness of the Equality Gap, and a momentum for a Muslim identity politics as a way 
of tackling this gap. 
191 Although the existence of Muslim political groupings and organisations in the UK much preceded the 
Rushdie affair (some of the earliest dating back to the early 60s), these were more localised in focus, and 
characterised by a preoccupation with social and intra-community issues, rather than political affairs. While 
several political standpoints were being articulated at this time, these were predominantly informed and 
coloured by ‘back home’ perspectives and allegiances. For many of these the Rushdie affair served to force an 
earnest effort to engage with the political landscape of the UK and to seek to formulate arguments that were 
located with a view to a permanent future in the UK. The most notable being the UK Action Committee on 
Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) followed to a lesser degree by the more ‘radical’ Muslim Parliament. Both 
continue to exist (albeit in changed and diminished forms) to this day. 
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the formulation and articulation of claims and rights to the state.192 The new sense of 
urgency that many Muslims felt both in response to the publication of The Satanic Verses 
and in frustration at the polarisation and dissonance of positions that their protests were 
met with by those around them, created a space for the development of community 
organisations, leaderships and other efforts of representation and interlocution on a new 
level.  
 
3.1.1 The Rushdie affair and equality: 
There were two main demands that were made on the grounds of equality, both of which 
relied primarily on expectations of a principle of equal treatment. The first was one that 
interrogated the rationale behind the inherent privilege that was enjoyed by the Church of 
England, as the established church of the UK, in the protection that it had as a religion 
from blasphemy under the law. Under this arrangement, it was (and remained so until 
2008) possible to prosecute against forms of expression or publication that are ruled to 
‘contain any contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous, or ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus 
Christ or the Bible, or the formulas of the Church of England as by law established’.193 This 
arrangement was objected to as a form of discrimination that, by some interpretations, was 
telling of a biased (as opposed to neutral) background political culture that placed Muslims 
(as non-members of the Church of England!) at a basic disadvantage. The existence of a 
blasphemy law protecting the Church of England made the language that was employed at 
the time in defence of ‘freedom of speech and artistic expression’ appear acutely unfair and 
discriminatory. Some Muslims wondered if they could ever become/be accepted as equal 
citizens without giving up essential aspects of their beliefs and identities. Thus many of the 
earlier representations that were made in the wake of the Rushdie affair focused on calling 
for an extension of the blasphemy laws to cover all religions and denominations.194 In the 
words of UKACIA’s correspondence with John Patten: ‘The crisis over The Satanic Verses 
refuses to go away… (because) our legal framework does not envisage a situation in which 
                                                          
192 An illustration of this kind of concerted action can be found in the UKACIA document Muslims and the 
Law in Multifaith Britain (1993) which also includes exchanges with the government incl. Home Office 
Minister John Patten. 
193 Lord Scarman, as quoted in Catriona McKinnon, Toleration: a critical introduction (London: Routledge, 2006) 
p.130. 
194 UKACIA, Muslims and the Law in Multifaith Britain (1993). Also Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000), Chapter 10, and Tariq Modood, ‘Muslims, Incitement to Hatred and 
the Law’ in Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration ed. by John Horton (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), 
pp.139-156. 
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an offence of sacrilege could be committed against religions other than the Anglican 
faith’.195 
 
The second demand focused more directly on the growing race relations agenda itself, as 
an object of reform. It was argued that, although welcome, in concentrating solely on 
ethnicity as a factor of difference, the anti-discrimination legislation that had been passed 
thus far lacked nuance and the necessary recognition of minority groups that were not 
identified primarily by ethnic terms. This in itself was one objection. However, it was 
complicated by the fact that as time wore on and the legislation was utilised in 
discrimination cases, it emerged that members of some religious groups could legitimately be 
protected from discrimination and hate speech by the very same race relations laws that 
excluded members of other faiths. The rationale behind this was that the religions 
concerned (Judaism and Sikhism) were identifiably linked with particular ethnic groups 
(Jews and Punjabis), and that racially motivated discrimination/hate speech against them 
was in effect impossible to separate from similar forms of hostility that were religiously 
motivated. Legal precedent had determined that the Jewish and Sikh faiths were ‘mono-
ethnic’,196 thus facilitating the prosecution of an attack against a Jew or a Sikh by appealing 
to the existing Race Relations Act. The most obvious religious ‘minority’ exclusion to this 
anomaly were Muslims – since even though it was possible to classify certain ethnic groups 
as being overwhelmingly Muslim (for instance, Pakistanis or Bangladeshis), it would be 
impossible to group Muslims themselves into any ethnic category since adherence to Islam 
itself does not follow any ethnic pattern.197 This legal loophole was indicative of an inherent 
disadvantage that Muslims faced when seeking redress against discrimination or looking to 
combat hate speech which could take advantage of it.198  
 
This second position encompassed two main strands. The more ‘basic’ of these was the 
charge that if the anti-race discrimination laws protected in their scope both Jews and 
                                                          
195 Letter from UKACIA to John Patten, 19th July 1989, reproduced in UKACIA, Muslims and the Law in 
Multifaith Britain (1993). 
196 Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL), 565. 
197 Nasar Meer, ‘The politics of voluntary and involuntary identities: are Muslims in Britain an ethnic, racial or 
religious minority?’ Patterns of Prejudice Vol. 42: 1 (2008), pp. 61-81. 
198 See Nadeem Malik, ‘Equality? The Treatment of Muslims under the English Legal System’ in Seddon, 
Hussain and Malik, British Muslims Between Assimilation and Segregation (2004) for detail on the legal loophole, 
also Tariq Modood, ‘British Muslims and Multiculturalism’ in Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: a 
European approach ed. by Tariq Modood et al (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.42-46 situates it in the context of 
EU human rights regulations – noting that the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 expects member states to outlaw 
religious discrimination, further highlighting the gap in the law. See Christopher Allen, ‘From Race to 
Religion: the new form of discrimination’ in Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure ed. by Tahir Abbas 
(London: Zed Books, 2005) on the far right’s exploitation of it. 
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Sikhs, then for the sake of fair and equal treatment, they needed to be extended to include 
Muslims as well. The other charge was that Muslims were facing a specific type of 
prejudice/discrimination that called for their inclusion in race relations/equalities 
legislation as a way of securing equality for them. This was to say that Muslims suffered 
disadvantage and discrimination because they were perceived and treated in a manner that 
was racist in its motivation and nature, and that this in turn meant that the experiences of 
discrimination that were felt by Muslims could not, straightforwardly at least, be 
approximated to experiences of racism that was founded on ethnic differences. Thus, it 
would be inaccurate to consider Muslims (from an equality and justice perspective) simply 
as members of their respective ethnic minority groups that suffer from socio-economic and 
other forms of disadvantage and discrimination. To do so would be to view them through 
the lens of the ‘mode of oppression’ rather than, through the fairer and more accurate 
‘mode of being’.199 This mode of being was not articulated only (or even in the main) 
through ethnic terms. This was reason enough to treat Muslims as though they were a race, 
or to use Tariq Modood’s phrase, an ethno-religious group.200 Modood points out in 
reference to ‘1980s antiracism in Britain’, that ‘most Muslims – suffering all the problems 
that antiracists identify – hardly ever think of themselves in terms of their colour’. Because 
of this, and because of the ‘racialised’ way in which they were sometimes prejudicially 
viewed, ‘ethno-religious’ as a category made more sense. For him, the understanding of 
race that had thus far informed race equality legislation was impoverished insofar as its 
definition of race excluded Muslims.201 In addition, his findings as well as those of research 
carried out for the Cabinet Office indicate that religion can and does constitute a factor in 
the actual degree and nature of disadvantage and social exclusion that communities face.202 
 
                                                          
199 Tariq Modood, ‘Muslims, race and equality in Britain: Some post-Rushdie affair reflections’ Third Text 
4:11, (1990), pp.127-134. 
200 This viewpoint is supported by research into negative public portrayals of Islam and Muslims. For instance 
John E Richardson, (Mis)representing Islam: the racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet newspapers (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Pub Co., 2004) who sees racism as a ‘shifting and changing concept’ which is not limited to colour 
or ethnic differences but defined more by hierarchical and unjust social relations. 
See also the distinction that Bhikhu Parekh makes between racism grounded in ‘physical’ difference and 
racism grounded in ‘cultural’ difference: ‘over the centuries all racisms have had – and continue to have – two 
separate but intertwining strands. One uses physical or biologically derived signs as a way of recognising 
difference – skin colour, hair, features, body type, and so on. The other uses cultural features such as ways of 
life, customs, language, religion and dress. […] most Muslims are recognised by physical features as well as by 
their culture and religion, and the biological and cultural strands in anti-Muslim racism are often impossible to 
disentangle.’ Runnymede Trust & Bhikhu Parekh, Report of the Commission on The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain 
(London: Profile, 2000), p.62. 
201 Modood, Multicultural Politics (2005), pp.104-108 and p.114. 
202 This is discussed in Tufyal Choudhury, ‘Comparative perspectives on discrimination law’ in Islam in the 
European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and the War on Terror ed. by Yunus Samad and Kasturi Sen (Oxford: 
OUP, 2007), pp.187-8.  
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In short then, there have been two ‘gaps’ in the law that the experience of Muslim identity 
politics has identified and argued against: 
a) Speech: Whether it is the Church of England being given ‘special treatment’ 
through the continued existence of blasphemy laws,203 or the arguable 
shortcomings of current legislation in proscribing incitement to religious hatred.  
b) Actions: The inadequacy of race relations policy (and specifically anti-
discrimination legislation) in appreciating the complexity of the British Muslim 
experience of prejudice/discrimination as an ‘ethno-religious’ group, and therefore 
the need for it to be revised. The gap here being illustrated by the inclusion of Jews 
and Sikhs (but not followers of other religions) under anti-race discrimination 
legislation. 
 
The first of these gaps is more straightforwardly provable than the second, and has 
remained a key focal point for Muslim representative and lobby groups until this day. It 
informed the representations against The Satanic Verses, and since then it has also, famously, 
and controversially been the direct impetus behind the strong support from a very broad 
spectrum of Muslim groups behind the introduction of a ‘religious hatred’ offence.204 The 
offence that was eventually introduced in 2005 was not, as many had hoped, as stringent 
and wide-ranging as the comparable sections of race relations legislation. However, even as 
symbolic recognition of Muslims as an identifiable group that needed to be catered for in 
integration policy, it received a measured welcome as a step in the right direction.205 It is 
worth noting here the development with time of a shift from the emphasis placed by 
Muslim groups on the extension of the blasphemy law as a way to achieving equality, to a 
more focused, and more human rights-grounded demand for protection from 
hate/Islamophobic speech.206  
 
As for the second gap, it motivated the terms of the successful campaign for the 
recognition of religion as an identity-category in official matters through the inclusion of a 
‘religion question’ in the 2001 National Census. Without the collection of such data, it was 
                                                          
203 The offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel were finally repealed by the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008.  
204 Pnina Werbner, ‘Islamophobia: Incitement to religious hatred - legislating for a new fear?’ in Anthropology 
Today 21:1 Feb 2005. Also Modood, ‘British Muslims and the politics of multiculturalism’, (2005). 
205 ‘Religious Hatred Law Perpetuates Inequality After Commons Vote’ MCB Press Release 1st February 
2006. Available at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/presstext.php?ann_id=186 [accessed on 25th May 2013]. 
206 McLoughlin, ‘The state, ‘new’ Muslim leaderships and Islam as a ‘resource’ for public engagement in 
Britain’ (2005). See also Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism, The Religious Offences Bill 2002: A Response 
(October 2002). 
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argued, there would never be any accurate and comprehensive aggregation of population 
numbers and demographics for the UK’s Muslims; and without this, it would never be 
accurately known how many Muslims actually were experiencing discrimination. It was only 
once such statistics were obtained that the more formidable task of assessing how much of 
this discrimination was based on their ‘Muslimness’, and how much was founded on other 
aspects of identity. Those involved in the campaign contended that it ‘represented a long-
standing dissatisfaction with the focus on race and ethnicity alone as a statistical marker for 
planning and resource allocation in the public sector’ and that ‘without it, British Muslims 
would remain statistically invisible’.207 Interestingly, and in support of the earlier arguments 
that I have made, the rationale behind this campaign also followed closely the push for a 
‘race/ethnicity’ question which had taken place ten years prior and had achieved success in 
time for the 1991 census.  
 
While each of these examples represents differing goals, they both provide useful 
illustrations of how the case for addressing the Equality Gap is gaining increasing currency. 
With the benefit of time and experience (its own and that of race identity politics), the 
articulation of the Gap by Muslim civic organisations and lobby groups is becoming clearer 
and stronger. At the same time, it is becoming more evident to policy makers that without 
addressing the gap, equality as recognition – in the tradition that has been set by the British 
race relations policy agenda – can hardly be claimed to have been fully achieved. From a 
philosophical perspective, the understanding of recognition that I outlined in the first 
section requires that the gap be closed, if we are to move beyond addressing (simply) the 
socio-economic disadvantages that many immigrant (and post-immigrant) communities 
face; and aim for an arrangement not only where we are aware that there will be specific 
challenges and disadvantages faced by each community, but to also find ways for the legal 
and political system to respond to those disadvantages that are unjustifiable or have 
disproportionate impact. From a practical perspective, straightforward equality of 
treatment under the law also means that a reassessment of present anomalies (such as the 
ambiguity around the inclusion of Jews and Sikhs under race relation legislation – and the 
legal disadvantage that this leaves Muslims and members of other minority faiths under) is 
also called for.  
 
                                                          
207 Jamil Sherif, ‘Campaigning for a religion question in the 2001 Census’ presentation delivered at The 
Demographic Profile of the UK’s Muslim Community, conference held at the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre, 
London, 26th September 2001. 
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3.1.2 Initial large-scale organising and representation on a national level: 
 
The mid-1990s represented a period of marked change in several areas of politics and 
witnessed the forging and development of political relationships which have held much 
significance in the ensuing years. The almost two-decade-long succession of Conservative 
administrations was drawing to a weary close, and there was a perceptible air of enthusiasm 
– both broadly-speaking, in politics, as well as more specifically among Muslim advocacy 
bodies. A number of factors catalysed or at least encouraged this enthusiasm. In terms of 
the intra-community situation, there had been growing realisations from many quarters that 
some form of coordinated voice would most effectively serve the shared aspirations of 
political voice and recognition that were now being so vigorously called for, since the 
Rushdie affair. The arrival of these new unity initiatives effectively illustrated how the 
UMO was becoming overshadowed and overtaken in its ambition to remain as the main 
representative and advocate for British Muslims. In what follows, I outline some the two 
most notable efforts in this regard: 
 
i. The Muslim Parliament: 
1992 saw the launch of a Muslim Parliament of Great Britain - an organisation founded on 
the premise that ‘all political parties and the mass media in Britain are now engaged in a 
relentless campaign to reduce Muslim citizens of this country to the status of a disparaged 
and oppressed minority’ and that as such, ‘greater cohesion and dynamism’ was needed 
among mosques and institutions in order to implement a ‘strategy for survival’.208 
Dominated by ex-Guardian journalist Kalim Siddiqui, and funded by the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, the Muslim Parliament (MP) was heavy on ideology and rhetoric yet apparently 
quite sparse in terms of concrete action. In many ways an overambitious and staunchly 
confrontational endeavour, it devoted its efforts towards the planning of a 
comprehensively self-sufficient and parallel infrastructure for the Muslim community, 
encompassing a parliament (basically a council), a central community fund (Baitul Mal), 
educational institutions including schools and a university, a research body (The Muslim 
Institute), as well as youth and women’s organisations.  
 
Although the MP did not ever officially cease to exist, it can be considered to have been 
short-lived for a number of reasons. Firstly, as with most projects that revolve around 
single personalities, it was dealt a heavy blow with the demise of its leader, Kalim Siddiqui, 
                                                          
208 The Muslim Manifesto (The Muslim Parliament, London: 1990). 
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in 1996. This left the crucial role of a central, unifying figure in the organisation unfulfilled, 
allowing for in-fighting and divisions to emerge amongst the MP’s ranks. Eventually this 
took the form of a split - with Kalim Siddiqui’s son, Iqbal, leading the newly-created 
splinter – the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought (ICIT), and Muhammad 
Ghayasuddin Siddiqui (no relation) assuming the role of the MP’s leader, a position that he 
occupies until today. Neither branch has ever really been successful in achieving either 
support or influence beyond their immediate sphere of contact - and neither has since 
proved capable of enjoying the degree of influence or recognition that they have aspired to.  
 
While Ghayasuddin Siddiqui has continued to perform an occasional role of spokesman 
through the MP mouthpiece on eclectic issues, this has been of a rather limited reach, and 
often as a ‘lone voice’ in relation to the rest of the community.209 On the other hand, Iqbal 
Siddiqui’s ICIT is practically obscure to the public eye. Its website does not appear to have 
been updated since 2000, and its principal preoccupation has been to present a history of 
the MP and Muslim Institute under Kalim Siddiqui as well as to promote his ideas through 
providing access to a collection of his articles and papers.210 Its magazine – Crescent 
International – does however continue to be published online, although it primarily deals 
with international political affairs rather than issues more directly concerning British 
Muslims.211 Other than these functions, the ICIT is, to all intents and purposes, non-
existent.  
 
ii. UKACIA: 
In a related vein yet with much more direct ambitions, the UK Action Committee on 
Islamic Affairs (founded in 1989) had built up substantial momentum among local and 
regional groups,212 and by 1993 had already accrued enough rapport with government to be 
able to submit its report entitled ‘Muslims and the Law in Multi-faith Britain: the need for reform’. 
Presented as a contribution to the CRE’s consultation for the second review of the 1976 
                                                          
209 Ghayasuddin Siddiqui has in recent times joined the British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD, cf. 
Table1). He has also undergone a rather dramatic shift in his opinions, now being a vocal opponent of 
Islamism and a proponent of ‘liberal’ Islam. He has also been involved in the rebirth of the Muslim Institute, 
which was re-established in December 2009 with a new structure, staff, and a revised outlook aiming ‘to 
promote and support the growth of thought, knowledge, research, creativity and open debate within the 
Muslim community and wider society.’ Cf. www.musliminstitute.org [accessed on 1st May 2013]. 
210 Cf. www.islamicthought.org [accessed on 21st March 2013]. 
211 Crescent International can be read online at www.crescenticit.com [accessed on 21st March 2013]. 
212 Cf. Sacrilege versus Civility ed. by Ahsan and Kidwai (1991), p. 342.  
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Race Relations Act,213 this paper forthrightly advocated that the persistence of several 
issues of inequality in British politics and public life was in urgent need of redress by 
government. Supported by articles from academics in law and politics, this collection drew 
arguments from the perspective that British Muslims constituted a group that required 
advocacy and representation in law and politics on a similar level with ethnic minorities. 
These arguments were largely grounded in the terms that I refer to as the Equality Gap - 
that this need for recognition and greater representation was not simply because their 
shared religion was considered to qualify them as a distinct group – but more as a result of 
reasons that the status quo in law and politics left British Muslims a conspicuously 
vulnerable minority.  
 
The UKACIA set out to avoid the challenges which had earlier faced the UMO and the 
MP by calling together a considerably more diverse group of community representatives – 
including various regions in the UK as well as a range of religious and political persuasions 
and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, it made resourceful use of established institutions, 
such as the London Central Mosque in Regents Park (where it became based) and by 
making appeals for support to the UK ambassadors of several Muslim countries. The 
Director of the London Central Mosque, Dr. Ali Al-Ghamdi, also served as chairman of 
the UKACIA’s steering committee and later became Co-convenor of the organisation 
along with Iqbal Sacranie.214 The combination of these factors appears to have contributed 
towards earning it some form of standing and recognition in its relationship with the 
government. So by the mid-1990s it held a central position as interlocutor for ‘religious’ 
concerns of Muslims – as distinct to concerns rooted or understood through the lens of 
race or ethnicity.  
 
Nonetheless, the UKACIA did have significant limitations. Key among these was that it 
was in essence a collective that was founded on the notion of protest – this being both a 
reactive as well as a primarily defensive organising tactic. With the Rushdie affair and 
offensive representations of Islam and Muslims in literature and the media as its main 
preoccupation, it became somewhat defined by its call for a widening of the blasphemy 
laws. As such, it did not appear to offer British society any tangible positive contributions 
and this may have detracted from the seriousness with which its demands were received. 
                                                          
213 ‘Muslims, the Law and Multi-Faith Britain’ in British Muslims Monthly Survey (Birmingham, August 1993), 
Vol. I, No. 8, pp. 5-6. 
214 Sacrilege Versus Civility ed. by Ahsan and Kidwai (1991), p.363. 
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Moreover, while it did enjoy some levels of prominent support in the community, there 
was no real consensus that it was to be the official representative or umbrella body for 
Muslim groups in the UK. Its diverse constituent groups meant that sufficient assent to an 
official status for the UKACIA was all the more important and that following on from this, 
regulated and standardised structures and mechanisms were also necessary in order to 
ensure viability and survival as an established organisation into the long-term. In addition, a 
certain level of reliance upon overseas support and funding may have played a part in 
creating perceptions of the UKACIA as being somewhat agenda-driven.215 
 
Both the Muslim Parliament and UKACIA displayed a keenness to push forward with 
presenting a case for equal treatment for Muslim, albeit using different styles. Whilst the 
Muslim Parliament adopted a more confrontational tone, its level of influence both in 
terms of community backing and durability was relatively limited in comparison to that of 
UKACIA. On the other hand, UKACIA was rather more broad-based, whilst at the same 
time officially preferring ‘to channel Muslim protest through economic, legal and 
diplomatic pressure’.216 
 
Although this new level of dialogue was originally ignited by anger at the realisation that 
they had no recourse to the law against what was considered grave blasphemy; it signified 
an important step up for British Muslims into a national level of advocacy that was both 
more focused and more coordinated than any preceding experience. What is more, it gave 
scope to the development of more coherent arguments regarding both the sense of hurt 
that was felt by Muslims on issues such as blasphemy, and in the areas of legal rights and 
claims-making.  
 
3.2 The formalisation of unity - and competition for representation 
The need for coordination and unity in political advocacy had become most apparent back 
in 1988 when the first reactions to the Rushdie affair were being formulated. It was at this 
point, more than at any preceding juncture that Muslim community leaders became so 
desperate to make their case heard with a united voice. Sources from this period are telling 
of a sense of being misunderstood and a frustration at the sheer level of opposition that 
                                                          
215 Kenan Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: the Rushdie affair and its legacy (Atlantic Books, UK: 2009), p.123. 
216 The Rushdie Affair 1988-1991 at Salaam:  
http://www.salaam.co.uk/themeofthemonth/september03/events.html [accessed on 17th June 2013]. 
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they were being faced with.217 One example is worth quoting at length. M H Faruqi argues 
that Muslim protesters against The Satanic Verses: 
 
(b)elieved that they were raising the most ordinary point about decency and 
dignity. They were not concerned about the faults or merits of the 
‘novel’… or its ‘theological’ or ‘scholarly’ criticism. They had no wish or 
intention to challenge anyone’s freedom of expression or to impose their 
‘mediaeval’ or ‘censorious’ values over the ‘civilised’ world.  
What they (wanted) was not even exclusively Islamic, it was the universal 
value… that it is not civilised to abuse and insult whatever the context or 
form of expression. They did not assume any malice on the part of the 
publishers.218 
 
Furthermore: 
There was never an attempt to understand Muslim feelings of deep hurt 
caused by the book, yet they were condemned ex parte as vandals and 
enemies of freedom! …The climax of incomprehension came when the 
Home Secretary armed with such sensational appreciation of the situation 
travelled to Birmingham to lecture the community to abide by laws of the 
country or else – to get out… (Yet) Their expression within the laws and 
etiquette of their country of citizenship was in fact an act of integration but 
surprisingly they (sic) are construed as refusal or unwillingness to 
integrate.219 
 
These sorts of sentiments convinced Muslim community leaders of the imperative need for 
unity in order to maximise their effectiveness and to achieve their common goal. Preceding 
efforts at unity had been characterised by a number of limitations in terms of their scope:  
 
Some of the more vocal initiatives were arguably out of touch with their self-ascribed 
community constituents. As I have illustrated above, the UMO provides a notable example 
in this regard. Its aspiration to be an umbrella body bringing together local and regional 
organisational efforts to facilitate a united voice had more success on paper than in 
practice. The Muslim Parliament, although outspoken and vociferous in its tone, was 
hindered by its lack of broad-based support and probably also by its closeness to the 
Iranian regime from which it received funding.220 In addition, both the UMO and the 
Muslim Parliament appear to have had little presence outside of London, and thus could 
hardly have in areas beyond the capital city. The UKACIA was also hindered by its 
                                                          
217 Cf. the numerous documents in Chapter 5, ‘The Muslim Argument’ in the anthology Sacrilege Versus Civility 
ed. by Ahsan and Kidwai (1991).  
218 M H Faruqi ‘Muslims and Britain’ in Sacrilege versus Civility ed. by Ahsan and Kidwai (1991), pp.193-199, 
(reprinted from Impact International 10th – 23rd March 1989, pp.5-8). 
219 Ibid.  
220 Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad (2009). 
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apparent close association with the Saudi regime. Indeed it has been suggested that the 
support of the Saudi and the Iranian governments for the UKACIA and the Muslim 
Parliament respectively was part of the wider rivalry that the two regimes were engaged in, 
as they vied with one another over who could claim the greater influence within the 
‘Muslim world’.221  
 
What was left, therefore, by the early 1990s, was a situation where there were a number of 
different bodies each claiming to possess mandates for representation and a more 
authentic/legitimate connection with the UK’s Muslim communities. However, each body 
was subject in its own way to significant limitations. These limitations were most clearly 
played out in the form of a sort of rivalry or competition that took place between them for 
exposure and attention. A clear example of this rivalry is evident in the drifting apart of the 
ICIT and the MP, and the manner of their subsequent references to one another.222 Each 
tried to portray the other in a negative light as a way of affirming its own exclusivity and 
legitimacy. In the meantime, work undertaken by the UMO’s National Muslim Education 
Council and the Muslim Education Trust (MET), while pursuing very similar aims, was not 
linked or co-ordinated in any visible way.223 Similarly, there was overlap between work of 
the UKACIA on political engagement and media monitoring and that of the UMO, and 
specifically the latter’s Vigilance Committee which also kept a watchful eye on press and 
public bodies for any ‘offensive’ or ‘anti-Islamic’ discourse.224 
 
Efforts to rectify these regular obstacles to effectiveness were commenced a few years later 
- driven in a large part by individuals who had been involved with UKACIA. Preparatory 
meetings of a National Interim Council for Muslim Unity (NICMU) took place between 
1994-1996; identifying widespread consultation as their main objective. Having already 
accepted the need for organised unity for advocacy and representation, the fifty or so 
community networks behind NICMU visited and corresponded with Muslims across the 
UK as a way of gauging support for the project, and receiving consultations on the form 
                                                          
221 Ibid. Also Madawi Al-Rasheed, ‘Saudi religious transnationalism in London’ in Transnational Connections and 
the Arab Gulf ed. by Madawi Al-Rasheed (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 155-6. 
222 Cf. http://www.islamicthought.org/mp-intro.html under the heading: ‘The decline of the Muslim 
Parliament’ [accessed on 10th April 2009]. 
223 Cf. the two separate publications: NMEC, Religious Education: a Muslim perspective (1997); and MET, Issues in 
Islamic Education (1996). 
224 ‘UMO Vigilance Committee’ in UMO, UMO 1970 - 1995 (1995), p.15. 
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and structures that it would adopt.225 These exercises paved the way for the establishment 
of the MCB, which set out to assume the role of a credible and effective interlocutor 
between Muslims and government - one which was genuinely and independently rooted in 
the UK and which was able to occupy a position which both parties were keen to see filled. 
By extension, this role gave the MCB the requisite capacity and exposure to occupy the 
prominent position of ‘authoritative spokesman’ on Muslim affairs in the media.  
 
As much as it could be criticised for other limitations, the early MCB did have the 
unprecedented asset of being the first Muslim body of its kind with some form of 
significant mandate and legitimacy to undertake leadership and representation. In its first 
year of existence, the MCB attracted affiliations from 250 organisations from around the 
UK, a number which has continued to increase consistently. Its legitimacy was also 
bolstered by its instituting of official and transparent procedures for membership, voting 
and decision making that were eventually formalised in its constitution and which made up 
the substance of its official launch in 1997. As such, the MCB quickly became the de facto 
port of call for government and official bodies when seeking dialogue and/or negotiation 
with Muslim community representatives. Further, this arrangement added important 
credibility to any pro-active lobbying that the MCB or individuals backed by the MCB 
decided to undertake. 
 
3.3 New Labour and Muslim representation 
Apart from the formal establishment of the MCB, 1997 was politically important for many 
other reasons - most of which are related to the Labour general election victory of that 
year. Historically, many of the manufacturing-class immigrant communities that had grown 
from the 1960s and 70s had been traditional Labour supporters. For them, the prospect of 
a Labour government represented a new hope, upon which many an expectation was 
pinned. It was anticipated that what had been variously characterised by so many Muslim 
commentators as a cold, post-colonialist, or just a plain anti-Muslim track record226 from 
the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher and that of her successor, John Major, 
could only be improved upon by the comparatively upbeat manner and overt keenness that 
                                                          
225   Source: ‘Was the MCB founded by the government of the day?’ in Frequently asked questions, 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/faq/faq.php [accessed on 10th April 2009] and ‘S for Surveys’ at 
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226 Kalim Siddiqui, ‘Generating “power” without politics’, speech delivered at Muslim Parliament’s London 
conference - The Future of Islam in Britain on 14th July 1990 (London: Muslim Institute, 1992), Letter from 
UKACIA to John Patten (19th July 1989) reproduced in UKACIA, Muslims and the Law in Multi-faith Britain: 
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was shown by New Labour to address the main issues of concern put forward by Muslim 
advocacy groups.227 What is more, the broader promise of a more approachable style of 
government under Labour was a source of encouragement for Muslims that they would be 
given the space and resources to voice their issues, and that government was prepared to 
genuinely listen to them as Muslims.  
 
What did Muslim ‘identity politics’ mean? 
Before examining how a British Muslim identity politics was formally institutionalised, it is 
worth establishing what practical meanings the term itself carried. I posit that it was about 
recognition, rights and the capacity to lobby, by Muslims qua Muslim. The first aspect 
relates to recognition. As I have already discussed in my first chapter, the need for 
recognition is quite often the first motivator for the expression of identity in politics by a 
minority or marginalised group. The initial way in which this need was expressed took the 
form of self-identification. This includes the titles by which community organisations 
choose to refer to themselves and to their leaders - all of which indicate the strong primacy 
of the Islamic/Muslim aspect of their identities, before any other aspect.  
 
Following on from this, the nature of the claims made to the state by Muslim advocacy 
bodies indicate the desire for recognition as Muslims - in the sense that they were both 
framed and premised on the idea of a communal Muslim identity that required both 
acknowledgement and rights in order for equality to be delivered. In other words, that the 
Muslim community required access to both official acknowledgement and to certain rights 
(be they exemptions/exceptional rights or rights that were already accorded to the 
mainstream, but where a loophole currently excluded them), in order to have true access to 
equality on a par with other citizens. 
 
This main aim of identity politics naturally leads to the final aspect, which is the space and 
capacity to lobby. All the Muslim representative organisations which I discuss here have 
lobbying as the most central of their functions. While they could never have been denied 
the right to make political representations or seek to apply influence or pressure on matters 
of concern to them, what British Muslim organisations have sought to achieve has been the 
establishment and formalisation of a direct, centralised channel of communication towards 
                                                          
227 By the time of its election into government in May 1997, the Labour Party was already in communication 
with Muslim groups (UKACIA and then the MCB) about the introduction of religious discrimination 
legislation and the state funding of Muslim schools. See British Muslims Monthly Survey from June 1997 through 
to January 1998.  
 110 
government, decision-making bodies and the media. This direct channel, it was hoped, 
would hold the same position as the one enjoyed by the Board of Deputies of British Jews 
(the Board).228 Although the Board, and the Chief Rabbi have not been without their own 
share of critics, as I will go on to show, it had established over time a widely recognised 
role as British Jewry’s spokesperson on both domestic and international politics as well as 
issues specifically relating to the state of Israel. 
 
This same aspiration to emulate what was seen as Jewish success in achieving effective 
ecclesiastical leadership is also illustrated by attempts in October 2010 to create a ‘Grand 
Mufti’ for the UK, claiming credence from Egypt’s Al-Azhar University  – and envisaged 
as some sort of counterpart to the Chief Rabbi and the Archbishop of Canterbury.229 
However, the enterprise failed to take off and was disowned by several quarters as 
inauthentic, ‘divisive’ and ‘regrettable’.230 
 
At this point, it is worth casting a glance at the establishment of Jewish identity politics in 
Britain and the origins of communal organisation among British Jews. In the following 
section, my survey of the institutionalisation of Jewish identity politics will provide a basis 
for my argument that the Jewish experience provided inspiration and an exemplar for the 
institutionalisation of a formally recognised Muslim identity politics, through the MCB, to 
aspire to.   
 
3.4 Jewish community organising in the UK – a survey 
 
When considering how British Muslim community organising became formalised in recent 
history, the question of how other religious-minority communities fared naturally arises. 
How did this formalisation compare with the experiences of other minority faith 
communities, in particular those which were also largely composed of immigrants? Can any 
                                                          
228 During the Rushdie affair, Shabbir Akhtar had not been alone in arguing that had Muslims ‘been a 
powerful, well-organised lobby like the Jews, Rushdie’s outrages would never have got into print’, quoted in 
Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad (2009), p.126 and calls to emulate the ‘Jewish model’ were made regularly. 
Iqbal Sacranie is also reported to have once said: "We are going to model ourselves on the Jewish Board of 
Deputies. See how much power they have in this country when we have none." Quoted by Yasmin Alibhai-
Brown, ‘Muslims can learn from this new Jewish group’ The Independent 12th February 2007. 
229 Cf. Letter to The Times ‘Support for UK Grand Mufti’, 4th February 2011 and ‘Announcement by scholars 
of Al-Azhar Al-Sharif concerning the declaration of “Banu Ibrahim – Children of Abraham” on dialogue 
between Muslims, Jews and Christians, and the establishment of the Office of Grand Mufti of the United 
Kingdom’, released 7th October 2010, available at the www.deenport.com message board [accessed on 18th 
April 2012]. 
230 Michael Binyon, ‘Grand Mufti claim highlights the pros and cons of Islam’s lack of ecclesiastical 
hierarchies’ The Times 28th January 2011. 
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comparisons and patterns be drawn, and what was unique about the Muslim experience? In 
an effort to answer some of these questions, I will look at the experience of Jewish 
communal organising in the UK and ask how and why it was that they managed to secure a 
firmer position within British law and establishment, and how their experience influenced 
the later development of Muslim community organising. After some background on British 
Jewish communal organising, specifically the Board of Deputies of British Jews, I will look 
at how the political engagement of both Jewish and Muslim immigrant communities was 
affected by cultural prejudices, migratory conditions, international connections and 
migratory mindsets. I will show how while there were common factors experienced by 
both communities, they each interacted in different ways with these factors. Ultimately, a 
combination of migratory conditions and subsequent political choices greatly facilitated the 
Board’s establishment and acceptance into the UK’s political landscape. While the MCB 
and its predecessors tried to forge a similar path, their success was limited by their 
interactions with their own migratory conditions and, crucially, much slower coming to 
terms with permanent settlement in the UK on the part of immigrant Muslim communities.  
 
3.4.1 British Jewish community organising: a brief history of early achievements: 
British Jewish community organisations have a far longer history than their Muslim 
counterparts. As an historically oppressed community, British Jews have long been engaged 
in the politics of identity, since the circumstances of their arrival, as exiles and refugees has 
meant that the intention to settle permanently has been clear from the outset. Thus both 
institution-building, and political engagement have been more focused (see section 3.5, iii). 
The Board of Deputies of British Jews, which has long enjoyed a quasi-official status as the 
official public representative of Anglo-Jewry traces its origins back to 1760, when the first 
meetings of coordination took place between appointed delegates from each of the 
Ashkenazi and Sephardi congregations in the UK.231 Of course with a history in excess of 
two and a half centuries, it will be impossible to do justice here to a comprehensive history 
of the Board, and of Jewish representative politics in the UK. However, what I will do here 
is to point out a few major milestones and show how they have been relevant in shaping 
the developing role of the Board.  
 
In this first instance, the Board’s purpose was to arrange for the two congregations’ joint 
communication to ‘testify their homage’ to King George III on the occasion of his 
                                                          
231 Raphael Langham, 250 Years of Convention and Contention: a history of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-
2010 (Edgware, Middlesex: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010), pp.8-10. 
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accession to the throne. There followed a formal agreement that those delegates would 
‘thereafter… deal with the most urgent matters which present themselves in connection 
with our nation’.232 However, the Board (or the London Committee of Jewish Deputies as 
it was initially known) met sparsely and irregularly during the early decades. Its first major 
spurt of development is generally associated with the presidency of Sir Moses Montefiore 
that spanned between the years 1835-74 (with gaps). Montefiore has been widely credited 
with laying down firm institutional foundations for the Board, formalising its constitution, 
structure, earning official recognition from the government and giving it an overall sense of 
permanency.233  
 
The Board consisted of lay-representatives, who were delegates from the various member 
congregations. Although the Board was technically open to congregations from across 
Britain, it was nonetheless dominated by those in and around London.234 As time passed, 
its remit broadened to cover not only official community representations to government, 
but also the role of regulation and authorisation of institutions and religious rites within the 
community – a role that often required cooperation with the two ‘ecclesiastical authorities’ 
– the Chief Rabbi of the United Synagogue as well as the Haham of the Sephardi 
congregations. In theory, these two posts were parallel ecclesiastical authorities, 
representing the Ashkenazi and the Sephardi congregations respectively, but in practice, the 
Chief Rabbi has come to be the most dominant of the two, due in part to the superior 
numbers of the congregations over which he claims authority, as well as a more extensive 
demographic spread, and more effective communal infrastructure.235 So while its initial role 
was one of providing a platform for British Jewry to express their loyalty to the Crown, the 
progressive institutionalisation of the Board and its development has led to its current 
status as the quasi-official representative body of Britain’s Jewish communities, 
participating in national events and negotiating on behalf of British Jews on matters of 
concern. The extent to which it has been successful is debatable, and as I shall go on to 
show, it has not been without its critics from among British Jews themselves. However its 
continued existence has been an important symbol of Jewish identity politics and provided 
                                                          
232 Extracted from the minute books of the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews, and quoted in C 
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a focal point both for the political establishment and other minority communities (such as 
Muslims) who looked to emulate the Board.  
 
Overcoming legal hurdles: 
British Jewry’s experience of emancipation and political engagement also set a precedent 
for future religious minorities. Ever since formal emancipation was inaugurated by the 1830 
Jewish Relief Act, there followed a succession of legal developments which removed 
official barriers that had previously restricted the civil and political rights of non-Anglicans. 
Many of these laws were passed specifically with Jews in mind, and so procedures specific 
to the Jewish communities were sometimes incorporated. These specific procedures, as I 
will show, helped to tacitly establish the Board of Deputies as the official custodian of 
Jewish civic and political affairs.  
 
For instance, the Marriage Registration Act of 1836 recognised the London Committee of 
Jewish Deputies, as it was then known, as the sole body that was permitted to certify 
Jewish places of worship for the purposes of marriage registration. As the first legal 
acknowledgement of the Committee, this implicitly conferred upon the Board a status of 
authority and legitimacy within the Jewish community, and recognised it as a representative 
body. The Act also bestowed legitimacy on the Chief Rabbi, albeit by proxy, due to the 
Board’s effective deference to the Chief Rabbi as its ecclesiastical authority. The 1846 
Religious Disabilities Act gave legal recognition to Jewish schools, places of worship and 
educational and charitable funds, thus putting their legal status on a par with counterpart 
non-conformist Christian institutions.236 By 1858, and after much wrangling between both 
Houses of Parliament, provisions were made in the Oath Act for Jewish MPs who had 
been elected to take up their seats in parliament by omitting reference to ‘Christian faith’, 
and subsequently Lionel de Rothschild became that year the first Jewish MP to take up his 
seat in parliament.237 
 
Similarly, the success of Britain’s Jews in securing official recognition and the relevant legal 
exemptions for specific aspects of religious practice also paved the way for Muslims. The 
Slaughter of Poultry Act 1967 and the Slaughterhouses Act 1974 both provide for 
exemptions on religious grounds for the practice of Shechita (Jewish ritual slaughter) from 
                                                          
236 ‘United Kingdom legislation concerning Jews’ in The Jewish Yearbook 1999 ed. by Stephen W. Massil (Essex: 
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the otherwise blanket requirement to stun animals before slaughter. The development of 
Beth Din, Jewish arbitrational courts to resolve civil disputes outside of English courts 
preceded the later establishment of Islamic Shari’a Councils to fulfil similar functions. 
Interestingly, an indication of a changed context to identity politics is that although Beth 
Din have been functioning for centuries, they have never generated the kind of 
controversy, criticism and opposition from wider society that Shari’a Councils have, in 
particular, the vitriolic media reactions to the reflections on the incorporation of certain 
aspects of shari’a by the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams in 2008.238 
 
All in all, the lifting of various restrictions relating to education, civic participation and 
public office for example meant that Britain’s Jews were unwittingly blazing a trail – by 
tackling the hurdles that they faced to equal citizenship, it meant that in the future, Britain’s 
Muslim communities, for example, would not have to face them either. 
 
3.5 Institutionalisation of Muslim Identity Politics in Britain – unique challenges 
To return to British Muslims, the institutionalisation of the MCB took place in a wholly 
different era and context to that of the Board of Deputies. Whereas the Board had the 
benefit of the contemporaneous Board of Dissenting Deputies to look to for inspiration, 
the MCB was on its own. This was coupled with several unique challenges that Muslim 
communities faced when it came to successfully establishing and maintaining political 
engagement, as compared with Britain’s Jewish communities. I place these under four 
headings: cultural prejudice, international connections, background and migratory 
conditions, and finally, migratory mindsets. In discussing these challenges alongside the 
experiences of British Jews, I will show how they contributed towards a unique set of 
circumstances within which Muslims in Britain were to forge their path towards formal 
political engagement.  
 
i. Cultural prejudice: 
For both Islam and Judaism, there has been a history stretching as far back as medieval 
times of fear, prejudice and demonisation that appeared in popular English culture and was 
regularly reflected in official channels through policy or discourse. Jews have long borne 
the brunt of historical ‘Christian theological contempt for Judaism’,239 which painted a 
picture of Jews as being in league with the devil and/or the Antichrist, as blasphemers and 
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enemies of Christians and Christianity. Added to this there were popular stereotypes which 
utilised and exaggerated derided ‘features’ of the Jews – Shylock the rich and stingy 
moneylender in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, and Fagin, leader of a gang of child 
pickpockets in Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist are both examples of characters which provide 
ample material on the nature of negative Jewish stereotyping in English culture.240 
 
Yet although there were significant historical differences and divergences between Judaism 
and Christianity, there was nonetheless arguably more common ground between the Jewish 
communities and the background political culture of the Britain in which they had settled, 
than there was between British culture and the UK’s immigrant Muslim communities. A 
shared Judaeo-Christian religious heritage meant that while some cultural and ritualistic 
aspects of Jewish religious identity may well have seemed foreign, they were comparatively 
more fathomable to the average person than cultural and religious practices of the Muslim 
immigrant communities that were to later arrive on Britain’s shores. Since Judaism 
historically precedes Christianity, there is an overlap of shared Biblical heritage from which 
a sense of familiarity can be extracted. As much as there has been historic prejudice and 
hostility towards Jews, the Old Testament remained a text that Christians recognised and 
referred to, and importantly, were much more likely to have come across it than the 
Qur’an. Islam, being the newest of the three faiths, arrived in modern Britain in the form 
of the spiritually-infused, folklore-influenced faith as practiced by Muslim immigrants from 
rural South-Asia.241 When political organising picked up and the first Muslim advocacy 
organisations were established, they were often headed by individuals associated with 
Islamic political movements ‘back home’ in their countries of origin.242 British Jews on the 
other hand were for a long time very wary about ‘importing’ ideas or techniques from 
political movements abroad. This is demonstrated by the vehement opposition that 
Theodore Herzl received when he first mooted his ideas about a Jewish state in the Jewish 
Chronicle in 1896.243  
 
 
                                                          
240 There is a debate to be had about whether the respective authors intended to indulge in or endorse anti-
Semitism through creating these characters, or whether they simply sought to reflect and portray the tragedy 
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the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. 
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ii. International connections: 
Both Jewish and Muslim immigrant communities arrived to the UK with links and affinities 
to counterpart communities, whether ‘back home’ in the countries from which they 
emigrated, or more generally wherever Jews and Muslims reside. For Muslims, there is a 
sense of loyalty to the ummah244 or the ‘Muslim world’ and for many Jews there has often 
been a similar sense of loyalty or attachment to the wider Diaspora as well as the state of 
Israel, both as an aspiration in the early 20th Century, and after its eventual establishment in 
1948. Yet it seems fair to say that each of the two communities interacted with these 
connections differently.  
 
As I highlight in various parts of this thesis, Muslim community organisations have, in 
most instances, been far more prone to overseas influence and even control. This is 
exemplified by the influence of trans-national movements on Muslim identity 
organisations; additionally, the UMO was initially linked to the Egyptian government’s 
aspirations for an international network of pan-Arab/Muslim organisations, and the 
UKACIA and Muslim Parliament were both financially linked to Saudi Arabia and Iran 
respectively. Additionally, the MCB has been dominated ever since its establishment by 
individuals who bear (at least historical) links with the Jamaat-e-Islami and similar Islamist 
organisations from the Muslim world. Although there has recently been a palpable 
distancing between Muslim organisations and Muslim political causes abroad, particularly 
since 7/7, this development has come effectively in reverse order to the Jewish 
community’s experience. As David Cesarani has argued, support for Zionism and the idea 
of an Israeli state seems to have picked up among official channels among British Jews, and 
specifically the Board of Deputies, only after the Holocaust.245 Prior to this, Zionism had 
received a poor reception for fear that it carried an implication that Jews ‘could not 
assimilate into Europe’. In fact, the Board of Deputies actively opposed ‘Zionist 
aspirations’ during the First World War, through to the interwar period,246 and its vocal 
backing of Israel only really began to gain momentum in the latter half of the 20th Century, 
when it was over one and a half centuries old.  
 
 
 
                                                          
244 I discuss this in more depth in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
245 David Cesarani, ‘The transformation of communal authority in Anglo-Jewry 1914-1940’ in The Making of 
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iii. Background and migratory conditions: 
Unlike Britain’s South Asian Muslim immigrants, Jewish immigrants to the UK were 
‘twice-minorities’. They hailed largely from Eastern Europe, where they had already lived as 
minorities, and where they had often faced far more acute persecution and discrimination 
than they would ever encounter in the UK. Indeed for many, the UK was positively a safe 
haven where they could escape from a history of pogroms and the day-to-day experiences 
of anti-Semitism, as well as (much later), the Holocaust.247 
 
For these Jewish immigrants, there was a clear intention to settle in the UK from the start, 
and this is exemplified by the early but cautious and measured forays into politics as well as 
ready expressions of loyalty to crown and country. An important example of this is the 
keenness of ‘acculturated, middle-class Jews’ to volunteer in the First World War as a 
demonstration of their loyalty.248 The establishment of schools, community arbitration 
courts (Beth Din) and synagogues among other aspects of community infrastructure all took 
the shape of a community aspiring to permanence and indigenousness.  
 
The wave of Muslim arrivals of the 1950s and 60s was the product of completely difference 
circumstances. These were mostly young, male labourers who arrived without their 
families, seeking to earn some money by filling a gap in the labour market of post-war 
Britain. In the main, they did not arrive with the resolve to settle, hence their willingness to 
put up with squalid living conditions and their belated interest in family-oriented 
community projects.249 This initial assumption that migration to the UK was primarily a 
temporary, economic measure meant that long-term planning did not feature so heavily in 
the life of Britain’s immigrant Muslim communities.250 The ‘myth of return’ endured, 
leading to lack of commitment to their newly established ‘homes’. Community institutions 
were built in a more gradual, piecemeal fashion. Even economic investment was often 
channelled directly to supporting family members ‘back home’ – a direct contrast to the 
long tradition of philanthropy amongst wealthy Jews, many of whom funded schools, 
synagogues and a range of other community establishments.251 
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iv. Migratory mindsets: 
From its inception, the Board self-consciously sought to present itself to the establishment 
in a similar light to representatives of Christian non-conformists of the day.252 The very 
name – London Board of Jewish Deputies, bore obvious parallels to the pre-existing 
London Board of Dissenting Deputies (est. 1732), and according to Michael Clark, was ‘a 
clear statement of the place Anglo-Jewry believed it inhabited in Britain’s religiously plural 
society’.253 This approach indicates an aspiration from the outset for the Board to pursue an 
‘integrationist’ path. By this I mean one where it hoped the Jewish community would fit in 
to the existing British socio-political landscape, rather than mark itself out as separate by 
functioning outside the political set-up of the day. That the very establishment of the Board 
was triggered by a desire to present a united expression of allegiance to the Crown is once 
again telling of the overarching desire to integrate and ‘fit in’. In contrast to this, the 
beginnings of representative groups within Britain’s Muslim community are found to have 
been moments of crisis and perceived attack, most famously exemplified by the Rushdie 
affair which triggered the formation of the UKACIA and the Muslim Parliament.254  
 
This same aspiration to integrate and ‘fit in’ is aptly illustrated by contrasting the apparent 
motivations behind the establishment of Jewish and Muslim community schools. Michael 
Clark notes how early Jewish communal education was ‘not designed to inculcate religion.’ 
Rather, ‘The separate Jewish schooling network was maintained in this era primarily for the 
purposes of disciplining, occupying and ‘improving’ the Jewish poor’.255 The Jews Free 
School (JFS) in London clearly saw social mobility for the community’s poor as its main 
target, while the children of middle and upper class families were sent to mainstream 
schools, where they were expected to ‘mingle’ with their Christian peers.256 In a similar 
vein, teachers at the JFS forced school-children to change Yiddish sounding names – 
evidently part of wider efforts towards acculturation and integration of the Jewish poor.257 
 
So the focus was on building academic achievement and ‘culturing’ for the sake of social 
mobility and integration. There was of course some religious ethos in Jewish day schools, 
                                                          
252 Aubrey Newman, The Board of Deputies of British Jews 1760-1985 – a brief survey (London: Vallentine Mitchell 
and Co., 1987), p.5. 
253 Clark, Albion and Jerusalem (2009), p.110. 
254 Cf. Section 3.1 in this chapter.  
255 Ibid., pp.196-8. 
256 Ibid., p.199. 
257 R. Livshin, ‘The Acculturation of the Children of Immigrant Jews in Manchester, c.1890-1920’, in The 
Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry ed. by Cesarani (1990), p.82. 
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but more intensive, traditional-style religious instruction was generally the preserve of 
Hadarim – small after-school enterprises providing religious teaching in immigrant districts. 
These were also frowned upon as a barrier to integration.258 
 
Muslim community schools on the other hand were clearly established specifically to 
safeguard the Islamic education and identity of Muslim children. The aim does not seem to 
have always been specifically to establish separate education per se;259 it was more the 
difficulty that Muslim parents had in securing their desired adjustments to the state 
education system which propelled them towards setting up a Muslim school sector. These 
included, variously: segregation of the sexes, especially girls; exemptions from music, art, 
physical education, religious education lessons and religious assemblies; arrangements for 
prayer rooms and/or Friday congregational prayers; adjustments to uniforms to 
incorporate Islamic notions of ‘modesty’; the provision of halal meat in school meals.260 
Muslim schools were regarded as a comprehensive solution to these various challenges, 
preventing the dilution of culture and providing a safe space for Muslim children to learn 
about their faith alongside their wider education, without having to necessarily make 
‘compromises’ to their beliefs and culture that were demanded by participation in the 
mainstream sector.261 
 
3.6 The MCB and its genesis 
There is now an old clichéd story that is told of how the Muslim Council of Britain was set 
up, or at the least, crucially supported and decisively moulded by the interests of New 
Labour, and that its first decade of existence was delimited by a relationship of 
understanding with successive government personalities and sections of the civil service.262 
By this account, the nature of the most successful British Muslim representative umbrella 
body to date would be that of an almost quasi-non-governmental body – one that although 
                                                          
258 Endelman, The Jews of Britain (2002) p.146. 
259 Marie Parker-Jenkins, ‘Equal access to state funding: the case of Muslim Schools in Britain’,  paper 
presented at the British Educational Research Association Annual Conference, Queen's University of Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, 27th – 30th August 1998, available at: 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/000000911.htm [accessed on 22nd April 2012]. 
260 Lewis, Islamic Britain (1994), pp.70-71. 
261 Shabbir Akhtar, The Muslim Parents’ Handbook: what every Muslim parent should know (London: Ta Ha 
Publishers, 1993), Sarwar, Muslims and Education in the UK (1983). 
262 Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims (2012), pp.160-162. There has, thus far, been hardly any 
academic literature devoted to the MCB, its history and development. Studies I have identified are Konrad 
Pedziwiatr, ‘Creating New Discursive Arenas and Influencing the Policies of the State: The Case of the 
Muslim Council of Britain’ Social Compass Vol.54:2 (2007), pp.267-280, and an unpublished MSc dissertation 
at Birkbeck College, University of London, entitled ‘The Muslim Council of Britain and the participation of 
Islam focused interest groups in British politics’, (2010). 
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not formally instituted at the behest and direction of government, was nonetheless 
indebted to the Labour government for its impact and success, and thus, for its continued 
existence over the course of its early history.  
 
In fact, as I have mentioned previously, evidence shows that unity initiatives among 
Muslims date significantly further back than 1997. Back in 1994, representations to the 
Conservative government were deemed not to merit serious consideration since they came 
across as insufficiently coordinated and lacking in a clear voice. This sentiment was perhaps 
most directly expressed by the then home secretary, Michael Howard, who actually 
suggested to Muslim leaders meeting with him that their various representations 
surrounding the common issue of religious discrimination would be more attentively 
received if they were to present their political case under a single, authoritative and united 
body.263 The idea was that this arrangement would provide the requisite coordination in 
voice and action for coherent government-community negotiation to develop. Since there 
was greater potential for misunderstanding to occur during this stage,264 the need for a 
coordinated voice and coherent organisation is understandable.  
 
 As I have mentioned, the MCB was not the first attempt by Muslims to organise 
themselves under a unified banner for purposes of representation and advocacy. Indeed 
many key figures among the MCB’s founding ‘old guard’ are veterans of preceding 
initiatives in communal representation. Iqbal Sacranie served previously as the convenor of 
UKACIA, while Muhammad Abdul Bari, his successor as MCB Secretary-General was a 
previous President of the Islamic Forum Europe – a federal organisation linking various 
community initiatives in London, around Manchester and beyond, as well as a long-serving 
key figure at the East London Mosque.265 Since its inception, the majority of the MCB’s 
office bearers have tended to be drawn from a common ‘pool’ of prominent individuals, 
many of whom found their first calling in the field of national politics in the wake of the 
Rushdie affair,266 and a majority of whom also have backgrounds in the ‘reformist’ strand 
                                                          
263 Ansari, The Infidel Within (2004), p.364. 
264 Cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis on the distance in understanding between government/establishment and 
community representatives. 
265 Author’s personal conversation with Dr Abdul Bari, October 2011. Also see 
www.islamicforumeurope.com [accessed on 17th April 2012] for more information about the IFE and its 
activities.  
266 Philip Lewis, ‘British ‘ulama and the politics of social visibility’ in Politics of visibility: Young Muslims in 
European Public Spaces ed. by Gerdien Jonker and Valerie Amiraux (London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 
p.170. 
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of community activism.267 However, unlike its predecessors such as the UKACIA, the 
UMO and the Muslim Parliament, the MCB garnered from the outset a high level of 
endorsement from government and the establishment that proved pivotal in cementing its 
position as the primary point of contact and/or liaison whenever the need arose. This 
advantage paid substantial dividends in the form of credibility and networking, both of 
which have been crucial in maintaining the rate of success that the MCB has had in 
effective lobbying and having the establishment and the media’s ‘ear’. 
 
The view from mainstream politics during this time was also conducive to the MCB’s 
growth and stability, as the building of the New Labour project under Tony Blair’s 
leadership represented the prospect of a substantially fresh style of politics – one which 
took an altogether different tone to emphasise new priorities and concerns. This was not 
least due to Labour’s acute appreciation that if it was to survive, and even hope to thrive 
into the long term, it needed to appeal and relate to a much broader constituency than to 
which the party had ever done before. As such, the level at which senior Labour figures 
engaged with Muslim representatives was both more frequent and more promising in its 
approach.  
 
3.6.1 New Labour and the MCB – early achievements: 
For example, directly after the General Election of 1997, there were hints and suggestions 
that a Labour government would be favourable towards the conferment of government 
funding to Muslim schools, and that there was sympathy with the case for anti-religious 
discrimination legislation, the possibilities for which would at least be seriously 
considered.268 This build-up served to raise the bar of expectations as to what Muslim 
representatives hoped could be delivered under Labour. On its own initiative, Labour 
endorsed Mohammad Sarwar as the first Muslim to run for a safe parliamentary seat in the 
1997 elections. Sarwar won the election and thus became the first Muslim MP in the UK, 
representing Glasgow Govan. This milestone was shortly followed in 1998 by the 
appointment to the House of Lords of two Muslim peers, also from the Labour party – 
Nazir Ahmed of Rotherham and Pola Uddin of Bethnal Green – making them the first 
Muslim peers in post-war Britain.269 As such, the late 1990s was a time when both 
                                                          
267 Cf. Fig. 2, p.224 of this thesis. 
268 ‘Religious Discrimination Legislation’ British Muslims Monthly Survey (Birmingham, June 1997), Vol. V, No. 
6, p.1 and ‘New Blasphemy Law?’ British Muslims Monthly Survey (Birmingham, July 1997), Vol. V, No. 7, p.3. 
269 Lord Henry Stanley of Alderley (d. 1903) was the first Muslim peer, having converted to Islam in 1862. He 
received a Muslim burial, attended by diplomats from the Ottoman Embassy in London, and a janaza prayer 
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government and community representatives felt that there was much to be gained from 
forging greater mutual understanding and a fresh, more flexible approach towards calls for 
recognition.   
 
Muslim activists on the matter of education and schools were heartened that the prospect 
for state funded Muslim schools was drawing closer270 and as such, campaigning was 
stepped up by the Association of Muslim Schools and in particular the Islamia School in 
north west London - which had submitted its first application for state funding in 1984. 
Sure enough, by January 1998, only eight months after Labour came to power, both the 
Islamia School and Al-Furqan School in Birmingham were granted government funding. 
This decision signified a policy change from the consistent refusal that funding requests 
had previously been met with from successive Conservative governments. Labour’s active 
engagement with the MCB on the census’ religion question consultations, and on the issue 
of religious discrimination legislation, were both also seen as promising signs of a future of 
greatly enhanced cooperation and understanding between Muslim groups and the 
government.  
 
There were other gestures that provided both symbolic and real practical encouragement to 
British Muslims. In 1999, the post of Muslim Advisor to the Prison Service was created. 
The role included coordination of the work of dozens of imams who were already 
providing (often voluntary) religious support services for Muslim inmates within the UK’s 
prison system, as well as the provision of official advice and guidance on all matters relating 
to Islam and Muslims, including dietary needs, religious obligations and religious holy 
days.271 This development had come about after several years of consultation and 
representations to the government from the Iqra Trust and the Islamic Cultural Centre (the 
London Central Mosque) – both of whom had been engaged in support and educational 
work within prisons for some time.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
was performed for him by Abdullah Quilliam at the Liverpool Mosque. Later on, Lord Rowland Headley 
(d.1935) and Lady Evelyn Cobbold (d.1963) were both hereditary peers who converted to Islam during the 
inter-war period, however, Labour’s appointed Muslim peers were marked out by their appointment not only 
as Muslim peers, but with an implicit understanding that they would communicate and represent Muslim 
community interests – which they did. 
270British Muslims Monthly Survey (Birmingham, January 1997), Vol. V, No. 1, p. 7 and May 1997 Vol. V, No. 5, 
p. 4 
271 ‘First Muslim Advisor to Prison Service’, The Common Good Vol.1, Issue 2, December 1999. 
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The same year also saw the launch of the first government-backed British Hajj Delegation. 
This was a scheme whereby the Foreign and Commonwealth Office funded and organised 
the stay of a British medical team of volunteers to provide on-hand medical assistance to 
British pilgrims to Mecca and Medina during the Hajj season, should they require it. 
Additionally, there was a consular aspect which ensured that basic consular assistance and 
advice was on hand. The scheme was enthusiastically received not only for the genuine 
services and reassurance that it provided for pilgrims and their families, but it was also 
appreciated as part of a friendly approach from the government in taking the recognition of 
the specific needs of British Muslims beyond lip-service, by providing actual resources into 
improving an area where there was specific need. 
 
On the matter of religious discrimination, and quite in fitting with the prevailing political 
mood of the time, the year 1997 also saw the release of the Runnymede Trust’s report on 
Islamophobia.272 This represented the moment when the term ‘Islamophobia’ first began to 
be used in public discourse - in itself a sign of much wider recognition for the Equality 
Gap, its existence and its problems. Defining the term as ‘unfounded hostility towards 
Muslims, the dread and hatred of Islam - and, therefore, to fear or dislike all or most 
Muslims’,273 it is credited with having opened the way towards an unprecedented level of 
official attention in addressing the problems of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim 
                                                          
272 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: a challenge for us all (London, 1997). 
Only two years later, in 1999, the Macpherson Inquiry’s report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence was 
published, which aside from crucial recommendations to the Metropolitan Police, also prompted enormous 
soul-searching in matters relating to race-relations and discrimination in politics and society on a more general 
level. Notably, Dr Richard Stone, a member of the commission which produced the report was also an 
advisor to the Macpherson Inquiry. 
273 The Runnymede definition of Islamophobia has not gone uncontested cf. Humayun Ansari and Farid 
Hafez, ‘Islamophobia: an introduction’ in From the Far Right to the Mainstream: Islamophobia in Party Politics and the 
Media ed. by Humayun Ansari and Farid Hafez (Campus, 2012), esp. pp.14-20. Among the main criticisms are 
that the definition is too simplistic, describing the features of Islamophobia in binary, black and white terms. 
For instance, that ‘Islam is seen as separate and other, rather than similar and interdependent’, or ‘Islam is 
seen as an enemy – violent, threatening and terroristic, rather than as a partner’. Runnymede Trust, 
Islamophobia: a challenge for us all (London, 1997). Chris Allen argues that such a definition is problematic 
because it overlooks the reality that many manifestations of Islamophobia in every day life will be of a more 
‘grey’ variety. In other words, the Runnymede definition does not tackle arguments about the face-veil being a 
‘barrier’ to social cohesion or those about the ‘death’ of multiculturalism. These, he argues, are fertile ground 
from which the likes of the BNP have been making gains. Cf. Chris Allen ‘K.I.S.S – Keeping Islamophobia 
Simple and Stupid 28th April 2008, available at www.chris-allen.co.uk [accessed on 5th August 2013]. Such a 
view is not dissimilar to the arguments made by Baroness Warsi in her 2011 speech on ‘dinner table 
Islamophobia’ (see Postscript). Another weakness, argue Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, is the use of the 
term ‘unfounded hostility’, since this would be open to interpretation in the courts. They additionally express 
concern that the term ‘Islamophobia’ has itself been overused, producing a ‘victimology’ and potentially 
providing ammunition to those critics who might like to deny its significance or claim it has been 
overexaggerated. See Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood ‘Refutations of racism in the ‘Muslim question’’ Patterns 
of Prejudice Vol. 43:3-4 (2009) pp.335-54. So while the report itself was definitely a step forward in official 
recognition of how widespread Islamophobia was, it nevertheless left substantial outstanding unresolved 
issues in definition. 
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discrimination.274 Whereas preceding Conservative governments had simply refused to 
acknowledge issues of anti-Muslim discrimination as warranting official attention (see 
discussions of the Rushdie affair in Chapter 3 of this thesis), the ready reception of the 
Runnymede report in 1997 was again indicative of Labour’s preparedness to forge a new 
approach towards Muslim identity politics.  
 
Yet it proved not enough for the Labour government to simply be prepared to 
acknowledge Islamophobia as a real and pressing social ill. What the MCB was after was a 
concrete legal development that protected Muslim citizens from discrimination or 
harassment on the basis of religion. While amendments to the Crime and Disorder Act in 
1998 created separate offences for crimes that were ‘racially or religiously aggravated’275 
which made provisions for the prosecution of any religiously aggravated crime that could 
be shown to be even partially racially motivated, these were still considered to be lacking by 
the MCB: 
Even the last minute amendments to the Crime and Disorder Act do not 
apply to me or those like me. I cannot summon indirect reference to my 
race – and find protection there. Indeed why would I want to? I feel sorry 
for those who are forced to surreptitiously use the clever language of the 
law to find protection.276 
 
While the Labour government did show initial indifference towards supporting this specific 
cause of legislative reform, campaigning continued apace until finally in 2006 the Racial and 
Religious Discrimination Act was introduced.277 Although this did take several years, the 
MCB had assiduously sustained the debate and maintained dialogue with the government 
throughout this period.  
 
Overall, the period between 1997-2001 was a time when relations between both the newly 
formed MCB and the newly elected Labour government were marked by a mutual desire 
                                                          
274 Chris Allen, ‘The ‘first’ decade of Islamophobia’ 5th July 2007, available at www.chris-allen.co.uk [accessed 
on 20th April 2013]; Yahya Birt ‘Defining Islamophobia today: the state of the art’ 15th September 2009, 
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275 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Part II, Racially or religiously aggravated offences: England and Wales. 
276 Extract from a speech by Sarah Joseph, then of the MCB’s Social Welfare and Regeneration Committee, 
quoted in Ahmed Versi, ‘Cabinet Minister accepts Muslim lunch invitation’ The Muslim News, 25th December 
1998. 
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welcomed, the extent to which it has the power to forcefully prosecute racists, and specifically anti-Muslim 
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for progress in terms of recognition and understanding for the needs of British Muslims, 
and generally, for better relations for the future.   
 
Conclusion 
The period between the 1980s and 2001 contained the most formative and defining years 
for contemporary Muslim identity politics. Preoccupation with and organising around 
identity preservation continued during the 1980s, and the Rushdie affair towards the end of 
the decade prompted urgent steps towards the co-ordination and formalisation of 
communal representation efforts across the UK. This opened up the way for more effective 
calls for recognition as a community and a much more coherent articulation of claims to the 
government and the wider establishment, that, it was hoped, would bring about greater civic 
equality for British Muslims. I have summarised these claims into what I have termed the 
Equality Gap, and it has been the different aspects of this gap that have continued to form 
a justificatory basis for the continued functioning of Muslim community and representative 
groups. The persistence of Muslim community activists in raising the Equality Gap as an 
issue over the decades is indicative of the reality of the challenges and obstacles that are 
posed by its continued existence. The Rushdie affair and its aftermath represented a 
learning curve for both government and the Muslim communities’ new-found 
representatives. Over time, arguments and approaches have been revised and fine-tuned, 
whilst some have been discarded altogether in favour of new ones. The most enduring 
grievance which has been voiced in the context of several claims and requests put forward 
to government has been that of the Equality Gap. My thesis will proceed to look at Muslim 
identity politics with an understanding of the central justification that the Equality Gap 
embodies, with a special focus on the role and experience of civil liberties in their 
development. 
 
In the wake of the Rushdie affair, there had emerged a number of structures aspiring to 
voice the concerns of British Muslims and to secure their rights. Some, such as the MP, 
took a more confrontational approach, others such as UKACIA preferred to pursue 
dialogue and diplomacy by campaigning and making representations to the government. But 
by the late 1990s, a combination of years of consultative groundwork and active 
encouragement from the government had placed the newly formed MCB at the helm of 
British Muslim identity politics.  
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The MCB has been the most long-lived of these and the most successful to date, not least 
because of the substantial endorsement that was afforded to its establishment by the 
government, and also because of its efforts to secure legitimacy through bringing on board 
affiliates from across the country and from a range of different sections within British 
Muslim religious and cultural spectra. In fact by the closing years of the 20th Century, the 
establishment of the MCB and its early development can be considered as something of a 
formalisation of British Muslim identity politics, in the same way that Jewish identity politics 
had been formalised over the years through the functioning of the Board of Deputies of 
British Jews. Indeed, a survey of the development of identity politics and community 
representation among both British Jews and British Muslims reveals interesting points of 
comparison as well as contrasts.  
 
Different migratory conditions have meant that each community approached its settlement 
in the UK differently. Long-term community planning played a greater role in the 
establishment of Jewish pan-community representation, whereas for Muslims, this came 
about more as a reaction to external circumstances. Ultimately, the formalisation of Muslim 
identity politics came about as a result of a sort of trial-and-error process, as consecutive 
efforts – from the 1960s, up until the mid-1990s – to unite British Muslims and represent 
them politically encountered hurdles, and fresh efforts took their place. 
 
Yet despite these unique challenges, by the turn of the century, Muslim identity politics had 
made a number of tangible achievements. A favourable political climate had afforded the 
MCB the type of official recognition that had long been craved by Muslim communal 
leaders, and with this came the achievement of considerable milestones in narrowing 
aspects of the Equality Gap – the first state funding for Muslim schools, a commitment 
from government to tackle religious hatred in the law, the success of the MCB-led 
campaign to include a religion question in the national census, as well as greater political 
representation, and formal state recognition and provision for the specific needs of British 
Muslims in various areas. In Chapter 4, I will show how the terrorist attacks of 11th 
September 2001 prompted a turning point in this quasi-official status that Muslim identity 
politics, primarily through the MCB, had recently acquired. 
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Chapter Four:  
 
The development of British Muslim Identity Politics: Turning Point 1 
The Aftermath of the September 11th Attacks: 
(September 2001 – July 2005) 
 
This period is characterised by a sharp increase in the level of Muslim political agency and 
the intensity of community organising. Much of this increase came about as a direct 
response to the rapid alterations which were taking place in the global and national arenas 
in reaction to the US terrorist attacks of September 11th. The introduction of heightened 
security measures and the style, discourse and thinking behind the resulting ‘war on terror’ 
provoked concerns in many quarters about silencing, restricting and/or channelling of 
expression and dissent as effects of:  
a) Restrictions/proscriptions imposed by anti-terror laws, and 
b) Disenchantment with perceptions of attitudes and motives in government foreign and 
domestic policies.  
These presented Muslim representatives and the government with fresh challenges that 
resulted in a defining moment in their relationship, leading to a somewhat cool and more 
cautious attitude between them. At the same time, there was a (also essentially reactive) 
drive among Muslims to state clearly their positions on matters which they felt they were 
being misunderstood and seriously misjudged on – including the denouncement of 
terrorism and violence, issues of loyalty and citizenship, and the notion of separate cultures 
and the irreconcilability of Islam with western democracy – often characterised as a ‘clash 
of civilisations’. The latter concept, as I will show later on in this chapter, became 
increasingly utilised as a tool by the far-right and others to justify an emergent ‘clean-faced’, 
respectable form of Islamophobia. 
 
This period also saw a growth in Muslim involvement within broad-based social and 
political coalitions (such as the anti-war movement), as well as the emergence and 
development of various new and more creative modes of Muslim self-expression to join 
pre-existing ones. It also witnessed a refreshed, more nuanced approach to reasoning that 
was used by Muslims to argue for their causes in the public-political domain, in particular 
the old issue of a legal response to religious discrimination and incitement to religious 
hatred. 
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In this chapter, I will first outline notable aspects of British Muslim political consciousness 
in the few years prior to the attacks of 9/11. This will help me to draw out exactly how this 
juncture represents a turning point and the role that freedom of expression and civil 
liberties played in these changes.  I will look at the reactions to 9/11 across government 
and Muslim advocacy groups and then discuss the changes that took place during the four 
years between 9/11 and the summer of 2005 (just before the 7th July attacks in London) 
under four main headings: new security legislation and the language of securitization, 
government-MCB relations, developments in the far-right and Islamophobia, and 
innovative forms of self-expression among British Muslims. I will analyse what the various 
developments under each of these four themes meant for Muslim groups, in particular the 
MCB, and also what they meant for the government’s relations with them as well as British 
Muslim political consciousness in general. This analysis will include a consideration of the 
policy developments related to each of these respective themes.  
4.1 British Islam at the turn of the millennium 
 
In the years running up to the new millennium, British Muslim public and political life was 
developing to become both outgoing and highly confident. The intense efforts at 
institution building that took place during the 1990s paid off by creating a generation of 
young, politically conscious and religiously committed British Muslims who viewed their 
Islamic identity and its primacy in their lives not only as something to protect and preserve, 
but also to positively promote.  
 
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, religio-political activism in the wake of the 
Rushdie affair had attracted the interest and subsequently, consolidated the influence of 
Islamic movements from around the Muslim world on the Muslim communities of the 
UK. One impact of this was that young British Muslims found that they now had easier 
access to a whole range of different political interests and perspectives – each was keen to 
widen its sphere of influence as far as possible. For many young Muslims in this generation 
there was something of a collective discovery that their ‘Muslim identity’ could be 
represented by a whole range of different political interests and perspectives. Youth and 
student groups, spurred on by this growing ‘Muslim-consciousness’, vied with one another 
to win a following amongst the second and third generations who had grown up without 
the kinds of psychological and practical struggles that their parents had faced. Whereas the 
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newly arrived first generation had been preoccupied with laying down foundations for their 
families’ basic needs, their children enjoyed a far greater degree of confidence and 
capability to assert what was distinctive about their own identities rather than trying hard to 
blend in with wider society.  
 
The new ‘primarily Muslim’ religious identity that had been fostered by the events of the 
Rushdie affair was carried with pride by many of the community’s young people. Visible 
manifestations of this included a steady increase in those who preferred to wear traditional 
religious or cultural dress. While such a development is clearly difficult to measure since no 
statistics directly measuring such a fluid aspect of individual choice as clothing can be 
obtained, anecdotal evidence sourced from articles and accounts written about this period 
are useful in giving an idea of how much the 1990s were a period of religious discovery and 
self-assertion for young British Muslims.278 And while the socio-economic status of many 
Muslim communities remained relatively low, significant numbers of young Muslims had 
nonetheless enjoyed access to good education, often better than that of their parents. Their 
entry into universities and the professions injected greater levels of confidence within their 
communities, not to mention diversity of opinion, aptitude and expertise. 
 
Strides had been made in political representation too, and the number of Muslims entering 
local politics was on the increase. While the statistics for Muslims in local politics can only 
be approximated from more general statistics on race and ethnicity in the field, they are 
definitely indicative of a steady, if limited, rise during this period,279 although as Hussain 
notes, this was largely due to individual endeavours rather than group participation or 
mass-organising. Indeed, where there were attempts at group participation in politics, such 
                                                          
278 For instance, Jonathan Birt reports on the preferred dress of a local salafi meeting-group of young men. I 
quote: ‘Some members of the group had developed a ‘look’: Pakistani-style shalwar kameez in camouflage, an 
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279 Dilwar Hussain ‘Councillors and Caliphs: Muslim Political Participation in Britain’ in Seddon, Hussain, 
and Malik, British Muslims between Assimilation and Segregation: Historical, Legal and Social Realities (2004), pp.173-
200; and Muhammad Anwar ‘Issues, Policy and Practice’ in Muslims in Britain ed. by Abbas (2005), pp.38-9. 
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as the Islamic Party of Britain280 and the Muslim Parliament (discussed earlier), results were 
poor and projects were short-lived.  
 
In terms of public self-image, and how Muslim communities saw themselves reflected in 
the mainstream, it was not uncommon to find a deep suspicion and mistrust of the 
portrayal of Islam and Muslims in the media ingrained in the collective psyche of many in 
the Muslim community. A large part of this can be put down to memories of the Rushdie 
affair, which were still fresh,281 but also goes back much further in the past.282 Both print 
and broadcast media were frequently portrayed as a form of enemy, who had ulterior 
vested interests in projecting a negative image of the Muslim community to their wider 
audiences. Such an understanding fed neatly into a polarised postcolonial perspective of 
‘The West versus Islam’ which featured Islam and Muslims as downtrodden and mistreated 
by an exploitative, and godless (or at least anti-Islamic) ‘West’. 
 
International security: 
Britain was by this stage sheltering a whole host of different political refugees from the 
Muslim world, who were attracting followers from among the country’s own Muslim 
population. For better or for worse, the UK’s perceived leniency when it came to 
allowances for political asylum seekers made it a popular destination for those Islamic 
political activists who were in exile or on the run from oppressive regimes in their home 
countries. Many exiled dissidents would cite the UK’s scope for freedom of expression as 
well as its historic reputation for sheltering ‘foreign dissidents, from Karl Marx to Victor 
Hugo’.283 The UK’s position as a ‘destination of choice’ was no doubt enhanced by its 
geography. In terms of distance, it was not too far to travel from their home countries in 
the Muslim world (as compared with North America for instance), the UK also had the 
benefit of easier access to mainland Europe, as well as the fact that the English language 
itself is widely spoken as a second language. In addition, Britain’s imperial past may well 
have fed into a sense of entitlement among political agitators seeking asylum, insofar as 
                                                          
280 Ibid. and the IPB website www.islamicparty.com [accessed on 8th June 2013]  
281 See Chapter 1, Section 1.1.2 of this thesis on British-Muslim cultural disorientations. 
282 For a window into British historical perceptions of Islam and Muslims cf. works by Nabil Matar, including 
his chapter: ‘Britons and Muslims in the early modern period: from prejudice to (a theory of) toleration’ in 
Anti-Muslim Prejudice: past and present ed. by Maleiha Malik (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), pp.7-25,where he shows 
how Muslims and Islam typically suffered prejudice and negative stereotypes in their portrayals in literature 
and theology, while actual interactions by diplomats and traders with Muslims led to less hostile, and more 
tolerant perspectives of Muslims and Muslim cultures. 
283 ‘Shutting the door in the face of Islam’s bogeymen’ The Guardian 27th May 1995. 
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their utilising the UK as a haven amounted to ‘taking back’ from a former empire which 
had previously exploited and dominated their homelands.  
 
The influence of international political dissidents was not limited to those who were 
resident in the UK – leading personalities from a spectrum of Islamist movements 
operating abroad were regularly hosted to speak at events in the UK. Such gatherings were 
used not only to spread their ideas and drum up support in the UK, but also to fundraise 
for these political movements.284 Hailing from countries such as Algeria, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, the Sudan, Pakistan and Syria, the UK provided opportunities for speeches and 
fundraising activities that were rather more difficult for these movements to arrange within 
those home countries that were the objects of their struggles. 
 
Language and self-identity: 
International events such as the first Gulf War (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the 
subsequent US invasion of Iraq) and later the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the tragic 
events in Bosnia, all served to rally together a sense of communal or, as Modood puts it, 
‘associational’ identity.285 Such events also prompted difficult questions about loyalty for 
British Muslims, many of whom opposed their government’s support for the war against 
Iraq and had natural ties and sympathies with the wider ummah abroad. This dilemma was 
only exacerbated by the perspective amongst some that the conflict in the Gulf was one 
between the ‘imperialist’ western Allies and the ‘anti-imperialist’ Saddam Hussein. Long 
standing grievances about US and British support for Israel were also invoked by radical 
groups such as HT to further support this characterisation. Furthermore, Saudi Arabian 
official ‘collusion’ with the Western powers was vigorously denounced as traitorous, and 
evidence that, as per HT’s worldview, regimes in the Muslim world needed to be toppled 
and replaced by a virtuous Khilafa.286 As for the war in Bosnia, the close proximity of the 
conflict and the ‘European-ness’ of Bosnian Muslims, coupled with the perceived 
reluctance of western nations to sanction military intervention simply reinforced the 
dilemma around loyalty and identity. As McRoy notes:  
The Bosnian crisis shocked the community, partly because Bosnian 
Muslims held the very identity that government ministers were 
understood to be suggesting for British Muslims, yet this did not 
                                                          
284 ‘Militants in the line-up for conference season’ The Guardian 5th August 1995. 
285 Tariq Modood, ‘‘Difference’, Cultural Racism and anti-Racism’ in Debating Cultural Hybridity: multicultural 
identities and the politics of anti-racism ed. by Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (London: Zed Books, 1997). 
286 Anthony McRoy, From Rushdie to 7/7: The radicalisation of Islam in Britain (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 
2006), pp.15-22. 
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prevent their being slaughtered. This discredited government statements 
at the time of the Rushdie crisis yet further… Their perception was that 
Muslims were unwanted in Europe, and that this prejudice had led to 
the massacre of their brethren elsewhere on the continent… Muslim 
voices expressed concern that they could be the next victims of 
European Islamophobia.287 
 
These international events contributed towards a reinforced sense of pride and association 
with the ummah on one hand, and a sense of distrust of, or at least, a sense of grievance 
towards ‘the West’ on the other. Among the manifestations of this attitude were conspiracy 
theories around Zionist-US plots to control and/or bring down the Muslim world. By the 
mid-1990s, these factors combined had all contributed to a general heightened awareness 
of the ummah among British Muslims. Right-wing commentators would have us believe that 
there was some kind of loyalty trade-off, whereby young Muslims who had been deeply 
affected by injustices abroad began to feel greater allegiances towards the ummah at the 
expense of the UK. Yet sources from the time convey less of a hostile sentiment towards 
British civic life or disengagement from it, than they do a feeling that double-standards 
were being employed towards Muslims when it came to foreign policy.288 
 
Somewhat linked to this was the display by many Muslim organisations in their discourse 
and activities of a confident (perhaps overconfident) and unguarded sense of openness that 
was raw, fresh and even acutely naïve in its choice of language and emphasis. Among the 
mainstream groups within the community there was sometimes a sense of pride taken in 
harbouring the desire to bring Islamic rule to the UK. In the main part, it was hoped to 
achieve such ambitions through peaceful da’wa (the evangelical call to Islam), however there 
was some talk among the most extreme of more violent means, although how seriously 
such talk was intended is a matter of debate, which I will come to shortly.   
 
More moderate thinkers within this strain spoke of a Britain that was ‘in search of a vision 
and a direction’ and to which its Muslim citizens bore the responsibility of offering 
guidance.289 On this basis, they emphasised the importance of civic participation. However, 
this was often accompanied with the qualification that responsible citizenship would 
further the cause of da’wa, and that community service was a means through which 
Islamically inspired social values could be disseminated through to wider society. By 
                                                          
287 Ibid. 
288 Cf. ‘Concern for Bosnia’ British Muslims Monthly Survey (Birmingham, July 1995), Vol. III, No. 7, pp.1-2. 
289 The Muslim News 24th November 1995, reporting on speeches at Islamic Convention held in September 
1995 at the London Arena by the Islamic Society of Britain.  
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highlighting this aspect, I am not suggesting that this attitude towards social participation 
was inherently disingenuous or insidious; however, it is telling that these sorts of 
justifications were so readily used. As I shall demonstrate later on in this chapter, the 
experience of building broad political partnerships post-9/11 catalysed a change in 
approaches to civic participation, such that it became more open, more pragmatic and less 
conditional upon religiously-grounded caveats and justifications.  
 
On the more extreme end of the scale, the British arm of Hizb ut Tahrir (HT), an Islamic 
political party with its roots in the Middle East provides one window into perspectives 
among radical Muslims during this period.290 During the 1990s its activities regularly 
grabbed headlines for their dramatic and confrontational nature.291 HT provoked anxiety 
and outrage in equal measures as it called for the ‘supremacy’ of Islam and preaching 
separatism to its followers, in addition to indulging regularly in anti-Semitism and clashes 
with gay and Jewish groups on university campuses.292 Probably its most highly publicised 
activity during this period was an international ‘Khilafa Conference’ that was organised in 
August 1994 at the Wembley Arena in London. The event courted plenty of controversy 
before it even happened. Bright, luminous publicity stickers were posted in high streets and 
public places, boasting of: ‘Khilafa – coming soon, to a country near you’.293 Invited 
speakers included individuals who were linked with the organisation from various Arab and 
Muslim countries. The conference organisers spoke of bold ambitions to ‘fly the flag of 
Islam above Number 10 Downing Street’ and there was even a call for the assassination of 
Prime Minister John Major from the leader of HT.294 However although organisers 
anticipated 8-10,000 attendees and an enthusiastic reception (The Guardian and The 
Independent 4th August 1994), the conference did not meet these expectations, with a much 
more modest audience turning up and barely any tangible impact beyond the few alarmist 
newspaper headlines that were generated.295 While the comparison of HT-type views with 
those of the ‘moderate mainstream’ is stark; in many instances, they both rely on some 
                                                          
290 Cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis for a summary of HT’s origins in Britain during the 1990s. 
291 For a useful overview of HT during this period cf. Hamid, ‘Islamic Political Radicalism in Britain: The 
Case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir’ (2007), pp.145-159. 
292 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest (1996), pp.172-176. 
293 A sketchy personal account of the build up for this conference and of the event itself is given by Ed 
Husain in his memoir – Husain, The Islamist (2007), pp. 134-138. Another (observer’s) account of the 
conference features in ‘Much Ado About Nothing’ Q News (12th August 1994). 
294 Op. cit., p.145. 
295 Examples include: ‘Muslim body accused of racism: Muslim rally angers Jews’ The Independent (7th August 
1994), Tim Kelsey, ‘Fundamentalist gathering seeks political overthrow of Western democracies: Muslims call 
for Israeli state to be destroyed’ The Independent 8th August 1994, and ‘Wembley survives the Muslim call to 
arms’ The Daily Telegraph (8th August 1994). 
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degree to the notion of Islamic religious and cultural primacy, juxtaposing it with some 
notion of western decadence.  
 
As a final example, I will look at a case among groups with more salafi (literalist) and jihadi 
leanings.296 Jonathan Birt sheds light on a mood of isolationism in which self-identification 
was constituted in opposition not only to ‘the West’, but also to their own communities, 
both locally and as an ummah. All of these were seen to be misguided in various ways – 
whether through godlessness, or through ‘associating with’ or ‘following’ the godless West. 
Central to this way of thinking was the notion of ‘al wala wal bara’; a concept with roots in 
early Islamic thought which roughly translates as ‘loyalty and disassociation’. Many salafis 
and jihadists would use this as a mantra to justify an exclusivist and self-righteous world 
view whereby their own remaining on the ‘straight and narrow’ was inextricably linked with 
a vehement denouncement of those around them for their misguidance – whether wilful or 
erroneous.  So at a meeting of a typical jihadi study-group, Birt reports of a mentor urging 
attendees to ‘cut your ties from the people of shirk (polytheism), because you can’t cut your 
ties from shirk except that you cut your ties from the people of shirk’.297 He then goes on to 
elaborate on the grave differences between ‘believers’ and kuffar (unbelievers), including the 
direct link, as he sees it, between faith and an obligation of jihad; in addition to emphasising 
the ‘need’ for true Muslims to migrate to the Muslim world, to dar al Islam and away from 
dar al kufr,298 since doing so was an appropriate and necessary demonstration of their loyalty 
to the faith and their disassociation from disbelief and decadence.  
 
The language and approach that was used by these types of groups is chilling and would 
certainly raise alarm bells in today’s securitised post-9/11 Britain. Talk of an obligation of 
jihad and of disassociation from non-believers would hardly be permitted to take place 
openly in mosques, nor would these sorts of conversations happen in open gatherings that 
members of the public could freely join. When considered with the benefit of hindsight 
acquired over the past decade, this sort of approach may well give impressions of an 
aggressive or threatening desire to violently dominate Britain and impose Islamic ideals on 
culture, politics and society in general. However, it is important to resist forming an instant 
                                                          
296 I use both of these terms as they would generally be used in day to day parlance. The salafi trend referring 
to a preoccupation with a strict and often puritanically literalist interpretation of original sources and texts, 
coupled with a deep suspicion of any ‘innovation’ in religion. The jihadi trend, which often attracts 
sympathisers from salafi circles, is broadly descriptive of a support for violence/armed fighting in the name of 
Islam – during this period, still very much confined to the international (rather than domestic) arena.  
297 Jonathan Birt, ‘The Radical Nineties Revisited’ (2009), pp.107-109. 
298 Arabic for ‘realm of Islam’ and ‘realm of disbelief’, respectively. 
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teleological judgement of these groups and to consider the period and context in question. 
As Birt (and others299) point out, the mainstream of the Muslim community rarely took 
such groups seriously and preferred instead to ignore or sideline them. For many, (Muslims 
and non Muslims), these types of characters were nothing more than ‘affable fools’,300 
rather than an urgent threat. At the same time, these groups in actuality had very little to 
hide – in essence many of them were talk-shops; gathering together disgruntled Muslim 
youth who faced common grievances or who were dealing with similar challenges in life. 
Often these included day-to-day issues such as difficulties in education or finding work, 
providing for their families or simply ‘fitting in’ with their peers. Overlapping with or 
running alongside these were the challenges of practising their faith, reconciling their 
Britishness with their cultures of origin and dealing with experiences (whether real or 
perceived) discrimination and injustice – such as Islamophobia or cases of unequal legal 
treatment, as well as frustration at aspects of British foreign policy that were interpreted as 
being anti-Islamic.  
 
In summary, the British Muslim ‘scene’ by the turn of the 21st Century was one of 
increasing diversity, confidence and growing sophistication in the nature and style of its 
political participation. However, many within the Muslim communities retained a strong 
element of naïveté regarding the true nature and meaning of citizenship and civic 
participation.  
 
4.2 Muslims, Freedom of Expression and Civil Liberties in a Post-9/11 Britain 
 
11th September 2001 – Immediate Reactions: 
 
11th September 2001 has come to be seen as a historic watershed moment in so many 
different respects, the world over; but extremely acutely so for the Muslim communities of 
western countries. British Muslims are a case in point, and the ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
comparisons that can be made are innumerable. From the very outset, a deep sensitivity 
was attached to the attacks that took place in the US – both as a reaction to their very 
happening, and in response to the association (whether covert or explicit) that was widely 
made between them and the Muslim faith. I will look at how this turning point came about 
in each of three areas: government, Muslim representative organisations and Muslim ‘grass 
                                                          
299 Jon Ronson recalls his shadowing of Omar Bakri Mohammad and his Al Muhajiroun throughout 1997 in 
his article: ‘My Night of Jihad’ The Guardian Comment is Free 30th April 2007 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/apr/30/mynightofjihad [accessed 26th October 2012]. 
300 Hamid, ‘Islamic Political Radicalism in Britain: The Case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir’ (2007), p.148. 
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roots’ – meaning ‘ordinary’ Muslim individuals and smaller/local groupings. I will then 
discuss the impact of the changes in discourse and communication that were precipitated 
by the events of 9/11 under four main categories: security, Islamophobia, government-
community relations and innovation in self-expression. 
 
4.2.1 Government responses to 9/11: 
For government, the most immediate and pressing concern was naturally that of national 
security. The attacks were of such a large and unprecedented magnitude, that an immediate 
response was called for, and considering that the motives301 for the attacks were traced 
back to international Muslim terror networks, the potential threat to British national 
security was clear and pressing. At the same time, the fact that the link was with Muslim 
terror networks meant that government had to deal with the impact of the attacks on 
community relations, and most specifically, to minimise the impacts of the backlash against 
Britain’s Muslims through the racism, discrimination, or ‘revenge attacks’ that took place 
across the country,302 to reassure Britain’s Muslims by emphasising unity, shared values and 
especially a shared abhorrence of terrorism, violence and victimisation.303 
 
i. Legal developments and securitization: 
From the security perspective, steps were taken to revise existing anti-terror legislation in 
order to have it reflect the new threats that the post-9/11 era would pose. This primarily 
included an extension to the recently introduced Terrorism Act of 2000 (TA 2000), which 
had superseded pre-existing anti-terror laws, and broadened their scope by addressing 
terrorism beyond activities that were associated specifically with the Northern Ireland 
conflict. The TA 2000’s defining features were its identification of a list of international 
terror organisations – the association with, or support of which was to be banned. In 
addition it made a provision for the first time for police to be allowed to detain terrorist 
suspects for questioning, for up to seven days. This act itself had not been passed without 
                                                          
301 At this very early stage, still only apparent motives, as evidence of the perpetrators had not yet been 
uncovered. 
302 Cf. ‘In the eye of the storm: The MCB – fulfilling its responsibilities’ in The Quest for Sanity (London: MCB, 
2002), Section 2, pp.29-37, for documentation of the kind of anti-Muslim hostility that took place in the wake 
of 9/11. Other reports include ‘September 11 and its Aftermath’ at 
http://www.salaam.co.uk/themeofthemonth/september03_index.php?l=34 [accessed 16th June 2013]. 
Also a log of Islamophobic incidents in the UK as reported to the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism 
(FAIR) between 11th September 2001 and 18th January 2005 at http://www.fairuk.org/research/FAIRuk-
ResearchData-IslamophobicIncidentLog.pdf [accessed 16th June 2013]. 
303 This sort of gesture became a regular feature of government-community conversation, used by Tony Blair 
and other prominent politicians both domestically and internationally. Stephen Lyon describes it as ‘the rise 
of universal values’ in his chapter: ‘The Shadow of September 11: Multiculturalism and Identity’ in Muslim 
Britain ed. by Abbas, (2005), pp.79-84. 
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intense debate and scrutiny, and indeed was watered down on its way to the statute books 
as part of this process. The 2001 Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act consciously sought 
to complete the 2000 legislation by making provisions for foreign terrorist suspects to be 
detained indefinitely pending deportation, even where deportation is ruled prohibited (for 
instance due to a real risk of torture at the destination country). It also introduced new 
regulations pertaining to the security and detention of aircraft where there is suspicion of 
an act of violence against a person on board, allowed police to obtain fingerprints and 
other identifying features to ascertain an individual’s identity by force, and gave powers to 
the Home Secretary for the regulation of internet and telephone communication 
companies’ retention of data for the purpose of national security.304 
 
In addition to these legislative measures, Tony Blair’s Labour government advanced 
decisive policies at home and abroad to ensure that it was seen to be in control in dealing 
with the new terror threat. These included a more hard-line approach in matters of 
immigration – for instance through the introduction of compulsory citizenship tests. This 
attitude was also played out in a new phase of foreign policy, one which placed much 
emphasis on Great Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the USA and the shared interest in 
combating international terrorism – both through increased security measures as well as 
going to war in Afghanistan. 
 
ii. Rhetoric and relationship-building: 
On the home front, the government took steps to indicate its commitment to containing 
and minimising the terrorist threat, and significantly, stability and cohesion within and 
among the country’s communities, in particular with regard to Britain’s Muslims. On 12th 
September, the day following the attacks, Tony Blair made specific mention of the ‘British 
Muslim Council’ (sic) in his address to the nation from Downing Street, praising their 
‘strong statement of condemnation’ and going on to assert that ‘the vast majority of 
Muslims are decent, upright people who share our horror at what happened.’305 On 14th 
September at an emergency session for which the House of Commons had been recalled, 
he addressed ‘our Arab and Muslim friends’ and referred to the attacks as ‘barbarism that is 
totally foreign to the true spirit and teachings of Islam’.306 On 27th September, Blair held a 
                                                          
304 Parts 4, 9, 10 and 11 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, respectively.  
305 The full text of Blair’s statement is available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/sep/12/politicalnews.september111 [accessed 19th June 2013]. 
306 Speech by Tony Blair to House of Commons on 14th September 2001. Full text available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/sep/14/houseofcommons.uk1 [accessed 19th June 2013]. 
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meeting with MCB representatives from which they stood together for the press, 
presenting the powerful image of a united front.307 Blair declared that racism and revenge-
type attacks on Muslims ‘have no proper place in our country’ and similarly, remarked 
upon the shared heritage between Islam and Christianity, in an effort to inject positivity 
into a mood that was weighed down by feelings of anger, suspicion and vulnerability. 
 
Together, these remarks represent an affirmative drive on the government’s part to speak 
to Muslims in the UK, and also internationally. This drive was a first in terms of its scale 
and its pro-activeness and was indicative of a conciliatory desire to open up dialogue and 
build partnership and trust. From the perspective of securing community cohesion and 
diffusing the very real atmosphere of unease and apprehension that was stoked by 
sensationalist media coverage on ‘Islamic terrorism’,308 this kind of language and gesture 
from the government was absolutely needed. However, when considered alongside the 
evermore stringent and heavy handed legal strand of the Government’s post-9/11 
response, it is difficult not to suspect that the associated motives must have contained 
some element of instrumentalism. Perhaps it was thought that the ongoing introduction of 
restrictive and highly controversial anti-terror laws coupled with the pursuit of a foreign 
policy approach that attracted widespread opposition could be sweetened with efforts to 
reassure British Muslims and underline their (at least nominal) inclusion in the evolving 
national conversation on security, citizenship and cohesion. 
  
4.2.2 Muslim groups’ responses to 9/11: 
As for Muslim organisations, there was a near-unanimous immediate reaction of swift and 
unequivocal condemnation.309 Press releases and a dense, consistent flow of media writings 
and appearances were the hallmark efforts of all Muslim advocacy groups and 
representatives, whatever their size, constituency or location. The Muslim Council of 
Britain was most prominent in this respect – with daily media appearances, it quickly built 
                                                          
307 ‘Muslims and Christians Share Values – Blair’, BBC Website, 27th September 2001 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1567187.stm [accessed 19th June 2013]; ‘Blair condemns racist 
attacks – PM stresses shared heritage’, The Guardian, 28th September 2001.  
308 Richardson, (Mis)representing Islam (2004); Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media representations of British 
Muslims (London: I B Tauris, 2002). 
309 The only exceptions to this were extremist elements such as Al Muhajiroun who (often provocatively) 
expressed praise and approval of the attacks, and eventually held an ‘anniversary’ event celebrating the 
‘Magnificent 19’, a reference to the 19 hijackers who carried out the three attacks on 9/11. See ‘Rallies will 
highlight “Magnificent 19” of Sept 11’ in The Daily Telegraph 10th September 2003. Also Parveen Akhtar, 
‘‘(Re)turn to Religion’ and Radical Islam’ in Muslim Britain ed. by Abbas (2005), p.164. However, even these 
were lone, marginal voices that were given very little serious attention by the mainstream within Muslim 
communities.  
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up a public profile as the official Muslim interlocutor on matters relating to the US terror 
attacks in particular, as well as more generally on questions pertaining to Islam and 
Muslims themselves. The attacks had sparked a remarkable level of public interest in Islam 
that was motivated by curiosity and a desire to understand more just as often as it was 
driven by hostility and paranoia.  
 
 With proficient and media-friendly spokespeople, this was a role that the MCB readily 
assumed. The benefit of this was that there was always somebody to ‘speak’ for the Muslim 
community. The established and organised channel of communication that both Muslim 
activists and the government had so long desired seemed to have finally found its calling 
and come into its own – albeit under extraordinarily highly-pressurised circumstances that 
it would hardly have wished for! On a community level, the MCB worked consistently to 
encourage and promote initiatives by its affiliates to develop ‘positive’ responses to the 
9/11 attacks. For example, the annual Islam Awareness Week for November 2001 had as 
its theme ‘Islam for Peace and Justice’ and held events across the country with the aim of 
dispelling the abundant tabloid myths of an inherently violent Islam as well as tackling 
questions on the nature of a just and commensurate response to the attacks.310 
 
The MCB’s political balancing act: 
There were drawbacks to the MCB’s newfound role as the voice of Britain’s Muslim 
communities. The intensity of the spotlight on the MCB meant that it was open to greater 
scrutiny and more readily held to blame for flaws and shortcomings that may otherwise 
have passed unnoticed. The tenuousness of this situation was played out in the two years 
after 9/11 as securitization and foreign policy concerns became heavily influential factors in 
government relations with the Muslim community. 
 
For example, the MCB’s concerted efforts at speaking in condemnation of the terrorist 
attacks could not easily be followed by a reticent silence against the backdrop of 
government foreign policy which was preoccupied with preparations to enter war in 
Afghanistan, and later in Iraq. As such, there were delicate decisions to make relating to its 
stance on post-9/11 foreign policy – the MCB could not command credibility by 
diplomatically ‘sitting on the fence’, yet at the same time, just one ‘wrong foot’ could 
damage the organisation’s hard-earned position as quasi-official gatekeeper to British Islam.  
                                                          
310 Cf. Islam Awareness Week website page for 2001: www.iaw.org.uk/previous/2001/ [accessed on 8th 
October 2010]. 
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After some deliberation, the MCB eventually found itself faced with ‘an important trade 
off’ to make.311 Initial hesitation to vocally oppose the War on Terror was met with 
growing disquiet amongst its affiliates, and the Muslim community in general.312 As Birt 
points out, this coincided with repeated attempts from the Blair government to keep the 
MCB ‘on side’, or at the very least, to keep it passive about the invasion of Afghanistan. 
The situation was difficult, to say the least. Here was the first time that a British Muslim 
representative body had simultaneously earned real credence in the community and was 
given respectability in establishment circles; yet here it was being expected to toe the 
government line on an issue that its constituents were overwhelmingly and strongly 
opposed to. Diplomacy, political bartering and even threats were all methods that were 
employed to win the MCB over,313 yet in the end it proved inconceivable for the MCB not 
to oppose the war. With the vast majority of Britain’s Muslim communities actively 
opposing military action, anything short of this from the MCB would effectively have been 
political suicide.  
 
When the Council did make a decision to come out clearly against the war, it precipitated a 
moment when each of the government, the MCB itself, and Muslim community groups 
made important realisations. For the government, that it was important not to ‘put all its 
eggs in one basket’ again, by relying solely on the MCB as the official representative of the 
Muslim community and its channel of communication with it.314 For the MCB, it made the 
realisation that it could not assume that either government support, or that of its 
constituency (its affiliate groups primarily but also British Muslims communities in general), 
to be automatically theirs by right. Politics was politics at the end of the day, and support, 
respect and credibility had to be earned and sustained, as with any other advocacy or 
lobbying arrangement. For Muslim grassroots organisations, this experience opened up 
doors to new ways of making their voice heard. Uneasy with the slow pace with which the 
MCB’s position developed, a number of community groups generated their own responses 
in opposition to the War on Terror. Most significantly, these included partnerships with the 
left-wing Socialist Workers Party to create the Stop the War Coalition. The Muslim 
                                                          
311 Tahir Abbas, ‘British South Asian Muslims: before and after September 11’ in Muslim Britain ed. by Abbas 
(2005), p.15. 
312 Jonathan Birt, ‘Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State’ in Muslim Britain ed. by Abbas 
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313 Ibid. Birt, (2005) pp.93-99 
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Association of Britain (an MCB affiliate) took a lead role in this, as did a number of other 
local and regional groups.315 Activities largely consisted of organising mass protest marches 
and demonstrations as well as petitions and campaigns to build up public awareness of and 
ultimately, opposition to what as seen as Britain’s gravely mistaken foray into unjustified 
international pursuits led by self-serving ambitions, and those of a ‘neoconservative’ US 
administration.  
                                                          
315 Op.cit.  
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4.3 New community challenges and policy trends: some losses, some gains 
 
Islamophobia – smokescreen for a new racism: 
 
Another noteworthy change which came about during this period was a rather bold 
resurgence of the Islamophobic far-right. Racists and the far-right were able to play on 
genuine fears and paranoia in the wake of the 9/11 events and build up hostility that was 
directed squarely at Islam and Muslims in the UK. The British National Party exploited a 
loophole in the law (the Equality Gap which I discuss at length and define in Chapter 3) 
and launched a ‘Campaign Against Islam’,316 focusing its efforts particularly in areas of the 
country which housed large Muslim communities. On the back of recent race riots that had 
taken place in the Northern towns of Burnley and Oldham during the summer of 2001, 
coupled with the fallout from the 9/11 attacks, these campaigns made use of a number of 
widespread stereotypes regarding violence, intolerance and the subjugation of women, 
among others, and sought to warn the public of the perils of the impending ‘Islamification’ 
of Britain, and the need to stop it in its tracks.  
 
Chris Allen has demonstrated how the arguments employed in the party’s literature and 
campaign material were built on remarkably shaky and highly skewed foundations.317 
Indeed, judging by the sheer incredulity of the numerous implausible accusations that were 
made, it seems that the BNP was intent on transferring the blame for each and every social 
ill or irritation that the ‘indigenous Anglo-Saxon white working classes’318 suffered from, 
onto the shoulders of Britain’s Muslims. In addition to the ‘usual’ charges of ‘stealing’ the 
‘native’ population’s jobs, housing and public services, the BNP promoted the notion that 
the religion and culture of Muslims were intrinsically and irrevocably sinister and 
incompatible with British life. For example, Nick Griffin, speaking to a gathering in 
                                                          
316 According to Matthew Goodwin at the University of Nottingham, this campaign was launched ‘in the 
hours following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001’. ‘The BNP and Islam’ at the election blog of the 
University’s School of Politics and International Relations 
http://electionblog2010.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/bnp-and-islam.html [accessed on 10th June 2013]. 
317 Allen, ‘From Race to Religion: the new face of discrimination’ in Muslim Britain ed. by Abbas (2005), esp. 
pp.55-63. 
318 The BNP under the leadership of Nick Griffin has been at pains to portray itself as respectable, patriotic 
and wholly un-racist. In doing so, it describes its struggle as that of the native, or indigenous white population 
of the British Isles, whose culture, language, religion and other norms are being threatened by immigration 
and multiculturalism. In the words of Griffin: ‘Towns and cities all over our beautiful country now resemble 
parts of Africa or Asia. British people have become a minority in many areas already, and within a few 
decades, we will become a minority across the country as a whole.’ – ‘A Message from BNP Leader Nick 
Griffin MEP’ available at: www.bnp.org.uk/introduction [accessed on 5th June 2013]. 
See also Matthew J Goodwin, ‘In search of the winning formula: Nick Griffin and the ‘modernization’ of the 
British National Party’ in The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain ed. by R Eatwell and M J Goodwin (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2010), pp.167-190. 
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Keighley, Yorkshire, claimed that the Qur’an instructs Muslim men to rape white women 
and children:   
... and you will find verse after verse after verse which says that you can take 
any women you want as long as they're not Muslim women - any woman that 
your right arm can own. That's the sword arm, it's the fighting arm, it's the 
arm you hit a white lad with a baseball bat with ... Any woman that they can 
take by force or guile is theirs. If they get a non Muslim girl and they get her 
pregnant then her community doesn't want her and the child generally grows 
up to be a Muslim. And that's the way that this wicked vicious faith has 
expanded from a handful of cranky lunatics about thirteen hundred years ago, 
till it's now sweeping country after country before it all over the world... 319 
 
 He went on to insist that ‘You have got to stand up and do something for the British 
National Party because otherwise they [Muslims] will do for someone in your family, that is 
the truth.’320 Further, campaign leaflets distributed by the BNP during this period depicted 
Islam as an acronym: ISLAM = Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson, Molestation of 
Women, it reinforced the message that the faith itself was centrally linked to despicable 
social ills and criminality.321 
 
Although politicians and public figures of every shade did denounce and distance 
themselves from this bold new trend in the far-right political agenda,322 much of it 
remained technically legal, and this reality highlighted anew the old problem of how to deal 
with prejudice and discrimination when it was targeted at groups that were identified by 
their religion, or where, as Kay Goodall describes it, ‘religion is used as a surrogate for 
racism’.323 
 
Policy reactions: a narrowing of the Equality Gap. 
While the BNP’s anti-Islam campaign was ongoing, activity was stepped up during election 
time, and targeted areas with large Muslim populations and where segregation was a 
problem. The language that was used exploited a gap in anti-discrimination legislation 
which at that point (the council elections in 2002, European, London Mayoral and council 
elections in 2004 and the General Election in 2005) did not yet outlaw incitement to hatred 
                                                          
319 Transcript of BBC documentary ‘The Secret Agent’, aired on 15th July 2004, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/3896921.stm [accessed on 10th June 2013]. 
320 Ibid. Also see Matthew Taylor, ‘BNP leaders may face charges after TV exposé of racism’ The Guardian 
15th July 2004. 
321 Chris Allen, Islamophobia (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), pp.88-9. 
322 ‘What they said about… The BNP’ The Guardian, 17th July 2004 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/jul/17/race.thefarright [accessed on 10th June 2013]. 
323 Kay Goodall, ‘Incitement to Religious Hatred: All Talk and no Substance?’ (2007) 70(1) Modern Law Review, 
p. 89 
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on the basis of religion. Publicity material – both printed and online – was careful to 
criticise Islam and Muslims as a religion, and culture, rather than in a racial way.324 It also 
defined the party as defending Britain’s ‘heritage’, its ‘Christian values’ and guarding against 
their dilution – partly through immigration and partly through its incorporation of 
immigrants (in particular Muslims) into society through access to resources. Another tactic 
employed by the BNP was to showcase its ‘ethnic’ membership, in a bid to shake off its 
racist image, while simultaneously attacking Islam and Muslims. This included featuring a 
turban-wearing Sikh man in its 2004 election broadcast and fielding Jewish and mixed-race 
candidates.325 
 
On the policy side, this new wave of open Islamophobia generated renewed debates on 
whether this Equality Gap’s continued existence could be justified. It also prompted 
discussions on the arguably fine line between calls for the criminalisation of incitement to 
religious hatred, and instituting what could be construed as a new form of blasphemy law 
whereby criticism of any religion or its texts could be penalised, and free speech restricted 
as a result.326 Lobbying from the MCB327 and other Muslim bodies328 was bolstered by 
recommendations that had been made throughout this period from organisations such as 
the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia – which 
published in 2004 a report to review and discuss progress and developments since its 
previous (1997) ground-breaking report on Islamophobia.329 The 2004 report was extensive 
in its coverage and comprehensive in its analysis – making specific recommendations for a 
whole range of government departments to adopt as a way of tackling Islamophobia. 
Importantly, it made detailed recommendations regarding the need to ‘make discrimination 
                                                          
324 Ibid. pp. 93-4, in which Goodall documents (now purged) online statements from the BNP website where 
party leader Nick Griffin provides guidance for contributors. To quote directly: ‘Emotive words, however 
justified they may be, must be avoided. Truth hurts, so words like ‘alien’, ‘vermin’, ‘gang’ instead of ‘group’, 
and such like must be avoided. A white rapist may be described as a ‘beast’ or an ‘animal’, but a black one 
must be merely a ‘criminal’.  
325 Goodwin, ‘In search of the winning formula’ (2010) p.178, the broadcast itself can be viewed at  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2epLm34iNok [accessed on 30th July 2013]. 
326 Op. cit. Also Allen, ‘From Race to Religion: the new face of discrimination’ (2005). A high-profile public 
campaign against the religious hatred legislation was led by the comedian Rowan Atkinson cf. his speech: 
‘Every Joke Has a Victim’ transcript at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/jan/30/immigrationpolicy.religion [accessed 1st June 2013]. 
327 For example, ‘Muslims laud Tony Blair’s stand on faith schools, but concerned over rise in Islamophobia’ 
MCB Press Release 20th May 2002. Available at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/pr/200502.htm [accessed on 
24th May 2012]. 
328 FAIR: ‘The Religious Offences Bill 2002: A Response’ (October 2002) emphatically makes the case for 
policy changes to criminalise incitement against religious identity, along with discrimination on the grounds of 
religion. 
329 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia ,‘Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action’ 
(London: Runnymede Trust, 2004), p.75 
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on religious grounds unlawful’, noting that while EU laws had brought this about in the 
area of employment, ‘the government’s continuing failure to deal robustly (on all levels) 
with this matter remains a matter of great concern’.330  
 
The government made several attempts to pass a law during this period dealing with 
religious hatred, but these were regularly opposed and voted out by the House of Lords. 
Nonetheless, a Select Committee was set up to look into the matter and by the 2005 
General Election, the government made a firm manifesto commitment that it would: ‘give 
people of all faiths the same protection against incitement to hatred on the basis of their 
religion. We will legislate to outlaw it and will continue the dialogue we have started with 
faith groups from all backgrounds about how best to balance protection, tolerance and free 
speech’.331 A law was eventually passed in 2006, and although this falls just outside of the 
time-frame under consideration in this chapter, I shall discuss it briefly, since its enactment 
can be attributed in a large part to the post-9/11 discussions that took place on the matter.  
 
The Act weathered significant resistance and controversy from diverse quarters. Outside of 
parliament, a host of actors, comedians, writers and artists opposed the law, seeing it as a 
threat to freedom of expression and artistic freedoms, including the space to be able to 
laugh at religion, religious dogma and establishment. The civil liberties group, Liberty, while 
acknowledging the need to protect minority groups, argued that freedom of speech was a 
value far more worthy of preservation. Moreover, it argued (along with the Discrimination 
Law Association, and many others) that the legislation, as proposed by the government, 
was not much more than an effort to ‘placate’ Muslims communities, in particular the 
MCB, who were aggrieved by foreign policy and relentless draconian anti-terrorism 
measures at home.332 Within parliament there was a large voting rebellion by Labour 
backbenchers and strong opposition from the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and many 
in the House of Lords. As a consequence, the final piece of legislation was passed with two 
amendments introduced by the Lords. These changes stipulated that the law should only 
criminalise ‘A person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written 
material which is threatening... if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred’,333 thus 
limiting its application so that it could not cover words that were ‘merely’ abusive or 
                                                          
330 Ibid. 
331 Labour Party Manifesto, 'Forward not Back' (2005), pp.111-112. 
332 Meer, Citizenship, identity, and the politics of multiculturalism, (2010), pp.163-4. 
333 Part 3A: ‘Acts intended to stir up religious hatred’ in Schedule: Hatred against persons on religious 
grounds, Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006.  
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insulting; in addition to making it a requirement for there to be an actual intention to stir 
up hatred, rather than simply a possibility. 
 
It was this last requirement of intent that proved to disappoint supporters of the law. With 
the requirement of intent clearly stipulated, it meant that in cases where defendants denied 
intent, prosecutors would be faced with the almost impossible task of proving it. This, as 
Goodall points out, renders the new legislation ‘almost unenforceable’, since while 
‘extremist clerics who confess their intentions may be caught … racist activists will have 
little trouble adapting their rhetoric’334 to avoid falling foul of the intent clause. The MCB 
expressed its dismay at this development, arguing that it had now created ‘a hierarchy of 
rights among British citizens’335 
 
The government’s clear and firm intent by 2005 to pass a law on religious hatred, despite 
the fierce controversy that it drew, represents how much had changed during this period in 
its policy relations with the Muslim community. Back in 1997, Home Secretary Jack Straw 
had been unwilling to consider any such legislation,336 yet by 2005 his party was on its third 
attempt to pass religious hatred legislation and was prepared to suffer extensive criticism 
and one of its most humiliating Commons defeats, in order to have it enacted. When 
considered in context, this new commitment must have been prompted by factors that 
were not present in 1997 – and, as was suggested at the time by the government’s critics in 
parliament, a desire to appease otherwise disgruntled Muslim communities seems a 
convincing explanation.337 Nonetheless, it also represents progress in the maturing 
government-community political conversation, as the lobbying by the MCB and Muslim 
pressure groups was lodged squarely in the language of equalities legislation,338 and all but 
discarded entirely the argument from blasphemy that was so often rehearsed during and 
after the Rushdie affair. As such, the MCB was able to confidently present its case 
alongside other interest-groups, as their support for the law shared common foundations. 
For example in January 2005 it held a meeting at the House of Commons jointly with the 
                                                          
334 Goodall, ‘Incitement to religious hatred: all talk and no substance?’ The Modern Law Review (2007) Vol. 70:1, 
p.113. 
335 ‘Religious hatred law perpetuates inequality after Commons vote’ MCB Press Release 1st February 2006. 
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336 The Daily Telegraph 23rd October 1997. 
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Commission for Racial Equality, the British Humanist Association and Justice on ‘The 
Need to Protect Faith Communities from Incitement to Hatred’.339 
 
Policy reactions: tough talk on integration and immigration 
 
In addition to the developments in the area of religious discrimination, another reaction to 
the rise of the ‘respectable’ far-right was in the field of immigration and the integration of 
immigrants and minority groups. As I have mentioned, the main parties were regularly at 
pains to denounce and isolate the BNP. However, the BNP’s very act of raising such 
issues, coupled with the constant (often media-fuelled)340 public concerns around security 
meant that the main political players were forced to tackle them in their own political 
agendas – if only as a matter of political expediency, to retain voters who were being 
attracted to the BNP, and to allay public fears regarding immigration and security.341 What 
this meant was that while there was a politics of reconciliation towards minorities in 
matters relating to tackling discrimination and racism, there was on the other hand a 
growth in ‘tough talk’ on immigration – especially so when it came to immigrants from 
outside the European Economic Community. In real terms, this trend impacted on Muslim 
communities more strongly than other minority communities. Legislation tightening the 
conditions required for immigrants to obtain citizenship called for applicants to learn to 
speak English to a minimum standard and to pass a test on ‘Life in the UK’. Other 
legislation made seeking asylum a far more rigorous process, making detention and 
deportation very real outcomes of asylum seeking attempts for those who could not 
provide watertight evidence to support their cases.  
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4.4 Proactive self-expression – through politics, civil society engagement and 
creativity 
 
A final development worth noting is the growth of momentum in the field of diverse and 
creative forms of expression within Britain’s Muslim communities during this period. I 
have already discussed the significant political leap that was taken by several Muslim groups 
by entering into partnerships with left wing organisations to voice their opposition to the 
war. It is arguable that this move was made more out of circumstance than any preferred 
choice, since it came about only after the MCB failed to move swiftly and decisively in 
leading a Muslim opposition to the war. Nonetheless, as pragmatic a deal as it was, it was 
entered into wholeheartedly, and this move in itself represented a capacity among British 
Muslims to explore new avenues for self-expression and making themselves heard.342 At 
the start of this chapter, I observed how British Islam of the 1990s was somewhat hindered 
in its reach and its progress by an underdeveloped sense of citizenship, and a rather 
overrated sense of self-mission. By the early 2000s, this mindset was changing at a steadily 
growing pace. 
 
The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) had positioned itself as a key partner in the 
British anti-war movement, playing a central role in organising for the epic demonstration 
of March 2003 that took place on the eve of the invasion of Iraq. Its alliance with the left 
was not without criticism (both from more extreme Muslim groups such as HT, and the 
liberal, pro-war left).343 However, the support it enjoyed was widespread, and the 
partnership provided invaluable learning experiences and networking opportunities for 
Muslim anti-war activists and groups. For example, this intensive participation in 
mainstream political movements paved the way for Muslim anti-war personalities standing 
as candidates for the recently formed Respect Party during the 2004 European, council and 
London mayoral elections. These included Anas Altikriti, himself a former President of the 
MAB, and Salma Yaqoob who cut her political teeth as a founder and leader of the Stop 
the War Coalition in Birmingham in 2001, as well as Yvonne Ridley, a former Sunday 
Express reporter who had been held captive by the Taliban and subsequently converted to 
Islam. The experience of working with the Left served to broaden the political experience 
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of many within the Muslim community, in addition to accelerating the pace at which their 
level of mainstream political engagement intensified. 
 
The burgeoning of Muslim self-expression was not limited to politics and foreign affairs. 
This period also witnessed a growth in Muslim press and media. Q News – originally 
founded in the early 1990s as a Muslim community newspaper with local preoccupations 
and a limited circulation, had recently reinvented itself as a glossy magazine. Post-9/11 
Britain was an optimal environment within which it could flourish – and it did, with 
impressive (albeit irregular) issues covering wide-ranging, topical and controversial topics.344 
The Muslim Paper, The Muslim Weekly and the London Muslim were altogether new newspaper 
initiatives born during this period, each devoting large sections of their publications to 
politics and Muslim identity issues – yet also making space for art, culture, sport and 
finance. The year 2003 saw the launch of emel, a Muslim lifestyle magazine which sought to 
provide an upbeat yet honest perspective into British Islam by providing ‘a window into 
the Muslim community away from the clichés’.345 In the area of new media, websites and 
blogs grew at a phenomenal rate, being used especially by younger Muslims to express 
themselves and make connections and networks in ways that weren’t possible before. Some 
are worth particular mention due to their longevity and continuous development since this 
period, proving their utility of purpose and relevance. These include www.salaam.co.uk – 
which was devoted to documenting wide-ranging information and data on British Muslim 
history as well as providing magazine-type features and directories of services, mosques and 
jobs; and www.deenport.com, a multi-faceted internet portal bringing together discussion 
forums, blogs, articles and artwork. Both of these sites were first set up in 2003 and have 
served as a point of expression, conversation and information on British Muslim 
communities for the individuals who run them as well as their users. 
 
On the more creative side, this period also witnessed a bolder proliferation and 
experimentation with traditional nasheeds. A notable example is the release in 2003 of the 
British artist Sami Yusuf’s first album. Yusuf’s songs blended authentic English with 
authentic Arabic, eastern music with western, and importantly, shifted away from the direct 
religious preaching-style which had traditionally been the norm. Instead, he offered a blend 
of spirituality and social justice themes, a style which proved accessible and appealing to a 
very wide audience. The idea of a young, indigenous British Muslim identity that was 
                                                          
344 Archive at http://www.q-news.com/buy-UK.htm [accessed on 19th May 2013] 
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comfortable with its heritage and history as well as confident about its future was also 
something that Yusuf was keen to promote. To quote him: 
I feel as though (my fans) see me as representing them, not 
Osama Bin Laden… A lot of young guys are going through an 
identity crisis and I think that’s where people like me come in and 
say you can be British, you can be Muslim, you can be hip, you 
can be having fun — its not either or.346 
 
 Yusuf’s work has been credited not only with triggering a ‘revolution in Islamic pop’, but 
also with playing an immensely positive international ambassadorial role for Britain, for 
instance, he has been invited on more than one occasion by the British Council and the 
Foreign Office to feature at their events.347  
 
Other initiatives included Living Islam – a large four day summer country residential event 
for Muslim families which was first organised by the Islamic Society of Britain in 2003 
incorporating arts, culture, speeches and debates as well as children’s activities and 
entertainment. In July 2005, a weekend Islam Expo was organised by many of the 
personalities who had spearheaded the MAB-Left anti-war alliance. Showcasing Islamic 
contributions to art, culture, science and civilisation, politics was nonetheless central to this 
event’s programme, which boasted participation from political figures across the spectrum, 
but in particular, the patronage of the then London Mayor, Ken Livingstone. Interesting 
parallels have been drawn between this event and the European Social Forum which was 
held prior to it, in London, in 2004. Both used Alexandra Palace in North London as their 
venue, and both events followed very similar formats, suggesting a direct link between the 
Muslim-Left alliance and the nature and direction in which aspects of Muslim civic 
engagement had developed. Finally, in the field of media and research, Anas Altikriti, 
veteran anti-war leader and Respect Party candidate, established the Cordoba Foundation, a 
research and public relations organisation with the aim of promoting dialogue and peaceful 
coexistence between cultures through research, facilitation and advisory roles.348 
 
All of these developments paint the picture of a sharper, more complex landscape in 
British Muslim identity politics that had developed by 2005, owing a great deal of its 
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development to factors related to the events of 9/11 and reactions to it. Indeed, if it can 
ever be said that the impact of 9/11 gifted British Islam(s) with anything, then perhaps it 
could be that this was it: a deepened sense of humility, bringing with it a more accurate 
understanding of their exact place in the wider scheme of things. The magnitude and 
suddenness of the 9/11 attacks and the overwhelming nature of the world’s reactions to it 
meant that Muslims really had to ‘think on their feet’ – to be able to deal with the 
immediate shock, question their feelings and identity, affirm it, defend it and make their 
views on the War on Terror known – all practically simultaneously.  
 
Conclusion 
The four year intervening period in between the events of 9/11 and preceding the summer 
of 2005 was one of momentous change and development for British Muslim identity 
politics. 9/11 threw open a large public window into British Muslim communities, creating 
an atmosphere of pressure, urgency and self-defence. Faced with pressing security 
concerns, the government strove to address them, but found it difficult to maintain a 
balance between fulfilling its foreign policy commitments and winning the loyalty of a 
Muslim community which sought political even-handedness both at home and abroad. For 
community organisation and representation – this definitely came of age in the crucible of 
post-9/11 politics, pushing for age-old Muslim issues such as the criminalisation of 
religious hatred in a more contextual, mature and inclusive manner. Islamophobia and its 
manipulation by the rising far-right prompted serious government attention to this matter, 
as well as to the restriction of immigration and a more stringent approach to the integration 
of minority communities and newcomers to the country. Finally, a host of factors, in 
particular the decision to enthusiastically participate in mainstream political activity 
alongside other interest groups sparked real development, change and diversification within 
the British Muslim political landscape, which, when compared with that of the 1990s, 
shows just how far British Muslim politics has travelled over this period.  
  
 152 
Chapter Five: 
 
The development of Muslim identity politics: Turning Point 2 
 
Identity politics and the threat of terrorism at home 
 
(7th July 2005 – June 2010) 
 
This chapter will consider how the terror attacks that took place in London on 7th July 2005 
heralded a second major turning point in the development of British Muslim identity 
politics, from the perspective of freedom of expression specifically; and civil liberties more 
generally.  
 
1) Following on from the preceding chapter, I will first give a brief overview of how 
this date served as a turning point in terms of specific events and reactions to them. I will 
proceed to discuss how the acute and urgent nature of the 7/7 attacks – being in the UK’s 
capital city and carried out by British citizens – instigated sharper reactions from each of 
the parties under discussion.  
 
2) Secondly I will examine legal developments initiated by the government – 
specifically the anti-terror policy and legislation dealing with speech and communication 
issues. After 7/7, the government pursued a twin-track approach to anti-terrorism, where 
the ‘hard’ approach involved the introduction of tighter anti-terrorism legislation and the 
‘soft’ approach was represented by the Contest scheme, and especially its Prevent strand, 
which focused on the task of combating radicalisation by ‘winning hearts and minds’.  I 
analyse whether or not government’s keen pursuit of such a ‘hard’ legal path was conducive 
to the amelioration of developing Muslim identity politics, and I will use case-studies to 
assess how far this new legislation managed to achieve its desired outcomes. I will also look 
at the ‘softer’ tactics that were pursued by the government as part of its tough new 
approach on terrorism and what became known as ‘violent extremism’. This primarily 
includes various aspects of the Prevent strategy and its affiliated initiatives, such as efforts 
by politicians to ‘direct’ or channel the discourse and attitudes within Muslim groups as a 
way of proliferating the anti-radicalisation message deeper into the community; as well as 
attempts to gather, and ‘map’ information about groups and individuals within Muslim 
communities. I will consider what, if any, implications these developments had on the 
Equality Gap. 
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3)  Next, I will look specifically at the MCB, as the pre-eminent Muslim advocacy and 
representative group at the start of this period – 2005. I will consider how the MCB came 
under increasingly intense public scrutiny and criticism. After looking at the role of the 
media, and non-governmental parties in contributing to these challenges to the MCB’s 
position, I will discuss how and under what pressures the MCB eventually took the step of 
acknowledging and attempting to deal with the realities of the ‘violent extremist’ influence 
in the Muslim community and of cooperating with the government on matters of security. 
I will especially consider how these developments panned out in the language and attitudes 
through which the MCB chose to express itself, both in its relations with the government 
and with other Muslim groups. I will show how the MCB was distinguished in its readiness 
to adopt a more independent and occasionally critical line towards the government whilst 
at the same time developing greater self-confidence and humility in recognising its own 
limitations. Faced with increasing ‘competition’ in the form of a growing number of 
Muslim groups clamouring for representative ‘status’, the MCB took steps, albeit 
reluctantly, towards acknowledging the contributions of other players in this field by 
gradually letting go of its previously characteristic insistence on exclusivity when it came to 
negotiations with government and the public representation of British Muslims.  
 
4) Finally, I will look at the emergence of a broad multitude of Muslim voices and 
organisations from 2005 onwards, each seeking to speak for Muslims, represent them and 
argue for various ‘Muslim causes’ (loosely defined). I will consider the factors that led to 
this development, arguing that the strong reactions and disagreements between the 
government and by the MCB respectively created a suitable environment for Muslim 
identity politics to blossom and diversify, and for these various voices to come to the fore. 
In addition, I will show how many of these newer initiatives were sponsored whether 
financially or ideologically by parties which harboured interests in the direction of the 
public debate on British Muslims and security issues, considering the extent to which such 
support influenced the stances that these groups chose to adopt at various junctures. 
 
In concluding, I will sum up how this second turning point of the 21st century heralds the 
end of Muslim identity politics as we have known it. I will point out how the challenges of 
post-7/7 Britain have led to a far more fluid relationship between government and Muslim 
communities. This has not decreased in the importance of communication and co-
operation between the two, but it has meant that the scenario is much less clearly defined 
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than it was between the years 2001-2005, during the days of the Labour government’s 
acquiescence to the MCB’s pre-eminence.  
 
Background: 
In Chapter 4, we saw how the period between September 2001 and 2005 was 
overwhelmingly defined by the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing fallout. They, along with the 
government’s response to the attacks in the area of security, framed the priorities for 
Muslim identity politics during this period and the course that it was to chart. Despite the 
intense pressures that this period placed on Muslims, it proved to be a time of significant 
strides in the maturing of Britain’s Muslim communities. Met with new and unexpected 
challenges, the British-born Muslim generations showed confidence and effectiveness in 
their political engagement, developing and enhancing the arguments that they deployed for 
recognition on various fronts. Additionally there were signs of a more assured sense of self 
within Britain’s Muslim communities, as partnerships were forged with others on the basis 
of shared interests and through embracing far more creative and diverse modes and 
subjects of self-expression. The recently established Muslim Council of Britain was also 
able to cement its new position as primary interlocutor for Muslims within the British 
establishment, holding onto good relations with government whilst opposing aspects of its 
foreign policy, and while a resurgence of the far-right which capitalised on the backlash 
after 9/11 posed new challenges, strides (albeit limited ones) were also made in narrowing 
the Equality Gap through legislation. But the events of July 2005 were to stimulate another 
turning point, when terrorism struck the British capital as four co-ordinated explosions 
took place on London’s transport system, killing 52 people, including the perpetrators. 
 
5.1 7th July 2005: Terrorism on home soil 
 
5.1.1 Context: 
Thursday 7th July 2005 has come to represent a moment in history when striking changes 
took place in the UK on the level of both the shorter and longer term. The former is best 
illustrated by contrasting the public mood in London on the 7th, with that on the preceding 
day. Wednesday the 6th had witnessed great expressions of jubilation and pride in the 
capital as news of its successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games was celebrated in 
Trafalgar Square, and indeed across the country. The capital’s cultural diversity and 
international connections were presented as sources of strength – assets that had helped to 
win the bid for London and that would make the 2012 Games all the more successful and 
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welcoming to athletes as well as spectators. The fact that London had beaten Paris in the 
final lap of the race to host the 2012 Olympics was hailed by many as a testament to the 
strength and durability of the British capital’s confident approach to diversity and 
multiculturalism over the French establishment’s preference for laïcité and reputed disdain 
towards multicultural pride.  
 
Multiculturalism in both countries (as indeed, across Europe), had been drawn into 
question by the recent experiences of serious urban unrest involving young people from 
minority ethnic backgrounds. England’s northern towns of Bradford, Oldham and Burnley 
experienced severe race riots in 2001, memories of which were still fresh, and simmering 
socio-economic problems in Paris’s banlieues eventually erupted later on in 2005 in the form 
of heavy rioting involving youths of North African immigrant parentage. Both of these 
occurrences shone a light upon the dramatic clash between the far-right’s aspirations to 
assimilate ethnic and religious minorities, or exclude them, and the realities of multicultural 
urban life. Additionally, they highlighted the urgency of problems around social 
deprivation, equality of opportunity, discrimination as well as the need for greater social 
cohesion in areas that were inhabited by large populations of immigrant communities (in 
these two cases, Muslim immigrant communities).349 
 
Yet despite this troubled background to multiculturalism, the city of London, and crucially, 
its Mayor, Ken Livingstone, was able to present an image where multiculturalism was not 
only accepted as a reality, but positively celebrated as a source of vibrancy and strength.350 
However if the celebration of a successful Olympic bid on 6th July symbolised a peak in 
optimism about London’s multiculturalism and sense of unity, the shock and horror of the 
attacks the following morning ushered in something of a rude awakening  – prompting 
deep, raw and searching questions about the nature, depth and durability of the nation’s 
civic unity.351 The 7/7 attacks also served to inject a renewed sense of urgent seriousness to 
                                                          
349 On the Bradford riots see: Chris Allen, Fair Justice: The Bradford Disturbances, the Sentencing and the Impact 
(London: FAIR, 2003). 
350 For a personal account of the ‘Diversity and Inclusion’ remit of the London Organising Committee of the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) see Muhammad Abdul Bari, ‘London 2012: a celebration of 
Britain’s diversity’ Huffington Post UK 21st February 2012, available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/muhammad-abdul-bari/olympics-london-2012-a-
celebration_b_1292015.html [accessed on 22nd May 2012]. 
351 From a government perspective, cf. Trevor Phillips’s speech of 22nd September 2005: ‘After 7/7: 
Sleepwalking into Segregation’ available at: 
http://www.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/socialchange/research/social-change/summer-
workshops/documents/sleepwalking.pdf [accessed on 24th October 2011] – in which he remarked that the 
nature of British multiculturalism needed to be reviewed in the light of 7/7 and that too much emphasis had 
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a national vigilance towards security, and proponents of a ‘Londonistan’ thesis, that the UK 
had for too long turned a blind eye towards extremist ideas on its very doorstep, or at least 
allowed them to go unchecked in the name of multiculturalism, argued that an ideological 
battle was absolutely essential to defend ‘our values’, at home as well as abroad.352 As to the 
longer term impact of the attacks – this became evident in the changing approach of 
government in the areas of anti-terror legislation, relations with the Muslim community and 
with Muslim community organisations, and the direction in which public discourses on 
radicalisation, identity and national security developed.  
 
In the following section I will consider the backgrounds of the four young men who 
carried out the 7/7 attacks, and discuss whether their profiles can tell us anything about the 
nature of radicalisation among young British Muslims and the threats to security that it 
poses in the early 21st Century. I will refer back to this analysis later on in this chapter when 
I examine the government’s justifications for new legislative approaches restricting speech 
and expression, as well as its heavy investment into its new community-centred approach 
to tackling radicalisation.  
 
5.1.2 Background to the perpetrators: 
As to the bombers themselves, many analysts have attempted to look into their characters 
and pasts in order to develop an understanding of how and why they became attracted to 
terrorist activity. At the face of it, their lives seemed unremarkable. There do not appear to 
have been any obvious major dramatic incidents that specifically or personally marked 
them out from their peers. Indeed, there were outward indications that they were ‘the very 
epitome of assimilation into British society’353, and that their day to day lives did not display 
any significant indications of internal cultural or religious conflict or any antipathy towards 
Britain. For example, friends and acquaintances of Mohammed Siddique Khan have related 
that he ‘was called “Sid” at school, had more white friends than Asian ones… He was not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
been placed respecting and making space for the various differences about Britain’s minorities, at the expense 
of developing a common and unifying shared culture. 
Tariq Modood, ‘Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7’ Open Democracy 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/multiculturalism_2879.jsp [accessed on 10th June 2013] 
summarises the range of commentary on the debate about the viability of multiculturalism as policy in Britain 
post-7/7. 
352 Michael Gove, Celsius 7/7 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2006). 
353 Milan Rai, 7/7, the London bombings, Islam and the Iraq War (London: Pluto, 2006), p.31. 
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interested in religion. He ignored debates about the plight of Muslims abroad… [and] 
“apart from the colour of his skin, he was just an English lad”’.354 
 
Thus, conclusions have varied widely – at one end of the analytical spectrum is the view 
that these bombers were second generation immigrants and thus enjoyed greater privileges 
to those that their parents had had access to. They had access to education, opportunity, 
leisure and all the amenities and life-chances associated with modern western lifestyles. In 
this narrative, it is often deduced that their main motivation was ideological and this is 
often used to support the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis and more generally what has become 
known as the ‘neoconservative’ world-view.355  
 
At the other end, attention is drawn to the fact that while these were of course westernised 
young men in so many senses of the word, they nonetheless experienced social exclusion 
and alienation on a number of levels.  For example, none of the 7/7 bombers were 
educated to a professional level. Most did not proceed beyond the minimum level of 
schooling and of the few who did, the most successful was ‘ringleader’ Mohammed 
Siddique Khan who worked as a classroom teaching assistant. Moreover, even if they did 
not directly experience social exclusion, they certainly were witnesses to it. Each of them 
hailed from towns in North Yorkshire where racial segregation was a problem and where 
Muslim communities received consistently low scores in all socio-economic indicators. 
They had all attended the Hamara Youth Centre in Beeston, where Mohammed Siddique 
Khan was a youth worker, and they undoubtedly must have come into regular contact with 
young people who may have faced difficulties in life relating to poverty and racism, for 
example. 
 
 At the same time, retrospective evidence shows that all of them seem to have been 
disaffected or frustrated in some way by what they saw as injustice – whether abroad, 
against fellow Muslims in the shape of the war on terror, or at home in the form of 
Islamophobia (real, direct experiences or internalised).356 What this understanding points to 
is that the bombers were in dire need of an outlet through which they could vent their 
internal feelings of anger and frustration. In the absence of any positive channels, the 
appeal of terrorism was perhaps that it was a concrete action that they could take, which 
                                                          
354 Paul Vallely, ‘So what turned Sid Khan into a bomber?’ The Independent 18th November 2005. 
355 Gove, Celsius 7/7 (2006). 
356 Milan Rai provides extensive profiles of each of the bombers, their backgrounds, family circumstances and 
childhoods in his 7/7, the London bombings, Islam and the Iraq war (2006), pp.21-48. 
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they believed would go some way to rectifying the wrongs which so troubled them, 
coupled with the inestimable, otherworldly ‘promise’ of reward that they stood to gain 
from. Considering the relatively simple level of education that the bombers possessed, this 
second analysis seems more plausible, since it would be unlikely for them to be interested 
in digesting deep ideological or intellectually demanding debates.  
 
Moreover, as much as they may seem to have been integrated in terms of appearance, 
language and lifestyle, the bombers evidently felt sufficiently detached from British society 
– not only to have been capable of carrying out the attacks themselves,357 but to have (as 
did Mohammed Siddique Khan), addressed society as a separate/foreign entity: ‘Your 
democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people’.358  
 
This rather normal and perhaps familiar nature of the 7/7 bombers and their daily lives 
emphasised further that there was a real problem of radicalisation among sections of 
Britain’s Muslim youth, and that addressing this problem was a matter of urgency. The 
government recognised this urgency, but chose to view potential solutions overwhelmingly 
from the perspective of national security, a perspective which risks overlooking social, 
political and economic root causes of discontent which have regularly been cited as the 
main push factors towards radicalisation.359 Hence it decided to embark with vigour on a 
range of different schemes to combat radicalisation with security at the top of the agenda. 
It utilised a two-pronged approach – firstly using ‘hard power’ through the introduction of 
new anti-terrorism legislation, and secondly, using ‘soft power’ through community centred 
initiatives aimed at using ideas to win over the loyalty of young British Muslims and defeat 
violent extremism, in a battle of ideas. 
 
5.1.3 The Government’s reaction to terror at home: tackling radicalisation and the 
impact on freedom of expression: 
The British government straightaway adopted a forceful and direct tone in the language 
that was used to respond to 7/7. Tony Blair spoke on 5th August 2005, less than a month 
                                                          
357 Of course comparisons can be made with other instances where similar social detachment has been 
displayed – such as perpetrators of a number of school/workplace shooting sprees that have occurred in the 
USA in recent times, as well as most recently the Oslo/Utoeya massacres of July 2011 which were carried out 
by Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian far-right extremist. Such examples show how high levels of 
personal/emotional detachment from society can come about as a result of a feeling of being ‘under attack’. 
358 Mohammed Siddique Khan’s ‘martyrdom’ video, broadcast on Al Jazeera Satellite Channel, 1st September 
2005. 
359 R Briggs, C Fieschi and L Lownsbrough, ‘Bringing it home: community-based approaches to 
counterterrorism’ (London: Demos, 2006). 
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after the bombings, declaring that ‘the rules of the game have changed’,360 and signalling 
firmly that a far more hard-line approach would be adopted towards the expression of 
radical and extremist ideas – specifically those that were deemed to ‘glorify terrorism’. The 
implication of this approach was a recognition that the root causes and processes by which 
young Britons were radicalised needed to be understood, analysed and stopped. 
This in itself was a step forward from the approach of the preceding five years. While in 
the wake of 9/11, the government had concentrated its security efforts largely on Britons 
who were thought to be actively supporting terrorism abroad, the post-7/7 approach was 
characterised by a determination to root out the very causes and/or catalysts that set young 
people on the path of extremism. In this section, I will look at the government response via 
the two general channels through which it was developed.  
 
Firstly, the ‘harder’ concrete legal changes that were introduced as a result of 7/7: I will 
look at aspects of the Terrorism Act 2006, specifically those concerned with classifying 
forms of expression and speech as illegal – such as the outlawing of the ‘encouragement’ 
and the ‘glorification of terrorism’. I will examine how these legal developments fared 
practically through looking at relevant case studies. Secondly, I will look at ‘softer’, 
community-based approaches to countering extremism and violence into which the 
government invested a great deal of resources post-7/7. These include the Preventing 
Violent Extremism (PVE) working groups that were set up immediately after the attacks, as 
well as the CONTEST scheme itself – and specifically PREVENT, its most prominent 
strand – that lasted throughout the remainder of the Labour government, and beyond. 
  
5.2 Legal changes and the Terrorism Act 2006: The ‘hard’ approach 
A new terrorism bill was swiftly put together and passed in February 2006 as the Terrorism 
Act 2006. It sought to emphatically bring home Blair’s earlier assertion that government 
would be tougher and more decisive than it had previously been in all matters relating to 
terrorism, and what was henceforth to be consistently referred to as ‘violent extremism’. 
The hallmark of this new legislation was its direct and deliberate entry into the realm of 
speech acts, sometimes referred to collectively as ‘encouragement offences’. These 
constituted clauses which made provisions to prosecute those who encouraged or glorified 
terrorist activity, as well as to allow for the proscription of organisations which glorified 
terrorism. Additionally, it introduced a penalty for the ‘dissemination of terrorist 
                                                          
360 Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Statement on Anti-Terror Measures. Full text available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism1 [accessed on 17th February 2011].  
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publications’ and for the ‘training for’ or ‘attendance at a place used for terrorist training’361 
– designed to address bookshops stocking ‘extremist’ material, and terrorist training camps, 
respectively.  
 
A major source of disquiet was that the descriptions included in these clauses were broadly 
defined and left a great deal open to subjective interpretation by the courts and the Home 
Secretary, thus potentially leaving the door open to huge miscarriages of justice.362 Human 
rights advocates argued that such legal developments while perhaps well-intentioned, were 
not the most effective way of tackling radical views and preventing terrorism, since they 
stood to limit opportunities for vulnerable young people (those who were most at risk of 
being ‘lured’ towards violent extremism) to discuss or explore of issues and grievances that 
were troubling them in a safe and responsible environment. Indeed, Article 19, the 
campaign group for freedom of expression, argued that the new offence of ‘encouragement 
of terrorism’ would ‘discourage the peaceful expression of controversial opinion’,363 a view 
that was backed by the UN Human Rights Committee as well as a number of other 
researchers, and legal and community practitioners.364 
 
For their part, Muslim community groups expressed concerns that the outlawing of radical 
speech would have a ‘chilling effect’ and rather than rooting out extremist voices and 
curbing the spread of their influence, it would instead simply lead them to operate more 
covertly – behind closed doors, rather than in public through high street stalls or mosques 
for instance, or to use more secure and sophisticated communication techniques via the 
internet and telecommunications.365 Additionally, the MCB argued that the new Act was 
‘based on a number of false premises’, and that it rendered the entire Muslim community 
                                                          
361 Sections 2, 6 and 8 of the Terrorism Act 2006. 
362 Liberty, ‘New Anti-Terror Bill Published’, Press Release, 15th September 2005. Available at 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2005/new-anti-terror-bill-published.php [accessed on 
13th May 2013].  
363 Article 19 ‘Submission to the 91st Session of the UN Human Rights Committee on Respect for Freedom 
of Expression in the UK and Northern Ireland’ (October 2007) p.8.  
364 Eric Barendt, ‘Incitement to, and glorification of, terrorism’ in Extreme Speech and Democracy ed. by Ivan 
Hare and James Weinstein (Oxford: OUP, 2009), pp.445-462, and Tufyal Choudhury, ‘The Terrorism Act 
2006: discouraging terrorism’ in Extreme Speech and Democracy ed. by Hare and Weinstein (2009), pp.463-487. 
Also Arun Kundnani, The End of Tolerance: Racism in 21st Century Britain (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p.179. 
 
365 Police and security working group feedback, Shaukat Warraich and Ifath Nawaz eds., ‘Preventing Extremism 
Together’ Working Groups Report (Home Office, 2005). Also cf. Ruth Gledhill, ‘Muslim task force attacks 
Government anti-terror plans’, The Times, 10th November 2005; Alan Travis and Patrick Wintour, ‘Terror bill 
chilling for Muslims, Blair warned’, The Guardian, 11th November 2005. 
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‘liable to suspicion, censorship and persecution’,366 urging the government to exercise 
‘maximum restraint’ in utilising the new legal powers, and warning that it would ‘consider 
legal intervention’ if the law was used to ban Muslim groups.367  
 
Whilst the concerted efforts of this broad-based opposition to the new raft of speech-
related offences did not succeed in preventing the Act from materialising, it has been 
argued that the widespread criticism of this Act served to ‘undermin(e) its chances of being 
an effective tool’.368 Indeed, while there have been some attempts to prosecute using the 
Act, they have been few in number, and moreover, verdicts have often been overturned 
after appeal. The remainder of this section, will look at three high profile hard cases where 
the 2006 Terrorism Act was invoked, and ask whether the law can be judged to have 
fulfilled the government’s aspirations of preventing terrorism through denying radical 
extremists and their organisations any form of public platform from which to preach, and 
in turn deterring others from being drawn to violent extremism through preventing the 
possibility of such ideas being expressed in the public domain.  
 
Case Study: Samina Malik – thought-criminal or potential terrorist? 
This was the first case to be successfully prosecuted where the new Terrorism Act 2006 
which included the highly controversial clause that prohibited the encouragement or 
glorification of terrorist acts was invoked.  However, in the end Malik was specifically 
convicted for ‘possessing records likely to be useful in terrorism’ (using Section 58 of the 
                                                          
366 ‘Muslim Community Opposes New Anti Terror Legislation and Urges Government to Exercise Maximum 
Restraint and Caution’ MCB Press Release, 13th April 2006. Available at: 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/presstext.php?ann_id=199 [accessed on 19th September 2011].  
367 This moment represents an interesting point in the development of British Muslim political identities. The 
threat of proscription for UK Muslim groups was quite clearly aimed at the separatist, radical and increasingly 
violence-endorsing trend which included groups such as Al Muhajiroun, The Saviour Sect and Al Ghurabaa – 
all of whom openly praised acts of terrorism, and often spoke contemptibly and provocatively of Britain, its 
government and its population as well as of other religions. Tony Blair and many of his advisors became 
persuaded of the ‘conveyor belt’ theory – that groups like the (also separatist but avowedly non-violent) Hizb-
ut-Tahrir was also eligible for proscription. (David Cameron and the Conservatives have also incorporated this 
thinking into their government’s approach to national security – cf. Cameron’s security speech at Munich in 
March 2011). Even though it was officially non-violent, HT was regarded as a ‘breeding ground’ from which 
many members ‘graduated’ on to violent extremism. Blair’s admission that he wished to ban HT sparked off a 
number of heated defences from various quarters in the Muslim community who genuinely feared that with 
the criteria for ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ firmly in the government’s grip, it would only be a matter of time 
before a whole range of other UK Muslim groups could be criminalised – whether for loose/historic 
international links with Islamist groups abroad (as I demonstrate in Chapter 2, there are plenty of these!), or 
for favouring ultra-conservative religious views (for instance on homosexuality or the role of women in 
society), or indeed for simply differing with the government on major foreign policy issues (cf. previous 
chapter for discussion on the MCB’s rift with government on the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan).   
368 Ellen Parker, ‘Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006 – the relationship between counterterrorism 
law, free speech and the Muslim community in the United Kingdom versus the United States’ Emory 
International Law Review Vol.21: 2 (Fall 2007), p.756. 
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Terrorism Act 2000) and was handed a nine-month suspended sentence in December 
2007. A shop assistant at a WH Smith outlet in Heathrow Airport, she had engaged in 
regular internet communications on jihadi websites and discussion forums. Using the 
screen-name ‘Lyrical Terrorist’ she fantasised through poetry, often graphically, her 
aspirations to engage in violent acts, including beheadings, ‘jihad’ and to die as a martyr. In 
addition, she was found to have corresponded with Sohail Qureshi, a 30 year old dentist 
who had been arrested at Heathrow Airport as he attempted to board a flight to Pakistan 
carrying weapons, cash and terror handbooks. 
 
 Her trial found no evidence that she had undertaken any concrete physical criminal 
actions, yet she was nonetheless found guilty on the basis that she had in her possession 
‘records likely to be useful for terrorism’ – these included jihadi literature that was found on 
her computer and at her home, as well as her own writings and poetry. Representing 
perhaps the first time that the new ‘rules of the game’ on terrorism were tested out through 
a real and hard case, the conviction provoked a great deal of public outrage. English PEN – 
the same group that had defended Salman Rushdie’s publication of his The Satanic Verses, 
back in 1989, came out and spoke in defence of Samina Malik. Deputy President, Lisa 
Appignanesi declared that the criminalisation of Malik merely for ‘dreaming and writing 
behind a bookshop counter would have Byron and Shelley turning in their graves’.369 In 
addition, numerous petitions and collectives sprung up online, variously defending Malik’s 
‘freedom of expression’, there were calls for a ‘World Samina Malik Day’370 and countless 
public figures wrote to denounce the ‘draconian’ nature of the anti-terror laws which, it was 
argued, had effectively created thought crimes.371 An interesting comparison was drawn 
between Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 under which Malik was prosecuted, and the 
recent experience of Gillian Gibbons, a British teacher in the Sudan who had been 
imprisoned for acquiescing to her pupils’ choice of the name ‘Muhammad’ for their teddy 
bear, and was only released after international uproar and mediation from a delegation of 
British (Muslim) politicians. 
 
                                                          
369 ‘Don’t jail ‘lyrical terrorist’, writers’ group tells judges’ The Guardian 6th December 2007. 
370 ‘World Samina Malik Day December 6th’ http://clatterymachinery.wordpress.com/2007/11/18/world-
samina-malik-day-december-6th/ [accessed on 20th June 2013]. 
371 Matthew Parris, ‘Think no evil? Are you serious?’ The Times 17th November 2007. 
Rod Liddle, ‘Free speech and the lyrical terrorist’ The Spectator 21st November 2007, in which he pens a short 
poem mocking the situation. 
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Malik’s conviction was later quashed in the wake of a successful (test case) appeal for the 
‘Bradford Five’372 – in which a landmark ruling judged that Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 could not reasonably be stretched to encompass ‘propagandist or theological 
material’. Upon re-examining her case, judges ruled that the documents in Malik’s 
possession and upon which her conviction had relied could fall under this category.  
 
Case study - Abu Izzadeen: deterrence or the making of a martyr-figure? 
Abu Izzadeen, also known as Trevor Brooks, rose to public prominence in his role as a 
leader and spokesperson for Al Ghurabaa.373 He made several outspoken media appearances 
between 2001-2006, where he brazenly flirted with anti-terror laws by praising specific acts 
of suicide bombing and even declaring his own aspiration to perform such actions.374 In 
September 2006, he heckled and disrupted a meeting of the Muslim community in 
Leytonstone, east London, with the then home secretary John Reid. Abu Izzadeen accused 
Reid of being an ‘enemy’ of Islam and decrying the audience for listening to him, and 
‘let(ting) him come into a Muslim area’ – declaring that it was shameful for them to listen 
to his call for Muslim parents to ‘spy’ on their children and report any concerns to the 
authorities, while ‘over 1,000 Muslims had been arrested’ (in anti-terror raids). His outburst 
received keen media attention, to the point of raising suspicions that the clash had even 
been staged,375 as a way of bolstering the message that Reid was trying to put across. 
Whatever the facts behind the incident – this was just the most prominent of what had by 
this stage become a catalogue of numerous statements which were arguably falling foul of 
the new anti-terror restrictions on speech.376  
 
                                                          
372 The case of four Bradford University students and a school pupil from Ilford, Essex, who had engaged in 
internet conversations fantasising about jihad, including communicating with individuals in Pakistan and 
downloading propaganda materials. Their initial conviction was quashed in February 2008.  
373 Al Ghurabaa (Arabic for ‘The Strangers’) was a successor group to Al Muhajiroun that was proscribed in the 
wake of 7/7 with the Terrorism Act 2006. In January 2010, the then home secretary, Alan Johnson, issued a 
banning order: ‘The Proscribed Organisations (name changes) Order 2010’ (Home Office, January 2010), 
extending the proscription for Al Muhajiroun to Al Ghurabaa, Islam4UK, London School of Sharia and the 
eclectic host of other names that the group’s members had taken to operating under.  
374 For examples, in an interview with BBC Newsnight in August 2005 he described the 7/7 attacks as 
‘completely praiseworthy’, and refused to refer to them negatively as ‘suicide attacks’, preferring instead the 
term ‘mujahideen activity’.  He also told Channel 4 News that: ‘For Muslims there (referring to Iraq and 
Afghanistan), they have a duty to fight occupiers, whether they are American soldiers or British soldiers’ 
quoted at ‘Radicals warned of treason risk’ BBC News Website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4129502.stm 
[accessed on 20th June 2013] – prompting calls for him to be prosecuted for treason or incitement to treason. 
375 Allen, Islamophobia (2010), p.94; Darcus Howe, ‘John Reid’s dirty little one-act play’ New Statesman 6th 
October 2006.  
376 Roya Nikkhah and Adam Lusher, ‘Police accused of ‘cowardly failure’ to prosecute militant’ The Daily 
Telegraph 24th September 2006.  
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Eventually, Abu Izzadeen was prosecuted and found guilty in April 2008 of inciting 
terrorism and of fundraising for terrorism. His case was considered by critics of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 to be politically motivated and part of a ‘knee-jerk reaction’,377 
particularly since the comments which he was prosecuted for were actually made in 2004, 
before the London bombings had even prompted the government to introduce further anti-
terror legislation. Moreover, his conviction was ultimately secured under the Terrorism Act 
2000, since initial attempts to secure a conviction for the ‘encouragement’ of terrorism 
using the Terrorism Act 2006 fell through after a jury failed to reach a verdict, thus further 
cementing existing expectations that the Act was far too broad to be effective in any 
tangible sense. 
 
As to Abu Izzadeen himself, he served one year of his four and a half year sentence, and 
then was released early after an appeal – much to the joy of supporters who received him 
as a ‘modern day Muslim hero’.378 He was recalled to prison only months later in July for 
breaking the conditions of his release by allegedly assaulting a police officer. Finally, he was 
released again in October 2010. Upon release, he appeared to show obvious signs of weight 
loss, but wasted no time in firing off strident and unrepentant accusations against the 
government and the judicial system for being biased and unduly harsh against Muslims.379 
If anything, the whole episode served to raise his profile and to cement his following, as 
evidenced by the warm and enthusiastic reception he received from his ‘followers’ upon his 
latest release from prison.380 He was greeted at the gates of Pentonville Prison by a crowd 
of cheering supporters, saluting him as a ‘Lion of Tawheed’ (monotheism), and insisting that 
‘The British government’s behaviour in silencing individuals whom oppose and expose the 
government’s economic, social or more importantly foreign policies… (will not) stop 
Muslim activists propagating the divine way of live (sic) of Al-Islam’.381 Abu Izzadeen then 
proceeded to scale the prison walls and deliver a speech-cum-press statement to his 
assembled supporters and the media. Video recordings show that he was clearly relishing 
the moment, and when questioned about whether his spell in prison had made him 
reconsider his views or the nature of any future public statements, he responded with 
indignation: ‘we have a right to speak out the truth, we have a right to expose the 
                                                          
377 Letter from George Galloway MP, ‘Alarm bells over terror conviction’ The Guardian 24th April 2008. 
378 ‘Radical preacher Abu Izzadeen freed from jail early’ The Daily Telegraph 6th May 2009. 
379 Press TV interview with Abu Izzadeen on his release from prison, 28th October 2010. 
380 ‘Abu Izzadeen Released’ Salafi Media website at: http://salafimedia.com/component/k2/item/1092-abu-
izzadeen-released.html [accessed on 20th June 2013]. 
381 Ibid. 
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corruption that’s going on, and if we’re going to go to prison for it, we’re more than willing 
to’.382  
 
This case study suggests that the efforts of anti-terror legislation in deterring Abu Izzadeen 
from making comments in support of violence against British troops abroad, and from 
speaking approvingly of terrorist acts at home were unsuccessful, and most probably even 
counterproductive. Abu Izzadeen’s trial, imprisonment and the high-level press coverage 
afforded to his outspoken views (this point being especially pertinent if his confrontation 
with John Reid was indeed staged) – all contributed to maximising his audience. That the 
efforts to convict him under the 2006 Act fell through is in itself something of an 
indictment of the legislation. In addition, just as the entire situation must have swelled the 
ranks of his critics, it undoubtedly did the same for his admirers, for whom the efforts to 
silence Abu Izzadeen only made him and his rhetoric all the more appealing – particularly 
when considered in tandem with the negative impacts of other strands of the government’s 
efforts in the areas of anti-terrorism and security, such as the Prevent programme, and 
high-profile blunders like the botched police raid in Forest Gate of June 2006.383 
 
Case Study – Ahmed Faraz and the perils of state-endorsed religious interpretations 
My final case study is the recent conviction of Ahmed Faraz, a Birmingham bookseller, 
under Sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. Faraz ran Al-Maktabah – an Islamic 
bookshop which was found to stock a number of texts that were used by, or found in the 
possession of various convicted terrorists over the past decade. His conviction for 
possessing and disseminating information ‘likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism’384 bore some parallels with Samina Malik’s case, in that the 
judge conceded that ‘there is no indication that Mr Faraz ever intended to carry out a 
terrorist attack’.385 It was also similar in that Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 had to 
                                                          
382 ‘Abu Izzadeen released from prison’ video available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUegJUROSBI&feature=related [accessed on 20th June 2013]. 
383 A dawn raid carried out on a home in Forest Gate, east London, targeted two brothers – Abdul Kahar and 
Abul Koiyar – and was based on what turned out to be false intelligence. The raid was widely criticised for 
the apparently gung ho and heavy handed attitude of the officers. One of the brothers was shot in the 
shoulder and there was huge community outcry regarding why and how such an intensive raid could have 
been carried out on the basis of such weak intelligence – and of course how it was that the police officer in 
charge of the raid could have shot Abdul Kahar so readily, when he showed no signs of resistance.  
384 Section 58, Terrorism Act 2000. 
385 Justice Calvert-Smith, quoted in Victoria Brittain and Asim Qureshi, ‘Banning books in Britain, fifty years 
after Lady Chatterly’ Open Democracy 17th December 2011. Available at: 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/victoria-brittain-asim-qureshi/banning-books-in-britain-fifty-
years-after-lady-chatterley [accessed on 29th May 2012].   
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be relied upon to secure the conviction. The books in question were annotated editions of 
classical volumes, or modern texts based on classical works. The majority of the books 
were written by three authors: Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th – 14th Century scholar, whose writings 
have been associated with modern puritanical Islamic thought, including Wahhabism; and 
two 20th Century authors: Sayyid Qutb, member and ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood; and Abdullah Azzam, a leader of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. 
Both of the latter have been credited with inspiring Al Qaeda and modern jihadist thinking 
in general. Additionally, both have been hailed as martyrs to their causes – Qutb was 
executed by the Egyptian government and Azzam was assassinated, allegedly by rival 
jihadists in Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. 
 
The trial decided that by stocking editions of these books that were accompanied by 
extensive commentary and appendices of the sort that ‘goaded’ readers to engage in 
fighting, spoke of Christians and Jews in highly derogatory terms, and provided footage of 
‘martyrdom’ attacks, Faraz was guilty of incitement to terrorism.386 Yet critics of the verdict 
pointed to the fact that most of the audio-visual footage of attacks that was relied upon by 
the prosecution was seized from a personal computer folder entitled ‘PhD’, and that Faraz 
had spoken of correspondence he had engaged in with a potential research supervisor, 
copies of which were also contained in the same folder.387 They argued that the conviction 
of Faraz on the basis that the court deemed the books he stocked to be dangerous, was 
more or less equivalent to the books themselves being banned. By sending a signal that 
these books were considered to be unacceptable, the courts were effectively criminalising 
other stockists/owners, as well as creating a ‘chilling effect’, whereby potential stockists 
would engage in self-censorship in order to avoid prosecution.  
 
Yet perhaps the most worrying aspect of Faraz’s conviction was the basis upon which the 
texts in question were classified by the court to be dangerous. This relied heavily on the 
account of an expert witness to the trial, whose arguments were built predominantly upon 
theological debates and differences.388 Essentially what this meant was that the justice 
                                                          
386 Cf. the account of the prosecution’s expert witness: Matthew Tariq Wilkinson, ‘This bookseller deserved 
his incitement to terrorism conviction’ The Guardian 18th May 2012. 
387 Brittain and Qureshi, ‘Banning books in Britain, fifty years after Lady Chatterley’ (2011). Also Asim 
Qureshi, ‘Conviction of thought: How Islamic Concepts are ruled on in UK Courts’ Arches Quarterly Vol. 5:9 
(Spring 2012), pp. 171-176. 
388 Cf. The full transcript of the testimony: R v Faraz - Testimony of Matthew 'Tariq' Wilkinson for the prosecution 
available at: http://www.cageprisoners.com/learn-more/legal-issues/item/2922-r-v-faraz-testimony-of-
matthew-tariq-wilkinson-for-the-prosecution-day-1 [accessed on 29th May 2012]. 
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system, through this conviction, offered official legal approval and privilege to one religious 
interpretation over another. Naturally this outcome is deeply problematic from the 
perspective of freedom of expression and freedom of conscience, since it gives succour to 
the notion that the state can legitimately play a role in endorsing ‘acceptable’ schools of 
religious thought and conversely, that it can legitimately reject ‘unacceptable’ schools of 
thought and religious interpretations. Britain is a nation whose constitutional history tells a 
story of struggle for freedom of conscience and, crucially, freedom of belief. Indeed it has 
sheltered refugees from religious persecution abroad, notably the Huguenots and the Jews; 
and dissenters fought for, and won, the right to differ freely from the Church of England. 
For these reasons, the idea that the courts could indict a defendant using evidence based on 
theological interpretations is one that gives rise to deep misgivings about the potential 
extent to which these laws can be used to outlaw certain religious interpretations, or to 
criminalise those who are merely interested in reading about them, let alone actually being 
convinced of them.  
 
This difficulty is especially potent when considered in conjunction with concurrent 
misgivings around the Prevent programme, and the Department for Communities and 
Local Government’s proactive efforts in promoting an ‘acceptable’ Islam to defeat a more 
‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ Islam in the battle for hearts and minds. These have all been 
important and ongoing security concerns which I discuss in further detail in the following 
section.389 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
389 It must be noted here that as I prepared to submit this thesis, news emerged that Ahmed Faraz’s 
conviction had been overturned by the Court of Appeal on 21st December 2012. The court took the view that 
Faraz’s earlier conviction had relied on a jury that was insufficiently informed about the complexities of the 
relevant aspects of Islamic theology, and that the controversial literature stocked at Maktabah could not be 
assumed to have necessarily been responsible for encouraging terrorist activity.  
This development is yet further evidence of the confusing nature and ineffectiveness of the encouragement 
offences in the 2006 anti-terror legislation. 
The full text of the judgement is available at: http://www.tooks.co.uk/library/court_of_appeal_judgment.pdf 
[accessed on 19th January 2013]. 
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5.3  State-initiated community-centred responses: the ‘soft’ approach 
 
In addition to the use of forceful rhetoric, the government set about putting initiatives into 
place with the aim of engaging with Britain’s Muslim communities in a deeper and more 
meaningful manner, and thus providing genuine and authentic deterrents to what was 
increasingly termed ‘violent extremism’, based on the foundations of comprehensive 
community networks and supported by key individuals and institutions from within the 
communities themselves. This approach has often been referred to as ‘community-
policing’390 – a technique which sought both legitimacy and authenticity through actively 
seeking out and engaging with Muslim community representatives on a broader and deeper 
level than had been done in recent history. To this end, a ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ 
taskforce appeared in August 2005, consisting of seven ‘working groups’, comprising 
handpicked ‘experts’ who were briefed to meet and discuss pertinent issues surrounding 
each of: Engaging with young people, Education, Engaging with Muslim women, 
Supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions, Imams training and 
accreditation and the role of mosques, Community security, and Tackling extremism and 
radicalisation. These groups met regularly over a period of two months, at the end of which 
a summary of their discussions and subsequent recommendations were collated and 
presented to the government via the Home Office.391  
 
The taskforce recommendations were extensive and ambitious. Yet they drew sharp 
criticism in the ensuing period as something of a superficial exercise, since the follow-up 
on their recommendations was remarkably sparse, giving rise to warnings of rising 
disillusionment among Muslims,392 and to suggestions that they were conveniently shelved 
for the discomfort that their contents may have posed to government narratives and 
objectives on the causes of extremism and how to combat it.393 It is interesting to note that 
the single recommendation (out of a list of sixty-four) from the PET working groups that 
was promptly followed through by government was the facilitation of a ‘scholars’ road-
show’.394 This eventually materialised into the Radical Middle Way (RMW) project, which 
started off as a joint collaboration between Q News magazine, the Federation of Student 
                                                          
390 Jytte Klausen, 'British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight 
Against Domestic Terrorism', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35: 3, (2009), pp.403-420. 
391 Warraich and Nawaz eds., ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups (2005). 
392 Sadiq Khan MP in his speech ‘Being a British Muslim’ to the Fabian Society, in London, on 3rd July 2006. 
Full Text available at: http://www.fabians.org.uk/events/event-reports/missing-a-positive-vision-for-british-
muslims [accessed on 13th May 2013]. 
393 Sadiq Khan MP quoted in Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad (2009), p.120. 
394 Warraich and Nawaz eds., ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups (2005), pp.12-14. 
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Islamic Societies (FOSIS), the Young Muslim Organisation (YMO) and a new body by the 
name of Mahabba Unlimited.  
 
According to the recommendation in the PET report, the thinking behind such a road-
show was to make accessible to young British Muslims ‘a group of international and 
national mainstream scholars… with credibility and influence… to disseminate effective 
intellectual and theological counter-arguments against extremist interpretations of Islam’.395 
This aspiration was fair enough, but the government’s zeal in implementing this particular 
recommendation cannot be disconnected from its pre-existing plans to launch a very 
similar campaign, exposing ‘moderate’ Muslim voices to young British Muslims, which 
were first mooted in 2004. 
 
In May 2004, the Sunday Times published leaked details of the initial blueprint for what was 
to become widely known as the Contest strategy.396 Contest picked up with great energy in 
the wake of the 7/7 attacks, but according to the document leaked to the Sunday Times, it 
was since 9/11 that plans had already begun to be discussed on how the government could 
‘win over’ ‘disaffected’ young Muslims – specifically seeking ways to ‘strengthen the hand 
of moderate Muslim leaders’.397 In the light of this, government enthusiasm in backing the 
RMW is not surprising. Indeed it appears to suggest that the channelling of Foreign Office 
and Prevent (see below) funding towards the project was not much more than a convenient 
way of letting vetted Muslim groups execute (and thus be the public faces for) a pre-
conceived government strategy.398 The roadshows were resented in some quarters as having 
‘an air of the colonial era about them’ since the government’s preference for its pre-
approved scholars from overseas was made clear, sidestepping ‘the talented expertise of 
home grown scholars’.399 This in turn raised questions as to the level of independence that 
the RMW project had, and the extent to which it was a government tool – to channel 
community debates in the desired direction and/or to keep fairly close tabs on community 
                                                          
395 Ibid., p.14. 
396 ‘Draft report on young Muslims and extremism’ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office 
April 2004. Available at: 
http://www.alghurabaa.org/books/reports/young%20muslims%20and%20extremism.pdf [accessed on 13th 
May 2013]. Also Cf.: ‘Britain’s secret plan to win Muslim hearts and minds’ The Sunday Times, 30th May 2004. 
397 The document made particular mention of Amr Khaled, an Egyptian ‘televangelist’ who had recently 
moved to the UK, Hamza Yusuf and Suhaib Webb – both US imams with widespread international 
followings, and Tariq Ramadan – a Swiss/Egyptian academic who’s appeal to English speaking audiences was 
rising substantially at this time, also coinciding with his move to settle in the UK. 
398 Briggs et al, ‘Bringing it home: community-based approaches to counterterrorism’ (2006). 
399 Iqbal Sacranie’s valedictory speech to the MCB Annual General Meeting, London, 4th June 2006, available 
at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/SECGEN.pdf [accessed on 24th July 2012]. 
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groups and individuals as a way of gathering information. This theme is an important one, 
since as I shall go on to show, it was to regularly recur with respect to government-led or 
government-sponsored initiatives under the Prevent umbrella – this often with good 
grounds for suspicion.  
  
The Prevent Strategy and its use and abuse of Muslim communities’ freedom of expression: 
A key ambition of the new community-based approach that was favoured by the Contest 
scheme was to engender ‘collaborative partnerships’ of trust and good channels of 
communication between communities and the authorities. In this spirit, April 2007 saw the 
official launch of Prevent – a scheme claiming to embody many of the ideas put forward by 
the PET exercise. It was one of four ‘workstreams’ that together formed the Contest 
strategy – a multi-pronged approach to effectively deliver the government’s counter-
terrorism work. The four workstreams were described by the Home Office as:  
 Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks 
 Prevent: to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism 
 Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack 
 Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.400 
The Prevent workstream is of particular interest to this study because it was designed 
specifically to develop and promote ideological challenges to ‘extremist ideas that are 
conducive to terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups’.401 This aim was posited on the 
notion that extremism stemmed from a ‘religio-cultural rejection of western modernity’402 
and that in order to prevent extremism from gaining any credence, the government had to 
spearhead a ‘battle of ideas’ – to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of those (mainly young, mainly 
Muslims) who were potential recruits to, or sympathisers with extremist ideology. This 
preoccupation with ideology meant that the strategy would necessarily operate around the 
realm of speech acts (inasmuch as they were the expression of ideas) and as such, it is of 
important relevance to this study as not only did it mark a new development in Muslim 
identity politics and government-Muslim relations, but it also presented a scenario where 
speech and expression issues were intricately intertwined with securitisation and 
                                                          
400 ‘The Counter-terrorism strategy’ http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-
terrorism-strat/ [accessed on 3rd November 2011].  
401 Ibid. 
402Arun Kundnani, ‘Spooked: how not to prevent violent extremism’ (London: Institute of Race Relations, 
2009), p.39.   
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community cohesion concerns in such a way that proved problematic from both a liberal 
(theoretical) perspective and that of the practical implementation of policy.  
 
I will attempt to analyse these problems under three sub-headings: funding, intelligence-
gathering and public relations. I will argue that the government proved unable to build a 
sufficiently genuine partnership of trust with Muslim communities through Prevent 
because of the approach that it adopted with respect of these three issues lacked 
transparency, openness to real dialogue and consultation, and relied on the imposition of 
its own agenda – one that was frequently rigid and pre-engineered. While the Prevent 
scheme did represent an unprecedented level of official recognition for Muslim 
communities this was combined with an often patronising and instrumentalist attitude 
towards them in the way that the strategy was formulated. In addition, government 
displayed a remarkable intolerance, almost an allergy, towards the idea of giving space for 
feedback and the uninhibited airing of ideas – something which would seem to be a basic 
need for an endeavour which sought to win over the hearts and minds of troubled 
communities, and particularly young people. 
 
i. Funding: 
 An important aspect of Prevent was the funding of community based/run initiatives in 
such a way that government provided the material support for them, but the community 
retained ownership. To this end, central government made available a generous fund,403 to 
which applications could be made by groups and agencies for ‘community-led’ projects. 
While the idea was that Prevent’s aims could be achieved through government-funded 
capacity-building projects, anecdotal evidence and recent research has found that a large 
number of community organisers felt disengaged and bypassed when it came to decision-
making and maintained that major decisions were always made in advance, ‘behind closed 
doors’ and only later presented to them as a ‘fait accompli’.404 This inconsistency was allegedly 
exacerbated by the poor grasp that central government decision-makers had of local issues 
and needs.405 Other problems identified with this funding have included an expectation – 
often understated but sometimes openly expressed – by police and/or other official 
representatives that community workers ‘toe the (central) government line’ when it came to 
                                                          
403 Between 2007-2010 various Prevent budgets totalled up to several hundred millions cf. HM Government 
‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: the UK strategy for countering international terrorism’ Annual Report 
(March 2010) p.13; Kundnani, ‘Spooked: how not to prevent violent extremism’ (2009), p.11-12. 
404 Kundnani, ‘Spooked: how not to prevent violent extremism’ (2009), p.15. 
405 Ibid., p.15. 
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exploring opinions – from deeply emotive and controversial topics including foreign policy, 
to day-to-day differences on what the priorities for local work and projects should be and 
how they should be implemented.406 The message that many came away with was that 
government funding was being offered with one hand, and that central government was 
expecting to receive on the other hand loyalty and tacit obedience to a preconceived 
agenda of priorities that was put together by Whitehall mandarins and their think-tanks of 
preference.407 Many community workers saw this funding arrangement to be especially 
manipulative since at a time when money for voluntary sector work was becoming 
increasingly difficult to secure, it was felt by some that they had little choice but to accept 
Prevent funding, and that if it was necessary to do so on government terms, then so be it.408 
 
ii. Allegations of surveillance and intelligence-gathering: 
Throughout the period of its operation, the Contest scheme, and specifically Prevent have 
regularly been the subject of shocking allegations. Among these are that rather than being 
simply an empowering community education and development scheme, it was utilised as an 
intelligence gathering tool used by the secret services to keep a ‘close eye’ on Muslim 
communities, including the surveillance of innocent Muslims and for information such as 
religious and political views as well as information on mental health and sexual activity and 
associates.409 Whilst such allegations have been strenuously denied by the government410 a 
number of community and youth workers have given detailed reports of instances where 
they were explicitly asked to provide information about the individuals with whom they 
worked to the police and/or local authority with which they liaised.411 Such allegations 
proved to be deeply problematic for government-community engagement, for two major 
reasons.  
 
Firstly, even the smallest indication that Prevent was being used for information gathering, 
profiling and mapping of the Muslim community shook the already damaged trust between 
                                                          
406 Ibid., p.17. 
407 Paul Thomas, ‘Failed and Friendless: The UK’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme’ British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations Vol. 12:3 (August 2010), pp.442-458. 
408 Op. cit., pp.26-27. 
409 Vikram Dodd, ‘MPs investigate anti-extremism programme after spying claims’ The Guardian 18th October 
2009. 
410 Stephen Rimmer, ‘Allegations made in the Panorama programme “Muslim First – British Second” on 
Monday 16th February’, statement from the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, 17th February 2009.  
In response to the Guardian investigation of October 2009, a Home Office spokesman said: ‘Any suggestion 
that Prevent is about spying is simply wrong. Prevent is about working with communities to protect 
vulnerable individuals and address the root causes of radicalisation.’, quoted in Andrew Hough, ‘Anti-
extremism scheme ‘spying on Muslims’, The Daily Telegraph 17th October 2009. 
411 Kundnani, ‘Spooked: How not to Prevent Violent Extremism’ (2009), p.28. 
 173 
government and its partners within the community. At a stage where recent milestones in 
official recognition and respect for Britain’s Muslim communities had been reached,412 this 
proved to be a tremendous setback to the development of understanding and rapport 
between government and Muslim community groups, as well as the grassroots. Unease 
about surveillance within Prevent was exacerbated by a range of similar concerns. There 
were complaints that young Muslim men were being accosted by members of the security 
services and attempts were being made to recruit them as informers. A high-profile case 
reported by The Independent involved a group of five young Muslim men in Camden, North 
London, who had each been individually approached by members of the security services 
or undercover police officers, and ‘intimidated’ or ‘blackmailed’ to provide them with 
information and assistance, and that their refusal was met with specific threats against them 
and even their families.413 The imposition of Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) as a 
requirement for all Prevent funded projects and furthermore, suggestions by prominent 
politicians that individuals in positions of responsibility – such as teachers, youth workers 
and university lecturers keep a vigilant eye (widely understood to be code for ‘spy’) on the 
young people in their charge for any signs of ‘radicalisation’ and to report concerns to the 
authorities – all of these together fed into a growing unease among the community about 
any kind of community work that was linked with Prevent in particular – and often even 
with government in general. Indeed some project leaders spoke of how they would 
deliberately avoid mentioning that they were using Prevent funding, or consciously rebrand 
the names of their projects, due to the increasingly negative connotations that the scheme 
began to carry.414 
 
Secondly, repeated suggestions that responsible adults should report on signs of extremism 
and radicalisation among the young people in their charge presented a major blow not only 
                                                          
412 For instance through legislation against discrimination in employment and against incitement to religious 
hatred, and long-fought-for victories in equal recognition such as the funding for Muslim faith schools and 
the inclusion of a religion question in the national census. Cf. previous chapters. 
413 Robert Verkaik, ‘Exclusive: How the MI5 blackmails British Muslims’ The Independent 21st May 2009. One 
of these men has since been identified as Mahdi Hashi, a British Somali who claims to have been regularly 
harassed when travelling. He was deported from Somalia on the instructions of British authorities, and is 
reported to have later been transferred to a US military base in Djibouti with the acquiescence of the British 
authorities. In 2012, his family was informed that he had been stripped of his British citizenship on the 
grounds of alleged extremism, making him one of only a handful of Britons to have had his citizenship 
revoked in modern times.  
414 Kundnani, ‘Spooked: how not to prevent violent extremism’ (2009), p.17; Therese O’Toole, Stephen H. 
Jones and Daniel Nilsson Dehanas, ‘The New Prevent: Will it work? Can it work? Arches Quarterly Vol. 5:9 
(Spring 2012), pp.56-62. 
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to trust between the community and the authorities, but between Muslim organisations,415 
and also more generally within institutions which traditionally have come to be regarded as 
safe havens for free expression and experimentation with new, contrasting and often 
radical ideas. Universities, schools, youth-clubs, and even (perhaps idealistically!) mosques 
should all be spaces where debates are conducted and ideas are explored. Yet for many 
young people this avenue for safe and supervised self-discovery fell into jeopardy, as they 
could never be sure whether confiding in their teachers or youth workers would result in 
their being referred to the authorities as potential extremists.416 Furthermore, a motion 
passed at the National Union of Students conference in May 2008 affirmed that the MI5 
and Special Branch had not only been ‘actively spying, harassing and intimidating students 
on campus’, but that they had even ‘sought to recruit numerous members of Islamic 
societies on campus’. The motion expressed grave concerns that such activities were 
creating a climate of suspicion and distrust where ‘fewer Muslims (would become) involved 
in Islamic societies, Students’ Unions or any political societies’.417 For the motion to have 
passed as it did, it is clear that the concerns around spying and recruitment were very real 
and were restricting Muslim youth and students’ sense of freedom of expression, and even 
affecting the kinds of circles that they mixed in and the choices that they made. 
 
 
iii. Targeted consultations and public relations: 
Another venture which attracted a great deal of Prevent funding and publicity interest was 
the idea of targeted focus groups and slick promotional campaigns on issues that were 
identified as critical to the battle for hearts and minds. On a domestic level, this included 
the launch of two government advisory groups focusing on Muslim women and young 
people – the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group (NMWAG) and the Young 
Muslim Advisory Group (YMAG).418 In addition, there was the establishment of a mosques 
                                                          
415 To mention one such controversy: Ed Husain of the Quilliam Foundation was roundly opposed by other 
Muslim groups when he insisted that ‘it is good and it is right’ for Prevent to conduct intelligence-gathering 
amongst Muslims, even if they were not suspected of committing any crimes. Husain argued that intelligence 
gathering should trump concerns around civil liberties, since: ‘It's not about doing the right thing by Islamists 
or by liberal do-gooders, it's about creating a society where liberal do-gooders survive freely.’ Condemnation 
of his comments was so strong that Quilliam later issued a rather vague statement to moderate the tone of 
Husain’s earlier comments: ‘Allegations of Government Spying on UK Muslims – a statement from Quilliam 
directors’ 20th October 2009, available at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press-releases/allegations-of-
government-spying-on-uk-muslims-a-statement-from-quilliam-directors/ [accessed on 11th June 2013]. 
416 O’Toole, Jones and Dehanas, ‘The New Prevent: Will it work? Can it work? (2012). 
417 Full text of the motion ‘Spying on Campus’ available at: 
http://fosis.org.uk/images/stories/blogs/spyingoncampusmotion.pdf [accessed on 16th June 2013]. 
For some anecdotal background cf. Zin Derfoufi, ‘MI5: leave young Muslims alone’ The Guardian 26th May 
2009. 
418 Launched in 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
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advisory board (MINAB). Although these were set up to be officially independent bodies, 
their reliance on funding from Prevent meant that in effect they were obliged to function 
within the parameters set by the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG).419 
 
For the former two, their purported role was to advise ministers on issues pertinent to their 
respective groups on matters relating to integration, community cohesion as well as to act 
as positive role models for women and young people in the Muslim communities. With 
NMWAG, as with other aspects of Prevent, high-minded intentions ended up translating 
into less than agreeable realities. As the groups were basically hand-picked by civil 
servants,420 their only mandate to act came from the Communities Minister Hazel Blears 
and her team. This was hardly sufficient if they were to make real headway in winning over 
hearts and minds for the cause against radicalisation. In fact this led many to question just 
how effective these groups could ever be – including a member of NMWAG, claiming to 
be the group’s co-ordinator, who resigned in 2010 citing a refusal to be used as a ‘political 
pawn’421 and an emphatic complaint that the linking of the initiative with the Prevent 
agenda was ‘disempowering’ and merely a ‘political fad’. Other members of NMWAG also 
echoed her complaints, ‘we thought we were going to be advisors, but found that (instead) 
we were project managers’, complained one participant.422  
 
YMAG seems to have been comparatively more successful than NMWAG. Members of 
the group have described how their relationship with government was honest and frank, 
and that they regularly gave advice and recommendations on sensitive issues such as 
extremism on university and college campuses. In fact, it was felt that the ministers with 
                                                          
419 Shaista Gohir’s open resignation letter to Home Secretary John Denham, 6th April 2010, available at: 
http://wallscometumblingdown.wordpress.com/2010/04/08/founder-quits-national-muslim-womens-
advisory-group-in-protest/ [accessed on 16th June 2013]. 
Author’s interview with a member of YMAG, 2008-present, wishing to remain anonymous, 30th November 
2011. 
420 While NMWAG members were handpicked from the start, there was an applications process for YMAG 
membership, but applicants were short-listed and eventual group members were then selected by the 
government. After it became apparent that the initial intake of NMWAG members ‘didn’t have a good 
enough cross-section of ages, ethnicities and backgrounds’, a competition round was held for a second intake 
of members to apply for positions on the group. Source: Author’s interview with Julie Siddiqi, 2nd round 
entrant to NMWAG, 20th June 2012. 
421 Ibid. Also cf. Shaista Gohir ‘Muslim women are not political pawns’ The Guardian Comment is Free 9th April 
2009, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/09/government-failed-muslim-
women?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 [accessed on 16th June 2013]. Shaista Gohir’s position as co-ordinator 
of NMWAG has been disputed by two other former members in their conversations with me. Both recall 
that there was no position of co-ordinator in the group. The existence of this dispute demonstrates that there 
were tensions between the group members which contributed towards hindering its potential. 
422 Author’s interview with former NMWAG member, wishing to remain anonymous, 9th January 2012. 
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whom they met displayed a greater readiness to listen to blunt criticism because it was 
coming from young people, and it was almost expected that young people would adopt a 
more direct tone and ‘tell it how it is’.423 For example one member related how group 
members had no qualms about telling ministers that they felt that such an advisory group 
under Prevent was ‘pointless’, and that ‘we’re only here to tell you that’.424 YMAG was 
given a list of tasks to fulfil – a website, a national youth conference and civic participation 
projects – all of which were carried out. Yet while there was scope for the group to run the 
projects themselves, they were nonetheless made aware of set parameters within which they 
could work, and there were instances where their proposals were vetoed or decisions 
reprimanded.  
 
Fundamentally, for YMAG, as with NMWAG, although they were technically and officially 
independent, in practice, their reliance on government for funding meant that they were 
unavoidably compelled to operate in a manner that was acceptable to government strategy 
and to work on issues that government approved. Proof of the extent of this reliance is 
that when the General Election of 2010 brought in a new coalition government, funding 
for YMAG was ended, and government support for the group was withdrawn. 
Consequently the YMAG website, magazine and a yet-to-be-launched research paper were 
either completely withdrawn or left in limbo as the group was forced to disband despite the 
strong bonds that had grown between the members and their sense of common cause. This 
situation suggests strongly that ultimate control of this advisory group was not in the hands 
of its members, but in the hands of its funders, who could ‘pull the plug’ on it, so to speak, 
at will.425  
 
MINAB: 
The idea for a mosque regulatory body did initially emerge from the PET Working Groups 
discussions.426 However, its formation became somewhat delayed as there was 
disagreement between the government and Muslim community groups over its design. The 
Labour peer, Lord Ahmed, was initially tasked to the role of assembling a mosques board, 
but ‘when he was unable to make any progress, it was entrusted to four community 
                                                          
423 Author’s interview with former YMAG member, wishing to remain anonymous, 30th November 2011. 
424 Ibid. 
425 YMAG has since re-launched as an independent social enterprise with the aim of ‘acting as a bridge 
between young people and policy makers’ cf. www.ymag.org.uk [accessed on 5th June 2012]. 
426 Warraich and Nawaz eds., ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups (2005), p.6.  
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organisations’.427 At the earlier discussions it was consistently emphasised that such a body 
should retain full independence and should be controlled and answerable to the community 
rather than to any government department. The finished product was unveiled in 2007 as 
the Mosques and Imams Advisory Board (MINAB).  It differed from NMWAG and 
YMAG in that it was set up under the joint aegis of the MCB, the Al Khoei Foundation, 
the Muslim Association of Britain and the British Muslim Forum, rather than being directly 
under the DCLG.  Yet when it emerged that it was to be heavily Prevent-funded, the 
extent to which these community groups actually ‘owned’ MINAB was brought into 
question, especially since MINAB seemed reluctant to declare upfront the provenance of 
its main funding.428 Disquiet was expressed among many imams and mosque officials in 
what comes across as something of a power struggle between the community and the 
government for control of the fledgling body, where MINAB’s links with the 
government,429 were described by Iqbal Sacranie as ‘excessive Home Office involvement, 
insufficient consultation and (giving) the perception that there was an attempt to 
marginalise the MCB’.430 Despite this, the four founding bodies decided to back the Board, 
perhaps seeing their continued involvement as the best way to keep government 
interference at bay. Yet these issues of funding and independence ultimately tainted 
MINAB’s reputation in such a way that its actual ability to perform its declared functions 
was hampered.  
 
 Each of the founding bodies nominated representatives who then formed a board of 
trustees and sat in specialist committees within an organisational set-up that bore several 
close similarities to that of the MCB.431 The Board was to fulfil the role of a self-regulatory 
body and concentrate on setting and raising standards for the UK’s diverse and hitherto 
disaggregated mosques and Islamic centres. This would be achieved through sharing best 
practice, providing and facilitating training courses for imams and mosque staff as well as 
maintaining dialogue and communication links with government. These plans were broadly 
                                                          
427 Author’s interview with MCB official wishing to remain anonymous, conducted on 17th October 2011. 
428 Inayat Bunglawala, ‘MINAB: Community initiative, or quango?’ The Guardian Comment is Free 15th May 
2009: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/may/15/minab-mosques-imams-
islam?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 [accessed on 19th November 2011]. 
429 Author’s interview with Yousuf Bhailok, MCB Secretary General 2000-2002, conducted on 10th October 
2011.  
Also see: ‘MINAB: autonomy or acquiescence?’ The Saga of Home Office Working Groups and its projects – 
Salaam.co.uk http://www.salaam.co.uk/themeofthemonth/september03_index.php?l=60#ccc2 [accessed on 
1st August 2012]. 
430 Iqbal Sacranie’s valedictory speech to the MCB Annual General Meeting, London, 4th June 2006, available 
at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/SECGEN.pdf [accessed on 24th July 2012]. 
431 The main architect of MINAB’s structure, Khurshid Drabu, was also a key figure in formulating the 
MCB’s constitution. 
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accepted across Muslim communities as being timely and welcome steps forward in 
community and institutional development. 
 
Senior figures from within MINAB’s four founding organisations have expressed 
substantial scepticism about the Board’s ability to have much impact.432 Its election process 
has proven unwieldy and problematic, and far too heavily reliant upon the four founding 
organisations, leaving it open to charges of cronyism, and severely watering down its 
powers of mandate or implementation. As one interviewee put it, ‘MINAB doesn’t have 
any power, it is only advisory’433 and herein lies its main problem. 
 
The nature of a very diverse and un-hierarchical organisational landscape within Britain’s 
Muslim communities (and of the Islamic faith itself) dictates that an advisory body (rather 
than an instructive one) would be the most appropriate format for self-regulation.434 Here I 
must differentiate between the inevitable existence of an unofficial, organic hierarchy of 
relationships within and between Muslim communities, and the lack of structural, official or 
clergy-like hierarchy within the Islamic faith. While there do exist organic hierarchies in the 
form of the power, respect and patronage that are wielded by community leaders, elders, 
religious and spiritual figures within community networks, the faith of Islam does not 
endorse a hierarchy of clergy or religious institutions that is in any way comparable, say, to 
the hierarchies that are to be found in various denominations of the Christian faith. So, 
given this background, an advisory body seemed to be the best regulatory set-up for British 
mosques, and naturally, such a body could only hope to be successful if it was able to win 
over the willing support and engagement of as many mosques as possible. MINAB’s close 
links with Prevent, and its subsequent lack of transparency and openness regarding its 
funding and procedures proved a serious blow to community confidence in it as an 
institution. This was reflected in the relatively low proportion of mosques and Islamic 
centres which joined MINAB. Although the 600-odd members did include among them 
the largest and most prominent mosque organisations in the UK, it was arguably the 
smaller, more obscure and perhaps far less well-resourced institutions which were more 
                                                          
432 Author’s interview with Yousuf Bhailok, 10th October 2011. Also, author’s conversation with senior MAB 
official wishing to remain anonymous, December 2011. 
433 Author’s interview with former MCB official, wishing to remain anonymous, conducted on 17th October 
2011. 
434 Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims (2012), p.194. 
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urgently in need of guidance, training, support and general raising of standards. With a total 
of around 1,200-1,500 mosques in the UK, 435 this left up to 60% unattached to MINAB. 
 
Ultimately, MINAB’s role shifted to focus more on service-provision and training, and 
away from the notion of regulation, since a crucial pre-requisite for the latter was a strong, 
consensual and trust-based relationship with a sufficient proportion of the country’s 
mosques and Islamic centres. Without this, what resulted was the Board’s provision of 
training courses and consultation meetings on topical issues, with the participation of a 
limited range of institutions – largely those that were associated with the main groups at the 
centre of MINAB’s administration. This is not to belittle the importance of the issues and 
skills that were addressed – transparency and democracy in mosque administration, the 
inclusion of women and young people in decision-making and providing them with 
training and leadership opportunities and engagement in interfaith and community 
initiatives were all laudable areas for MINAB to encourage mosques to focus on. However, 
with no significant outreach to the majority of smaller institutions without the benefit of 
basic infrastructure or the luxury of even the most preliminary of 
communication/networking capabilities which would have facilitated their participation in 
such initiatives, MINAB was left open to similar charges that NMWAG faced – that it was 
a tick-box exercise preaching to the converted. These are charges that were only bolstered 
by evidence of recent discord and difficulties among MINAB affiliates around the matter 
of elections and organisational processes.436 
 
iv. Public relations overseas: 
Efforts were also made to take the battle for hearts and minds beyond the shores of the 
UK.  The Foreign Office ran a Prevent-funded campaign entitled ‘Projecting British 
Muslims’.437 Prominent British Muslims were selected to take part in whirlwind foreign 
visits to Muslim-majority countries where they would meet with government, civil society 
and community bodies and perform something of an ambassadorial role by extolling the 
positive aspects of life as a Muslim in Britain to their audiences. The FCO envisaged that 
the project would ‘signal the UK’s pride in its Muslim youth’, and as well as providing the 
delegations with opportunities to ‘challenge misconceptions about the reality of life for 
                                                          
435 Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain: an introduction (2010), p.158. 
436 Ibid., p.171. 
437 A general archive of the project with details of visits to-date is available at: 
www.projectingbritishmuslims.co.uk [accessed on 19th June 2013], however the project itself appears to have 
been closed or at least paused by the Coalition Government (from June 2010). 
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Muslims in Britain’, also give them the chance to learn more about the British 
government’s work in these areas – leading to stronger ties between British Muslims and 
communities overseas in addition to ‘grassroots follow-up initiatives’.438 Yet as genuine as 
the efforts of those who took part may have been, this was hardly a project of a grassroots 
nature. Since delegates were handpicked by the FCO, it is reasonable to deduce that they 
would hardly have included individuals with a propensity to take a line too disparaging of 
the government’s own policies. Moreover, with the itineraries for each visit set and 
managed by the FCO, encounters would have been at best too closely supervised and at 
worst too staged for participants to engage deeply in the kinds of frank and honest 
exchanges of the sort that a real battle of ideas would produce. The earlier discussion on 
how surveillance and profiling featured in the Prevent workstream serves to underline this 
analysis. While participants in the PBM project have spoken of beneficial and fruitful 
engagement at their visits, they have also criticised the project for being intensely and 
exhaustively covered by the media, to the extent that it felt like an ‘obvious propaganda 
campaign’, and leaving many participants wondering what the visit was actually doing to 
prevent violent extremism.439 
 
Also funded with Prevent money through the FCO were a number of projects run by non-
governmental bodies. For instance in 2009 ‘Deen International’, an organisation headed by 
Khurshid Ahmed, then of the British Muslim Forum, partnered with the FCO and was 
granted £500,000 to deliver a campaign entitled ‘I am Muslim, I am British’.440 This was by 
its own admission ‘a major marketing and PR offensive’.441 The project got as far as a pilot 
phase, which was based in Pakistan. It included a media campaign with advertisements on 
television, radio and in the print media as well as a website. There were debates, discussions 
and conferences and an extensive lecture tour of universities and colleges around 
Pakistan.442 These efforts were aimed to utilise the services of prominent, successful British 
                                                          
438 Correspondence from Lucy Hughes, Head, Prevent Team CTD at the FCO to Graeme Breen, in response 
to the latter’s freedom of information request regarding FCO involvement with the Quilliam Foundation and 
the PBM project.10th May 2010, Reference 0238-10. Available at: 
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tter%20final.doc.html [accessed on 19th June 2013]. 
439 Author’s interview with past PBM delegate wishing to remain anonymous, 29th November 2011. 
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November 2011]. 
441 ‘I am the West – project synopsis’ http://www.deeninternational.co.uk/downloads/i-am-the-west.pdf 
[accessed on 21st November 2011 – Site appears to have taken down as of 19th June 2013]. (‘I am the West’ 
was the initial title given to the project, before it was changed to ‘I am Muslim, I am British’ – cf. previous 
footnote). 
442 Ibid.  
 181 
Pakistani Muslims to put across the message that ‘British society was not ‘anti-Islamic’’, to 
demonstrate the extent of British Muslim integration in the UK, and to ‘stimulate and 
facilitate constructive debate’ on liberal values and Islam.443 In doing so, the hope was that 
the extremist narrative against Britain (and ‘The West’) as ‘enemies’ of Islam and Muslims 
would be robustly challenged, that allies might be won from amongst ‘ordinary’ Muslims 
abroad, and thus that some headway would be made towards combating the threat to UK 
security from ‘radical Islamism’. 
 
v. Don’t mention the Foreign Policy: 
A final factor of great importance to the degeneration of trust between the government and 
Muslim communities in the period after 7/7 has been the dogged refusal of government to 
acknowledge any role that its foreign policy decisions have played in increasing 
radicalisation among young Muslims, and thus threatening the nation’s security. This was 
most acute during the Blair years. From the very first exercise in government-community 
engagement after 7/7, the PET Working Groups, UK foreign policy had been identified as 
a ‘root cause’ of terrorism which needed to be ‘interrogat(ed) and understood’, along with 
other root causes, if terrorism was to be effectively tackled.444 However, despite the 
government’s declared intention to tackle the factors behind the appeal of violent 
extremism amongst young British Muslims, critics were quick and persistent in pointing out 
an almost pathological blindness to any sort of recognition that foreign policy might have 
played a role in this regard.445 For these detractors, the idea that the road to violent 
extremism could be understood, and thus adequately tackled, without considering the 
discontent and anger that British involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention 
historically in Palestine, was farcical at best, and deeply insulting at the very worst.446 For 
the Blair government, admission that foreign policy played a role in increasing the terror 
threat was dismissed as giving in to the terrorists, or ‘making excuses’ for their horrific acts 
and thereby granting them the hope of some legitimacy, no matter how minimal. 
 
                                                          
443 Ibid., p.3. Emphasis in original. 
444 Warraich and Nawaz eds., ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups (2005), p.75. 
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within Muslim communities who have all taken the view that the Iraq war in particular, and foreign policy in 
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For many Muslims, such a stance smacked of arrogance and was hugely frustrating. For 
those working on the ground with young Muslims, it was crystal clear that the offensives in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were viewed with resentment. With details emerging steadily of 
civilian deaths in these countries, of destruction, the mis-treatment of prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib prison and others, it seemed remarkably myopic of government to accuse critics of 
trying to excuse the terrorists’ actions, or even to explain them away. Moreover, perhaps 
the single consistently recurrent theme in the speeches or testimonies of so many of those 
who attempted to, or indeed did carry out terrorist acts, was their citation of foreign policy 
in ‘Muslim lands’ as a major motivating factor.447  
 
A prime example of dissonance between the government and Muslim communities on this 
issue took place in August 2006. At the height of Israel-Hezbollah conflict, and in a rare 
gesture of unity bringing together otherwise disparate and rival sections of the Muslim 
community, an open letter to government was published urging Prime Minister Tony Blair 
to ‘redouble his efforts to tackle terror and extremism and change our foreign policy to 
show the world that we value the lives of civilians wherever they live and whatever their 
religion.’448 Signed by Sunni, Shi’a and Sufi groups from all areas of the UK as well as the 
majority of Muslim parliamentarians (Birmingham Perry Barr’s Khalid Mahmood being the 
notable exception), it was a demonstration of unanimity in asserting to the government 
with one voice that engaging in ‘policy risks’ abroad ‘not only increases the risk to ordinary 
people in that region (the Middle East), it is also ammunition to extremists who threaten us 
all’.449 Despite the letter’s broad-based support, and the painstaking efforts made by its 
signatories to condemn terrorism – a chorus of government figures roundly proceeded to 
write off the initiative as ‘dangerous and foolish’,450 and ‘the gravest possible error’.451 
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Rather than a plea to understand the root causes of disillusionment and despair that might 
leave young people vulnerable to radicalisation, it was interpreted as an unacceptable 
attempt to allow terrorists to ‘dictate’ to the UK how to shape its foreign policy, and a call 
to engage in some kind of appeasement or concession.  
 
Participants in YMAG and the PBM project have spoken of how they would be regularly 
sent ‘fact-sheets’ by the FCO whenever any aspect of foreign policy provoked controversy 
among Muslim communities. These documents would highlight ‘all the positive aspects of 
government involvement, say in Iraq or Afghanistan, and (they) were asked to ‘please share 
this with your communities’’.452 This approach was seen to be patronising both in its tone 
and its expectations – after all, participants in these forums were chosen for their leadership 
and initiative, and were (at least officially) assured that they would be free to express their 
own independent views of government policy.   
 
This sort of situation was to recur often, as Muslim groups became increasingly convinced 
of foreign policy’s role in making extremism appealing and the government maintained its 
refusal to even countenance that its foreign policy decisions could provide an explanation 
for the appeal of radicalisation as a resort for frustrated and disillusioned young Muslims. 
With neither side willing to shift its position on this matter, the issue of foreign policy 
proved to be a major source of disconnect between advocates from Muslim communities 
and the government. 
 
To sum up, there was obviously a pressing need for an initiative such as Prevent. Its 
declared ambitions: empowerment, capacity building and educating so as to combat the 
spread of violent extremism, were fair enough, and in principle had a great deal of willing 
support. However, a preoccupation with securitisation tainted the venture, as it resulted in 
a ‘conflation between the security and counter-terrorism aspects, and community 
cohesion’453. Evidence of community profiling and the involvement of intelligence services, 
in addition to a (perhaps typical of government) bureaucratic preoccupation with meeting 
targets and the conducting of superficial consultations in order to tick boxes seriously 
damaged the level of trust between Muslim communities and government agencies. The 
extent to which the ‘soft’ approach to counter-terrorism, and specifically the Prevent 
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programme succeeded in stopping extremism in its tracks or safeguarding the UK from 
terror threats is difficult to measure in concrete terms. However, what is certain is that 
Prevent caused acute and lasting damage to the level of trust between the government and 
Muslim communities, and that this was exacerbated by stubborn intransigence from the 
government on the issue of foreign policy as a root cause of radicalisation. Whether this 
scar can be healed is yet to be seen, but neither the Labour government, nor the coalition 
which succeeded it in 2010, have shown signs of abandoning the Prevent approach.454 
 
5.4 The MCB, the ‘Israel Test’ and the rise of ‘apolitical’ Islam – the media directly 
influencing political trends? 
 
5.4.1 Challenging the MCB in the media: 
From around August 2005, there began to appear a steady stream of voices in the media 
challenging the working arrangement that the MCB and the government had been 
operating under for most of the preceding decade. Led by a handful of journalists who 
were broadly aligned with the ‘liberal left’, these voices were likened by some to a 
‘campaign’, since their efforts sometimes appeared to be co-ordinated and sources were 
often mutually shared.455 In August 2005, the BBC’s Panorama featured a programme 
presented by John Ware entitled ‘A Question of Leadership’. This documentary sought to 
argue the case that the Muslim community, and the MCB’s leadership in particular, were in 
‘a state of denial’ about the presence of extreme views among its affiliates, and that they 
were out of touch, and subsequently failing to take seriously the need to combat radical 
views. These were views which, although they did not necessarily espouse violence, did 
nonetheless promote separatism, ‘contempt’ towards non-Muslims and acted as a ‘slippery 
slope’ towards extremism and eventually violence.456 Central to Ware’s argument was his 
search for authenticity and un-equivocation in the MCB’s condemnation of violence and 
specifically suicide bombing.  
 
The 7/7 attacks were the first time suicide bombing had taken place on UK soil, and as I 
have mentioned earlier, had shocked the nation and prompted much soul-searching 
amongst Muslim groups that had previously preferred to focus on conspiracy theories and 
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victimisation as easy scapegoats for the rise of Islamist terrorism. Ware argued that in the 
post-7/7 era, it was simply unacceptable for those claiming to lead the Muslim community 
to sustain a position where on one hand they had vowed to root out extremism and come 
down harshly upon it457, and on the other, they were reluctant to denounce specific cases of 
sympathy for extremists or to distance themselves from affiliate organisations that held 
personalities with ‘radical views’ in high regard458. 
 
To make his argument, Ware persistently challenged leading MCB figures, including 
Secretary General Sir Iqbal Sacranie and Deputy Secretary General, Muhammad Abdul 
Bari, to clearly and directly condemn the tactic of suicide bombing by Palestinians in Israel. 
Ware, by his own admission, had set this as a sort of litmus test: 
The reason I focused on Israel … is because I think the Israel-Palestine 
conflict presents the toughest test, in a way, for all the high-minded 
principles, including tolerance and peace, which political Islam claims to 
have,  
 
[and, in response to accusations of bias in his questioning technique]  
I appreciate the Middle East conflict has a dynamic of its own, but there 
were people on the MCB who felt it was justifiable to support the 
targeting of civilians in Israel on theological grounds but not in London. 
I think those two positions must be incompatible, I really do.459 
 
Ware also challenged the MCB on its non-attendance of the UK’s Holocaust Memorial Day 
event,460 as well as on Iqbal Sacranie’s presence at a memorial service for Shaykh Ahmed 
Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas who was assassinated in a targeted strike by the Israeli 
military. In the meantime, an investigative article was published in The Observer newspaper to 
coincide with Ware’s programme. Its findings overlapped with Ware’s claims of double 
standards towards extremism within the MCB – drawing attention to sympathies with 
Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) among some of MCB’s larger and more influential affiliates 
and arguing that the JI and its founder, Maulana Abul A’la Maududi, subscribed to 
extremist, separatist views that were incompatible with the liberal, secular democracy of 
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modern Britain.461 The Observer also suggested, as did Ware in his film, that the MCB was 
wielding its influence to stifle creativity and diversity in an upcoming Festival of Muslim 
Cultures, in the name of preserving religious orthodoxy.462  
 
However, these efforts were received with suspicion, indignation and defensiveness by the 
MCB who accused the BBC of succumbing to pressures from the ‘pro-Israeli’ lobby. 
Sacranie declared that he refused to pass the ‘Israel Test’,463 which he considered to be a 
disingenuous ploy to de-legitimise the MCB and to portray their principled political stances 
in a negative light, thus, undermining the entire notion of Muslim political engagement and 
therefore of Muslim identity politics itself. The MCB fired off furious press releases, and 
letters to the BBC and The Observer, charging them with poorly researched and agenda-
driven journalism and arguing that the various journalists and commentators involved were 
engaged in a ‘witch-hunt’ against it aiming to ‘purposefully sabotage’ British Muslim efforts 
at political participation.464  
 
The following year, similar accusations were levelled by Martin Bright, in a Dispatches 
documentary465 and an accompanying pamphlet, in which he argued that the government, 
and especially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were engaged in a ‘love affair with 
radical Islamism’.466 This, he elaborated, was a gravely mistaken policy of engaging with 
non-violent, but ‘reactionary’ Muslim groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood abroad, and 
its counterpart organisations in the UK, as a strategy with which to combat the spread of 
violent extremist ideas in the Muslim community. Bright relied on a series of leaked 
documents from a civil servant467 at the Foreign Office for his information, which related 
to a number of occasions where officials in the FCO’s Engaging with the Islamic World 
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suspension from his job at the FCO. Cf. Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad (2009), pp.127-128. 
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Group (EIWG) positively pushed for dialogue with and even the promotion of groups and 
individuals who were ‘reactionary’ and ‘Islamist’. Bright contended that the EIWG’s 
preferred stance of leniency towards figures from abroad such as Shaykh Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi and Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, as well as UK groups like FOSIS and YMO;468 
rather than acting as a desired ‘buffer’ for violent extremism, instead served only to 
legitimise intolerant and illiberal views towards religions other than Islam, towards women, 
homosexuals and towards democracy itself. He accused many of these groups and figures 
of having inconsistent positions on violence – denouncing it in front of western audiences 
and sanctioning it as an acceptable tactic in places such as Israel and Iraq. Furthermore, he 
concurred with John Ware’s argument, which was basically a version of the ‘conveyor belt’ 
thesis. This was that even if these non-violent groups were deemed to be ready partners 
from within Islamism who were willing to work with the government in tackling and 
isolating violent extremism, they nonetheless (even if unassumingly!) acted as stepping 
stones via which disaffected young Muslims could hop from ‘moderate radicalism’ to its 
more extreme, and violent versions of Islamism. 
 
5.4.2 The rise of ‘apolitical Islam’: 
This ‘conveyor belt’ understanding of the process of radicalisation was finding increasing 
favour within the liberal left. It insisted that truly moderate Islam did not concern itself 
with political ideologies or political affairs. The implication of this was that truly moderate 
Muslims needed to be either apolitical, or at least to be non-dissenting from the political 
status quo – since any dissent or vocal political activism from a Muslim would make them 
an Islamist – and thus place them at the start of the conveyor belt moving through 
radicalisation and towards violent extremism. In this context, a number of self-professed 
‘apolitical Muslim’ groups were indeed appearing on the Muslim representation scene.  
 
These groups included the British Muslim Forum (BMF) and the Sufi Muslim Council 
(SMC), both of whom were set up apparently to fulfil alternative roles to that of the MCB 
– that of bringing together Muslim groups across the country, and/or representing British 
Muslims to government, the media and other official arenas. The BMF, like the MCB, was 
an umbrella group, but its affiliates consisted mainly of Sufi/Barelwi mosques.469 The SMC 
on the other hand did not appear to have an easily definable constituency as such, yet both 
                                                          
468 Cf. Table 1 ‘Glossary of UK Muslim representative/lobby groups’, pp.222-227. 
469 Ibid., for more information on these organisations.  
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of these groups claimed to be speaking for the silent, apolitical majority of British Muslims 
who apparently resented their religion being hijacked for political purposes by the likes of 
the MCB. These new groups contended that Islamism had kept a hold on British Muslim 
community leadership for too long; and in regularly and painstakingly arguing that there 
should be a clear and absolute demarcation between Islam and Islamism, they sought to 
present a somewhat polarised landscape of the Muslim community in which they were the 
bona fide representatives of adherents to the former (the majority, who were law abiding, 
everyday citizens) and in which the latter, the Islamists, were holding disproportionate 
sway, often with self-serving motives that were not aligned with the aspirations of the 
majority.  
 
Also within this general trend were the more localised or specialist voices of new quasi-
intellectual/academic groups and consultancies. These included Dr Taj Hargey of the 
Muslim Education Centre of Oxford (MECO), British Muslims for Secular Democracy 
(BMSD) founded by the columnist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown who acted as a trustee and 
prominent spokesperson, Ed Husain and his Quilliam Foundation, and Haras Rafiq 
(initially linked with the SMC) who set up CENTRI (Counter Extremism Consultancy, 
Training Research and Interventions). As specialist groups, these differed from the 
aforementioned representative bodies in that they did not seek to directly represent the 
grassroots in the same way that the BMF, SMC, MCB, or even radical voices such as HT 
and others did. Instead they chose to engage with government and the media on the basis 
of their expertise. This was largely derived from personal experience, with many of these 
groups employing or relying on former extremists who had denounced their pasts and 
embraced ‘moderate’ Islam. Again this was often a purportedly apolitical religiosity, and 
often centred around spirituality. Yet what was most peculiarly consistent about these 
individuals and the groups within which their worked was their near-obsessive opposition 
to the use of Muslim identity in the political sphere.470 The paradox of this position was 
that on one hand, it was arguing that Muslims were apolitical, and that they should leave 
their religion out of politics, and on the other, these groups were engaging heavily in 
politics in contestation with the MCB and others, overwhelmingly on issues relating to 
Muslims. So while arguing that the ‘silent majority’ of authentic Muslims were apolitical, 
they were demonstrating themselves to be deeply engaged in politics, as Muslims, albeit ex-
extremist ones.   This attitude put them at odds with the more long-lived Muslim groups, 
                                                          
470 Maajid Nawaz, ‘How the government should handle the ‘Muslim Question’’ New Statesman (5th December 
2011). 
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primarily the MCB, which, as I have demonstrated in earlier chapters, was founded on the 
very idea of Muslim political agency, with Muslim-ness as the primary marker of identity. 
Another notable consistency was a conspicuous acquiescence to the political status quo, or 
at the very least, silence, on foreign policy issues that were otherwise highly contentious 
among UK Muslims – namely Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
The official reception that such groups received from government was warm and 
encouraging. Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly, and her successor Hazel Blears each in 
turn made it clear that they were amenable to cooperation with newly formed bodies that 
better suited their agenda, and moreover, that they were willing to end, or freeze cordial 
relations with existing bodies that were not so readily enthusiastic about the direction of 
government policy.471 For the MCB, this was seen as a direct threat,472 and an affront to 
their right to differ with government on matters of principle.473 The MCB and others 
responded by pointing out these new government interlocutors/advisors were by far 
lacking in the credibility due to their detachment from grassroots Muslim institutions474. 
This did not seem to halt their progress. These new bodies had the benefit of being led by 
individuals who were themselves very well connected in the media, government 
departments and quangos and thus were able to secure prominent exposure and highly 
placed support in a relatively short time. 
 
Nonetheless, for some of these bodies, their heavy reliance on the sway of a handful of 
prominent individuals proved to be a cause for their swift descent into obscurity. Beyond 
sparse, intermittent activities centring around key personalities,475 they have been largely 
absent from the day-to-day issues affecting ordinary Muslims. Activities have focused on 
                                                          
471 ‘Minister Backs New Muslim Group’ BBC News, 19th July 2006 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5193402.stm [accessed on 28th November 2011]. 
Ruth Kelly, ‘Britain: our values, our responsibilities’ speech to Muslim organisations on working together to 
tackle extremism, London, 10th October 2006. 
472 MCB ‘MCB responds to Secretary of State Ruth Kelly MP’ 15th October 2006. Full text of letter available 
at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/features/features.php?ann_id=1537 [accessed on 6th June 2012]. 
473 Author’s interview with MCB official, wishing to remain anonymous, October 2011. 
474 Cf. ‘Martin Bright's C4 Documentary: Part of a Campaign to Divide and Rule’, MCB Press Release, 13th 
July 2006 available at http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/presstext.php?ann_id=214 [accessed on 28th 
November 2011] in which an SMC representative is described as ‘discredited’ and it is queried ‘what level of 
support – if any - he actually had within the Muslim communities across the UK which he is now claiming to 
represent.’ 
See also Shehla Khan, ‘New Sufis for New Labour’ The Muslim News 25th August 2006. 
Additionally, former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, has claimed that the SMC was funded 
by the CIA, cf. Craig Murray, ‘Sufi Muslim Council a CIA/Karimov Front’ 23rd March 2009, available at: 
http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2009/03/sufi_muslim_cou/, [accessed on 8th June 2013]. 
475 The SMC’s most recent project was a five-venue tour with Shaykh Hisham Kabbani in July 2010, their 
apparent spiritual leader who had also featured prominently in all their previous activities.  
 190 
denouncing terrorism and ‘Islamism’, yet there is no evidence of any real efforts to engage 
with ‘bread and butter’ issues concerning Muslim communities such as education, 
employment, youth work, to mention a few. Indeed the BMF has since 2008 been virtually 
defunct after issuing a statement in support of the government’s highly controversial 
proposal to introduce 42-day detention without charge for terrorism suspects, which led to 
a split in its ranks.   
 
Whilst the MCB has soldiered on, it has been weighed down by the complexity of its set-
up, with committees and sub-committees galore, and no straightforward way for 
individuals to become involved except through membership of an affiliated organisation, or 
through personal connections.476 Accusations that I have mentioned earlier regarding a lack 
transparency, outreach and a broader representation of the UK’s Muslim communities are 
not without foundation, and suggestions for improvement have long been put forward by 
well-wishers.477 Despite these structural difficulties, the MCB’s grassroots support level has 
gone up, as greater energy has been invested in community empowerment schemes, work 
with young people in schools, mentoring initiatives, leadership development programmes, 
joining civic partnerships and coalitions, and running health campaigns to mention just a 
few.478 None of the newer advocacy bodies have offered this level of service to the 
community and certainly not with such consistency. In fact it is doubtful whether they 
enjoy the commensurate level of grassroots support in order to be able to implement such 
schemes. However, with the most active of these groups being consultancy/think-tank –
type bodies rather than community organisations with a membership or institutional base, 
their level of community support is difficult to gauge. Yet, just as the MCB cannot claim to 
be fully representative of British Muslims, neither can it be said that the post-2005 
‘apolitical’ set of Muslim groups do not represent anyone at all.  
 
 
 
                                                          
476 Cf. MCB, ‘The Muslim Council of Britain – its structure, history and workings’ (2002), p.6, for an outline 
of the organisation’s structure, its various specialist committees and office-bearers. 
477 For examples cf.: Yahya Birt, ‘The Next Ten Years: an open letter to the MCB’ emel magazine issue 46, July 
2008, and Mohammed Amin, ‘The Muslim Council of Britain’s need for constitutional reform’ 20th January 
2011, available at his website: http://www.mohammedamin.com/Community_issues/MCB-constitutional-
reform.html [accessed on 6th December 2011]. 
478 Some examples include: Footsteps – a mentoring scheme for young Muslim schoolchildren; the MCB 
Leadership Development Programme (run annually since 2004); the Young Muslim Beacon Awards (run 
annually since 2008); regular partnerships with Citizens UK, a grassroots campaigns alliance working to 
promote proactive political engagement in diverse communities; and a dedicated Muslim Spiritual Care 
project run in partnership with the National Health Service. 
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5.5 British Muslims – a changed identity politics in a changing political 
landscape 
By 2006/7 it had become increasingly clear that the future of British Muslim identity 
politics was in considerable flux. If one thing was for certain, it was that securitisation and 
the terror threat from extremism had come to dominate the relationship between the 
government and Muslim community groups in an unprecedented manner. Naturally, this 
affected the way that identity politics developed – both in terms of priorities, dynamics, and 
their style of conduct.  
 
The arrival of a multitude of representative groups and the growth of an ‘ex-extremist’ 
advisory sector meant that each Muslim representative organisation was now open to 
greater scrutiny, and comparisons were regularly conducted between them. A natural 
consequence was that introspection ensued within existing groups and steps were taken to 
become more relevant and engage with current issues and to deal with weaknesses in a 
productive manner. This was especially true of the MCB, which gradually become more 
reconciled with the presence of other (‘competitor’) umbrella and advocacy groups. For 
instance, it undertook to cooperate with the BMF on the matter of MINAB, where both 
groups sat on the Board’s steering committee.  
 
Over time, the MCB has gradually shown itself to be more open to seeking common cause 
with others despite major differences. Whereas previously, it had made little effort to shake 
off the reputation of being the exclusive preserve of orthodox Muslims,479 2007 saw the 
MCB take steps to openly support the Equality Act, which included new laws against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.480 Despite the inclusion of a firm 
addendum to its statement maintaining the Islamic theological opposition to 
homosexuality, this step was welcomed by gay rights campaigners and groups, some of 
                                                          
479 Accusations which have been regularly levelled at the MCB by the ‘liberal left’ – see Section 3, above.  
480 ‘MCB statement on SORs’ 30th April 2007 http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/presstext.php?ann_id=250 
[accessed on 6th December 2011]. It is arguable that the MCB’s opposition, along with a host of other faith 
groups, to the introduction of same-sex marriage in 2013 was a regression from this. [see ‘Same-sex marriage 
bill – act now!’ MCB Press Release, 4th February 20103, available at: 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2268 , accessed on 10th August 
2013]. However I would argue that it is unfair to make such a deduction based on such an emotive and 
sensitive issue to religions in general. Indeed all major faiths made representations to some effect on this 
matter before the law was finally passed. Additionally, an important part of the MCB’s objection was its call 
for an exemption for mosques from being required to conduct same-sex marriages, on a par with the 
exemption granted to churches. See ‘MCB calls for equal gay marriage exemption for mosques’ Engage website, 
18th December 2012, available at: http://www.iengage.org.uk/news/2270-mcb-calls-for-equal-gay-marriage-
exemption-for-mosques [accessed on 10th August 2013]. 
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whom had earlier invited the MCB to join hands with them to eradicate the ‘twin hatreds 
of Islamophobia and Homophobia’.481 Whilst the MCB didn’t go as far as taking this 
invitation further, their statement, as short and precise as it was, marked a small but 
potentially significant shift in thinking. In expressing support for the law, it demonstrated a 
new maturity in its political approach – one that appreciated that in campaigning for its 
own interests in a modern and pluralist Britain, it needed to understand and even 
empathise with the interests of other groups – even if they differed with them on 
fundamental issues. Therefore, that if it was to argue (as it regularly did) for a solution to 
the Equality Gap for Muslims – in terms of discrimination in employment for instance, 
then it had to equally appreciate that other minorities and historically disadvantaged groups 
deserved the same recognition from the state, and the same level of parity under the law, 
despite fundamental theological or value-based differences that it might have with them.  
 
Further, in January 2008, the MCB finally took the decision to participate officially in the 
national Holocaust Memorial Day, dropping its previous stance of ‘staying away’482 until the 
occasion became more generic and ‘more inclusive of other genocides’. This step had been 
the result of persistent and divisive deliberations within the organisation which pitted those 
who preferred not to participate until the condition of inclusivity had been met, against 
those who saw the MCB’s absence as a ‘self-inflicted wound’, providing opponents with a 
‘stick with which to beat us’.483 Again, this decision was a difficult one to make and still 
remains controversial among the MCB’s affiliates. Indeed, senior MCB figures stayed away 
again in 2009, perhaps in protest against the belligerence of Israel’s bombing campaign on 
Gaza during that time, and the UK government’s muted response.  
 
Still, no matter how painful these controversial decisions were for those who made them, 
they were transformative, both for the MCB and for the Muslim communities. As much as 
the Council’s influence and leverage had diminished over the years, its so far unparalleled 
level of community support and its unmatched consistency of operation have served it well 
and have helped it to retain a (often wobbly) primus inter pares position. Subsequently, 
difficult decisions such as these made perceptible, if unassuming ripples further afield 
                                                          
481 Extract of a letter from Peter Tatchell of OutRage! to Sir Iqbal Sacranie, quoted in: ‘Muslim leader urged: 
drop homophobia. Gay group calls for solidarity against intolerance’ available at: 
http://www.petertatchell.net/religion/muslimleader.htm [accessed on 13th June 2013]. 
482 Detractors of the MCB position preferred to call it a boycott. 
483 Vikram Dodd and Hugh Muir, ‘Senior Muslims tried to reverse Holocaust Memorial Day snub’ The 
Guardian 27th January 2007. 
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within Britain’s Muslim communities and networks, and added legitimacy and weight to 
those in the community who were already pushing for a less insular and more open 
understanding of civic cooperation.484 
Additionally, signals have been made that structural reappraisals are underway in the form 
of a constitutional review for the MCB,485 though these have been a very long time coming 
– as of 2013, changes in structure and constitution have yet to be implemented. Efforts 
have been made to be more inclusive of diversity within the organisation’s executive posts, 
with women and young people featuring in these positions regularly in recent years. 
However, with the results of its elections still being effectively pre-determined by the 
Council’s main affiliates, the emergence of fresh blood, and the contribution of individuals 
who are not linked to any of the major affiliates remains virtually impossible.  
 
The case of Mohammed Amin, a Manchester accountant who put himself forward for the 
post of MCB Secretary General at its 2010 elections is illustrative of this point. Here was an 
individual who had been involved in various sub-committees of the MCB for a good 
couple of years, had enjoyed a distinguished career and had been of service to his local 
community in various capacities. In putting himself forward for the post he went to great 
efforts to highlight his suitability and his goals and ambitions for the MCB by publishing a 
manifesto and acquiring endorsements from a handful of prominent Muslim figures. Yet 
the outcome of the election was a foregone conclusion – basically because the main affiliate 
organisations486 of the MCB had, as per tradition, decided well in advance to instruct their 
delegates to back Farooq Murad for the post, (Chairman of Muslim Aid and a long-time 
community activist and leader). Murad was highly qualified too and I am by no means 
arguing that Amin was necessarily a better candidate. The salient point here is that Amin’s 
campaign was not given a fighting chance because he was a relative newcomer to the MCB 
and because he lacked the heavyweight backing from the main MCB affiliates that Murad 
                                                          
484 For example, prominent Muslim figures have since (at least) 2006 been in occasional discussion with gay 
rights groups regarding the potential for cooperation in tackling homophobia among Muslims and in tackling 
Islamophobia together. Cf. minutes of Equality and Diversity Forum (EDF) meeting, 18th January 2006, 
which records such discussions between Mohammed Aziz and Alan Wardle of Stonewall. Mohammed Aziz is 
cited to have been representing the MCB at this meeting, although the MCB later disowned his comments, 
nonetheless, his approach is representative of a growing approach among leading British Muslim figures. 
Minutes available at: www.edf.org.uk/publications/MinsJan06Mtg.doc [accessed on 14th June 2013]. 
485 Author’s interviews with Yousuf Bhailok (MCB Secretary General 2000-2002), and other (anonymous) 
MCB officials, 10th and 17th October 2011. 
486 Here I refer specifically to the main British Muslim organisations of the reformist strand (see Chapter 2 of 
this thesis), or of reformist heritage. Specifically the national bodies of the UKIM, Dawatul Islam, IFE, YMO, 
MAB, ISB, YMUK and all their local branches and affiliated mosques, the delegates of which, together, form 
a sizeable voting bloc within the MCB. 
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enjoyed. In a sense, the election was over before it began.487 This incident reflected 
cogently how the MCB was still a long way away from demonstrating a capacity for true 
inclusivity beyond the handful of groups to which it owed so much of its patronage, 
manpower and indeed its very foundation. It was almost as though these groups had 
invested so much hope and effort into the MCB that they had become obsessed with 
retaining control of its steering. Yet without giving genuine room for others to come 
forward, and without a fairer voting system, it will be impossible to see what a much more 
representative MCB would look like, and how its policy priorities and decisions might be 
affected. 
 
Conclusion 
In order to assess the point at which British Muslim identity politics had arrived by 2010, 
let us conduct a brief comparison between this and the previous phase I have examined in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Where are we now with respect to the previous phase? 
To sum up, the period between 9/11 and 7/7 which I have referred to as ‘Turning Point 1’, 
can be characterised by the following main features: 
 
Firstly, there was a peak in rapport between the government and the MCB. Although there 
were difficult times, the MCB did enjoy a pre-eminent and quasi-official position, as it was 
endorsed and promoted by the government in the wake of 9/11 as the voice of British 
Muslims. The then MCB Secretary General Yousuf Bhailok talks of having daily phone 
conversations to co-ordinate with the Home Secretary in the months following the 
attacks.488 Additionally, government ministers, and even the Prime Minister himself were 
regular fixtures at MCB events; and MCB officials were regular guests at Downing Street, 
Parliament and the various government departments. For example, the MCB were invited 
to send a delegation to Downing Street for consultation with the Prime Minister in the run 
up to the decision to send troops to Afghanistan in 2001.489 This was a highly publicised 
event, and the MCB was the only Muslim representative organisation to be invited. 
                                                          
487 Madeleine Bunting, ‘The MCB’s wonderland election’ The Guardian 18th June 2010. 
Inayat Bunglawala, ‘Mohammed Amin resigns from the MCB’ at: 
http://inayatscorner.wordpress.com/2010/06/22/mohammed-amin-resigns-from-the-mcb/ 22nd June 2010 
[accessed on 6th December 2011]. 
488 Author’s interview with Yousuf Bhailok, 10th October 2011. 
489 ‘Muslim delegation meets with Prime Minister’ The Muslim News 28th September 2001. 
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Contrast this with the government consultation with Muslims in the aftermath of 7/7 – the 
net was cast much wider than the MCB, which was now only one of several groups to be 
consulted. 
 
This conferment of an ‘official status’ to the MCB symbolised a ‘coming of age’ for Muslim 
identity politics. It was a mutually beneficial arrangement for both the government and the 
MCB. The direct benefit for the MCB was that it had the ear of the government if it ever 
needed to raise an issue, and the government for its part, was assured that it had direct lines 
of communication into the Muslim community. Of course this is not to ignore that the 
MCB did not represent all components of Britain’s diverse Muslim communities, but the 
channel of communication was there, it was prominent and ‘above board’, and those who 
wished to use it knew what they had to do.   
 
The period between 2001 and 2005 also witnessed the Muslim community gradually 
adopting a far less insular attitude, and a new sense of being ‘at ease’ with aspects of wider 
society that shared values and ambitions. This was manifested through greater participation 
in civic campaigns on shared issues and a huge diversification of self-expression, using an 
ever-broader range of media. 
By 2010, there had been regressions on a number of fronts: 
Since July 2005, we have seen that relations between government and Muslim groups have 
become progressively more strained, and more conditional, when it came to matters related 
to community cohesion and security. This was in spite of a far greater honesty and 
openness to introspection, self-criticism and difference between mainstream Muslim 
players. The main exception was that of new ‘government-friendly’ organisations, with 
whom the government established cordial, supportive relationships, but whose efficacy was 
questionable since they were less well established than the MCB and many of its affiliates. 
As we have seen, most of these organisations were either single-issue focused, had sporadic 
or short-lived activity, or eventually faded into some level of obscurity.  
 
A major contributing factor to these strained relations was the Prevent strand of the 
Contest scheme, which contributed significantly to a loss of trust and rise in suspicion 
between local Muslim groups and communities, and the government. New and more 
stringent legal developments which sought to criminalise speech acts that were deemed 
harmful also fed into a growing atmosphere of distrust and resentment among Muslim 
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communities who felt that they were being unfairly targeted and that their highly cherished 
freedoms to criticise and speak openly on many aspects of politics and even religion were 
being unduly restricted. Many of the attempts that were made to implement these laws 
proved ultimately to be difficult to uphold in court and had the undesired attempt of 
creating martyr figures from among the outspoken, obnoxious and (perhaps!) dangerous 
individuals that they were targeted against. 
 
Insofar as dialogue was concerned, the nature of government-community conversation had 
returned again to a far more abrupt nature. Engagement was now conditional and subject 
to prerequisites set by the government. Rather than the flexible, almost empathetic 
approach that had been used post-9/11, there was now a ‘take-it-or-leave-it style’ 
characterised by a fair amount of public grandstanding and ultimatums being issued by the 
government.  
 
On the other hand, positive developments have included greater steps towards 
transparency and openness in Muslim community groups, as a result of the more intense 
and often hostile public scrutiny that they were faced with, notably from quarters within 
the media. While the conditions for these developments may have been hostile and high-
pressured, they have yielded community groups that have become more willing to reform 
and embrace progress and change. In addition, many of those lobbying for ‘Muslim’ causes 
have invested greater efforts into putting their message across through the media and 
through civil society campaigning, recognising that government preoccupation with 
securitisation meant that non-governmental avenues were more effective options for their 
purposes.  
 
Has this period been a case of ‘two steps back’ being taken, following the post-9/11 ‘one 
step forward’? Time will tell. With the arrival of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in 2010, details of engagement with Muslim communities are 
emerging gradually. The Conservative Party is not known to be keen on the notion of 
identity politics, having regularly criticised it whilst in opposition. This stance marks it apart 
from Labour’s long tradition of championing the causes of society’s minority and 
disadvantaged groups. Indications are that the future of Muslim identity politics, if it is to 
survive past the coming phase, is necessarily at something of a crossroads. While some 
legal aspects of the Equality Gap have been substantively tackled, the religious hatred 
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legislation remains something of an open wound, facing charges of being something of a 
dud law – one that, at best, fills a gap in technicalities rather than in equalities.490  
 
The nature of the gap itself has also experienced a shift. On one hand, it has been 
narrowed through the abolition of blasphemy legislation in 2008, but on the other hand, 
issues of Islamophobia still persist, and are arguably worsening. Recent times have seen the 
English Defence League (EDL) take on the mantle of the BNP, which in turn is ever more 
anxious to gain respectability, having enjoyed an (apparently short-lived) spurt of electoral 
successes at the local council and European parliament levels in 2008 and 2009. Education 
and awareness regarding Islamophobia is needed as much as ever, evidenced by uproar in 
reaction to the speech of Conservative Party Chairman, Baroness Warsi in 2011, which 
warned that Islamophobia was the last remaining socially acceptable prejudice among 
British polite society. She argued that it had ‘passed the dinner table test’, and was seen by 
many as ‘normal and uncontroversial’.491 While her pronouncement could conceivably be 
criticised as ill-advised,492 and is naturally open to question and debate, it was certainly not 
made without context. A whole host of public figures and commentators had recently 
taken issue with the very notion of Islamophobia, questioning the extent of its existence or 
arguing that it was disingenuously over-exaggerated. Others had indulged in casual anti-
Muslim comments that were designed to positively test the boundaries of the acceptable, in 
ways that would have been roundly denounced if they had been made about other minority 
groups.493 As Tariq Modood has noted: 
Muslims are frequently criticised in the comment pages of the respectable 
press in a way that few, if any, other minority groups are. Muslims often 
remark that if, in such articles, the words ‘Jews’ or ‘blacks’ were substituted 
for ‘Muslims’, the newspapers in question would be attacked as racist and, 
indeed, be vulnerable to legal proceedings. Just as the hostility against Jews, 
                                                          
490 Goodall, ‘Incitement to religious hatred: all talk and no substance?’ The Modern Law Review (2007) Vol. 70:1, 
Simon Thompson, ‘Freedom of expression and hatred of religion’ Ethnicities January 2012 Vol.12:2, pp.215-
232. 
491 Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, ‘My Faith’ Sir Sigmund Sternberg Interfaith Lecture delivered at Leicester University, 
20th January 2011. 
492 Indeed it was criticised as exactly that, cf. Charles Moore, ‘It was selfish – and wrong – of Lady Warsi to 
give that speech’ The Telegraph 21st January 2011.  
493 Warsi cited Polly Toynbee, ‘I am an Islamophobe and proud of it’ The Independent 23rd October 1997, as 
well as Rod Liddle who delivered a speech entitled ‘Islamophobia? Count me in!’ [Warsi, ‘My Faith’, (2011)]. 
Other examples include Martin Amis who, commenting in an interview on the 2006 foiled transatlantic 
aircraft terror plot opined that: ‘The Muslim community will have to suffer until it gets its house in order.’ 
What sort of suffering? Not letting them travel. Deportation – further down the road. Curtailing of freedoms. 
Strip-searching people who look like they’re from the Middle East or from Pakistan… Discriminatory stuff, 
until it hurts the whole community and they start getting tough with their children.’ Ginny Dougary, interview 
with Amis in The Times Magazine, 9th September 2006.  
See also Peter Oborne, ‘The shameful Islamophobia at the heart of Britain’s press’ The Independent 7th July 
2008. 
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in various times and places, has been a varying blend of anti-Judaism 
(hostility to a religion) and anti-Semitism (hostility to a racialised group), so 
it is difficult to gauge to what extent contemporary British Islamophobia is 
‘religious’ and to what extent ‘racial’.494 
 
As for Muslim advocacy groups, they have learned a great deal during this period, and 
come out with increased confidence and greater resilience. On balance, the MCB’s 
experience of ‘detachment’ from government, as painful as it may have been, was 
ultimately beneficial. It has opened up options for a serious reassessment of approach, but 
serious decisions need to be made as to whether civic partnerships and campaigns will be 
the way forward for Muslim political agency, or whether lobbying of the government will 
regain its position as the main preoccupation of Muslim organisations. 
  
                                                          
494 Tariq Modood, ‘Muslims and the politics of difference’ in Muslims in Britain: race place and identities ed. by 
Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p.204. 
 199 
Postscript: 
Although this thesis officially covers the period between the years 1960-2010, 
developments since 2010 have been both fast and significant. Therefore, before I move on 
to my concluding chapter, I take a look here at three important themes where such 
developments are being played out, both to enrich my final conclusions and to highlight 
areas for potential further research.  
 
The future of multiculturalism and of identity politics: a changing game 
 
i- Multiculturalism in the balance: 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks ushered in much probing and 
reflection over the future of multiculturalism. Had multiculturalism as policy been a 
contributory factor to a divisive climate in Britain, within which citizens could bring 
themselves to launch a terror attack in their own country? Had we ‘focused far too much 
on the “multi” and not enough on the common culture’?495 Was it time to now discard it 
and for the state to take the lead in calling for a more forthright national unity which 
demanded more outward signs of loyalty and assimilation to a shared British culture from 
minority communities, while making less allowances for their specific needs or claims? 
These were questions that were being asked increasingly by voices in the centre-Left of 
politics, and with the combined pressures of securitisation and the electoral threat from the 
rise of the far right, as well as anti-immigration parties such as the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP), these thoughts soon began to find their home in day-to-day politics.  
 
This trend had an impact in the area of the government’s relations with community 
representative groups. In Chapter 5, we saw how the government began to shift its 
approach to identity politics by signalling that it would be open to engagement and co-
operation with any group that fulfilled the requisite requirements in ‘tackling extremism 
and defending our shared values’.496 The engagement of community representative 
organisations with the government was now firmly based upon conditionality. In addition 
to the veiled threat made by Ruth Kelly to the MCB on its history of absence from the 
Holocaust Memorial Day service,497 another important example is the standoff that took 
place between the government and the MCB in 2009 over the position of its Deputy 
                                                          
495 Trevor Phillips, ‘Sleepwalking into Segregation’ (2005). 
496 Ruth Kelly, ‘Britain: Our values, our responsibilities’, speech delivered in London, October 2006. 
497 See Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Secretary General, Dr Daud Abdullah. Abdullah had signed a declaration at a ‘Global Anti 
Aggression Campaign’ conference in Istanbul regarding the Israeli offensive on Gaza in 
January 2009. The eighth point within the declaration took the view that it was: 
The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign 
warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent 
the smuggling of arms to Gaza, as a declaration of war, a new occupation, 
sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation. 
This must be rejected and fought by all means and ways.498 
 
This point was interpreted by many observers, including the Communities Secretary Hazel 
Blears, as a call to arms against British troops, in view of the Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown’s recent suggestion that the Royal Navy could be sent to the region to help enforce 
an arms blockade on Gaza. Blears’ response was to ‘suspend’ engagement with the MCB 
pending the outcome of an investigation, while stating in no uncertain terms that it 
expected the outcome of this investigation to result in the resignation of Dr Abdullah from 
the MCB, ‘and for the MCB to confirm their opposition to acts of violent extremism’.499 
This suspension of engagement soon became long-term as the MCB rejected Blears’ 
correspondence as an ‘unacceptable… attempt to undermine the independence of the 
MCB’,500 and intervening talks held with the MCB by Muslim parliamentarians,501 as well as 
diverse other representations,502 proved fruitless in moving matters forward.503 
 
While this approach from the government can be criticised as meddling, interfering and 
even ‘dictatorial’, what we have also seen happening in recent times has been a sea-change 
within the structures of identity politics. This has partly been in response to governmental 
                                                          
498 Point 8, ‘A statement by the religious scholars and proselytisers (du’a) of the Islamic Nation (ummah) to all 
rulers and peoples concerning events in Gaza’ (commonly referred to as The Istanbul Declaration).  Available 
at: http://www.hurryupharry.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/istpdf.pdf [accessed on 5th August 2012]. 
499 Hazel Blears’ letter to Dr Abdul Bari, MCB Secretary General, dated 13th March 2009. A copy is available 
at: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2009/03/23/blears__letter.pdf [accessed on 
5th August 2012]. 
500 Inayat Bunglawala, then spokesman for the MCB, quoted in: Vikram Dodd, ‘Muslim Council accuses 
government of undermining independence’ The Guardian 26th March 2009. 
501 Ibid. 
502 Two such examples are: Brian Whitaker, ‘Alienating British Muslims’ The Guardian Comment is Free 24th 
March 2009; and Geoffrey Alderman, ‘Hazel Blears must back down’ The Guardian Comment is Free 25th March 
2009. 
503 The government later resumed relations with the MCB in January 2010, after more successful mediation 
between Muslim parliamentarians and the Council’s leadership, and a written assurance from Muhammad 
Abdul Bari to the new Communities Secretary, John Denham, undertaking that the attendances of MCB 
office bearers of international conferences would, in future, be subject to set protocols. However, a number 
of MCB officials I have interviewed (all requesting anonymity) have said that government-MCB relations 
have not returned to the same levels of familiarity and trust that they had enjoyed previously. 
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pressures, which ultimately forced the MCB into a position of complete self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency. Daud Abdullah himself argued that:  
If anything good is to emerge from this saga it should be the affirmation 
of the independence of MCB. However much Hazel Blears may dislike or 
disagree with its views she should respect this independence and deal 
with its representatives as equal citizens, just as it deals with the 
representatives of other communities.504 
 
Such a position placed the onus on the MCB to demonstrate its credibility and worthiness 
solely on its own merit, without relying on connections, networks or support from 
government departments or agencies, as it may have done in its earlier years. 
 
Yet it is also fair to say that other circumstances have played a part. These include the 
growing involvement of the younger generations within communal organisational 
structures. For many of these individuals, the culturally-infused norms and traditions of the 
older generations simply do not hold much purchase. So the notion of community 
representation that is run almost exclusively by a rotation of older men with links to the 
same group of organisations, even if convenient or effective, has been challenged far too 
many times for it to feasibly continue as the MCB’s system of operation. In addition to 
this, the proliferation and ease of mass communication techniques through new media over 
the past few years has meant that the policy positions, actions, and indeed the inactions, of 
the MCB have been open to swifter and more intense circulation, commentary and 
scrutiny. On one hand, this has meant a greater workload for the (administratively 
stretched) organisation in managing these added challenges. But it also has provided new 
channels for communication and accountability with sections of Muslim and wider 
communities that it may never have otherwise reached. It proved imperative for the MCB 
to adapt to these new realities. 
 
These challenges have been encountered in other communities as well, and along with the 
changing approach of the government, look set to have a strong bearing on the shape of 
identity politics into the future. In the following section, I will revisit the comparisons that 
I considered between Muslim and Jewish experiences of communal representation in 
Chapter 3, and cast a glance some of the relevant developments that have taken placed 
within the MCB and the Board of Deputies of British Jews. 
 
                                                          
504 Daud Abdullah, ‘My reply to Hazel Blears’ The Guardian 26th March 2009. 
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ii- Community Representation: Recent changes in both Muslim and Jewish identity politics  
Today’s largest British Jewish and Muslim representative organisations (the Board and the 
MCB) have a substantial amount of features in common. While both maintain that they 
expend substantial effort to bring together disparate sections of their respective 
communities, their procedures for election and other routes to participation have often 
been criticised as unwieldy and outdated. Both are also regularly criticised for being 
unrepresentative, and for an undue absence of women and young people from their 
leaderships.505 Both are accused of being out of touch and controlled by cliques, and both 
regularly face charges of pandering to the government or the establishment at the expense 
of authentically conveying community concerns. Additionally, both the MCB and the 
Board of Deputies have had their virtual monopoly on communal representation 
challenged and weakened by the emergence of newer groups in recent times. In the Jewish 
community, Independent Jewish Voices (IJV) was launched in 2007, arguing that:  
‘…the broad spectrum of opinion among the Jewish population of 
this country is not reflected by those institutions which claim authority 
to represent the Jewish community as a whole. (and) … that 
individuals and groups … should feel free to express their views on 
any issue of public concern without incurring accusations of 
disloyalty.’506 
 
In another (perhaps pre-emptive) move, evidently in recognition of the waning influence of 
the Board, a Jewish Leadership Council (JLC) was established in 2003.507 This brought 
together leading Jewish organisations such as the Board, charities and prominent and ‘well 
connected’ personalities508 to ‘act as a coordinating body’.509 The JLC has since been 
growing in leverage and influence, but also been facing increased criticism. A notable 
example is that of Jonathan Arkush, a vice-president of the Board of Deputies who recently 
severely criticised the JLC as ‘unelected, unaccountable, and …therefore unacceptable’ (for 
it to lead the Jewish community).510 Arkush proceeded to swiftly and unreservedly apologise 
for his words, thus giving succour to the impression that he was pressured into doing so by 
                                                          
505 Geoffrey Alderman, ‘Disband this body of (un)representatives’ The Jewish Chronicle 1st March 2002; Alibhai-
Brown, ‘Muslims can learn from this new Jewish group’ (2007). 
506 Declaration, Independent Jewish Voices available at: http://ijv.org.uk/declaration/ [accessed on 24th April 
2012]. 
507 Initially the Jewish Community Leadership Council, the word ‘community’ was soon dropped. Cf. 
http://www.thejlc.org/about-us/history/ [accessed on 26th April 2012]. 
508 Geoffrey Alderman has referred to individual members of the JLC as the ‘funding fathers’ of the Jewish 
community – in a nod to the considerable financial backing that they provide to various communal 
institutions. Cf. Geoffrey Alderman, The Communal Gadfly (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2009), Section 
1. 
509 Op. cit. 
510 Simon Rocker, ‘Board vice-president’s attack on JLC prompts open warfare’ The Jewish Chronicle 23rd 
February 2012. 
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the JLC chairman who had suggested a reconsideration of its financial support for the 
Board. 
 
Other signals of the Jewish communal establishment’s recognition of the changing times 
include the formation of a JLC Committee on Women in Jewish Leadership, which has 
recently conducted a survey, the results of which it hopes to use as a basis for ‘firm 
recommendations so that the Jewish community can reach a situation where women are 
properly and appropriately represented at leadership level’.511 Also, ‘Changing the Board’, a 
youth-initiated campaign to push for more young and female voices to be heard at the 
Board of Deputies – whether through facilitating the affiliation to the Board of young 
people’s groups, or encouraging women and young people to stand for election as deputies 
to the Board.512 An integral part of this campaign has been pressuring the Board to adopt 
greater transparency and communication with the wider Jewish community and young 
people in particular, for instance through organising pre-Board Election hustings events and 
engagement in online social networks such as Twitter and Facebook. 
 
The MCB for its part has also been under fire for having a stagnant, ‘retrogressive’ 
leadership.513 The post-7/7 period has seen an abundance of Muslim organisations of all 
shades and structures seeking to speak for various sections of the Muslim community. 
Some have been more successful than others, as my discussion of them in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis shows.514 While the MCB leadership has come to acknowledge the shortcomings in its 
structure and composition,515 it has been slow to take any steps in rectification. After 
protracted internal debate and review, motions were finally passed at its annual general 
meeting in 2012 to create a 20% quota for women in the organisation’s National Council, 
and for the post of Secretary General to become directly elected by delegates to the AGM 
(rather than chosen by the newly-elected National Council from amongst themselves, as 
had been the previous arrangement).516 While these are definitely welcome developments 
                                                          
511 Commission for Women in Jewish Leadership (CWJL) webpage: 
http://www.thejlc.org/portfolio/commission-for-women-in-jewish-leadership/ [accessed on 6th June 2012]. 
Also cf. the initial report, CWJL ‘Gender Imbalance – The Status Quo’ (2011). 
512 Changing the Board ‘Mission Statement’ at: www.changingtheboard.wordpress.com/about/ [accessed on 
6th June 2012]. 
513 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, ‘The cloak of darkness is no exercise of civil liberties’ The Independent 25th January 
2010. 
514 Muslim organisations in Britain are also profiled in Table 1, pp.222-227. 
515 Author’s interviews with several MCB officials, all choosing to remain anonymous, October and 
November 2011. 
516 ‘Muslim Council re-elects leader, promotes female quotas’, MCB Press Release,11th June 2012. Available 
at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/presstext.php?ann_id=490 [accessed on 25th July 2012]. 
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for the cause of greater representation, democracy and transparency, they will not be 
implemented until the 2014 elections for the Secretary General and National Council. This 
begs the question of why the voting on these motions was not scheduled ahead of the 
elections at the AGM rather than after them. This would have allowed for the motions to be 
implemented straightaway, and thus for MCB to send out a far stronger message 
demonstrating its willingness to include more diverse and varied voices. Nonetheless, these 
changes will mean that future elections for the MCB’s Secretary General will be necessarily 
a more competitive affair than they have ever been, since it will be harder for the main 
organisations among the MCB’s affiliates to nominate and collectively back a preferred 
candidate in the manner that has been customary thus far.517 There have also been rumours 
of receptiveness in government circles towards the creation of a more pliant Muslim 
Leadership Panel, which would perhaps overshadow and effectively replace the MCB, 
perhaps in a similar way to which some argue that the JLC is gradually overshadowing the 
Jewish Board of Deputies.518  
 
Importantly both Jewish and Muslim representative groups have to deal with the reality of 
the multiple challenges facing multiculturalism in 21st Century Britain. In the age of global 
terrorism and securitisation, and particularly after the 7/7 attacks in London, 
multiculturalism as state policy has come under immense scrutiny, as many have questioned 
whether it has been to blame for encouraging ‘separateness’ among Britain’s minority 
communities, and thus undermining the scope for loyalty and ultimately creating fertile 
conditions for the growth of radicalisation and extremism.519 As I have discussed in Chapter 
5, successive government ministers have taken this thinking on board, and it was reflected 
more and more clearly in the communities policy of the Labour government in its later 
years, as conditionality for engagement with community groups became the norm, and 
greater emphasis was placed on promoting ‘Britishness’ and a shared national identity.520 
                                                          
517 See Chapter 5, Section 4 of this thesis. 
518 ‘Pickles and Warsi wrestle for control of Government strategy on anti-Muslim hatred’ Islamophobia Watch 
http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/islamophobia-watch/2011/11/19/pickles-and-warsi-wrestle-for-
control-of-government-strategy.html [accessed on 14th June 2012]. 
Introductory correspondence between the MLP and Eric Pickles (Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government) states: ‘The impetus for the formation of the MLP is the absence of a constituted body 
that the Government, the European Parliament and established organisations (for example, the Church of 
England) are able to constructively converse with on matters relating to the British Muslim community.’ 
Letter from Iftikhar Awan, MLP Co-ordinator to Eric Pickles (3rd November 2011); available at: 
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/remitmembership_of_the_muslim_le_2#incoming-336750 
[accessed on 15th February 2013]. 
519 For an example of this type of argument see: Munira Mirza, Abi Senthikumaran and Zein Ja’far, ‘Living 
apart together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism’ Policy Exchange (2007). 
520 Cf. Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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This line of thinking has been picked up even more strongly by the Conservative-led 
coalition government since 2010, as exemplified by Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
speech to a Security Conference in Munich, where he declared that the ‘doctrine of state 
multiculturalism’ had ‘failed’.521 Practical implications of this attitude for Muslim 
organisations have been visible in the antagonistic approach that Cameron and his 
supporters in the cabinet (such as the Home and Education Secretaries, Theresa May and 
Michael Gove) have maintained towards ‘Islamists’, who they have defined very broadly.522 
Examples include David Cameron’s directive in 2010 that no Conservative politicians 
should attend the Islam Channel’s Global Peace and Unity event,523 causing his party’s Co-
Chairman, Baroness Warsi to pull out after having already committed to attend.524 Theresa 
May’s issuing of an exclusion order in 2010 to prevent a visit to the UK of the Indian 
Muslim ‘televangelist’ Dr Zakir Naik, in response to concerted campaigns from right-
wingers, while earlier that year granting a visa to the far-right Dutch politician, Geert 
Wilders (despite his exclusion the previous year),525 suggested double standards and 
vicitimisation to many Muslims.526 
 
What this has meant for organisations such as the Board and the MCB is that putting aside 
the similarities and the contrasts that have existed between them over the years; they both 
now face the shared challenge of adapting their terms of operation to a political landscape 
which is becoming increasingly uneasy with the notion of affording recognition to group 
identity. So, while these very groups developed – with active encouragement and 
endorsement from the government – to speak for and represent the identity politics of 
religious minority communities, if they wish to continue to play a representative role in 
                                                          
521 David Cameron, speech at Munich Security Conference, 5th February 2011. Full transcript available at: 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/ [accessed on 2nd May 
2012]. 
522 The contents of this speech resonated with thinking that had been present within the Conservative Party 
during its time in opposition. A policy report produced by the Conservative Party’s Group on National and 
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values’. Conservative Party, Uniting the Country (2007), p.37 
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525 Humayun Ansari, ‘The Multiculturalism Backlash and the mainstreaming of Islamophobia post-9/11’ in 
Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims: Irish ‘Religious’ Conflict in Comparative Perspective ed. by J Wolffe (forthcoming). 
526 ‘Zakir Naik Exclusion Order a Serious Error of Judgement’ MCB Press Release, 18th June 2010, available 
at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1097&Itemid=93 [accessed 
on 5th August 2013. 
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politics, they will need to become far more accessible, open and streamlined in their 
structure and operation. They will also need to reassess the premises upon which they 
justify their existence – for the MCB and other Muslim representative groups, this involves 
a resetting of agenda priorities (the Equality Gap) and the techniques through which their 
causes are furthered.   
 
iii. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia – Jews and Muslims as both victims and perpetrators: 
Recent times have witnessed a dramatic rise in the prominence of the EDL, not least 
encouraged by the murder in May 2013 of a member of the armed forces in Woolwich by 
two men claiming to be acting in the name of Islam and in retaliation against British 
foreign policy in Muslim lands.527 Even though the EDL remains a fringe, and extremist 
group, and even though the BNP, and its electoral fortunes, continue to suffer from 
infighting,528 all indicators seem to nonetheless suggest that Islamophobia from the far-
right is set to persist into the future period. This is only exacerbated by aspects of the 
media, including sensationalist stories that imply that Islam and Muslims are inherently 
insidious,529 as well as irresponsible programming that gives extremists a wider audience 
than they would ever have reached otherwise, and one entirely disproportionate to the 
segment of the wider population who may share their views.530 Further aggravation has 
been caused by misguided ‘revenge’ attacks, by equally fringe and extremist Muslims.531 
 
There have been a number of recent academic comparisons made between current 
experiences of Islamophobia, and the anti-Semitism that the Jewish communities of Britain 
and Europe suffered in the 19th and 20th Centuries.532 It has been argued that there is 
                                                          
527 Michael Adebolajo, one of the alleged perpetrators of the attack is recorded to have said:  ‘we must fight 
them as they fight us… I apologise that women had to witness this today, but in our lands our women have 
to see the same’. Mentioning women brought in a new dimension, as responses from EDL supporters on 
social media began to call for the targeting of Muslim schools and mosques, and attacks on women and 
children. 
528 Matthew Goodwin, ‘Forever a False Dawn? Explaining the Electoral Collapse of the British National 
Party’ Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 66:2, April 2013. 
529 Joseph Harker, ‘This is how racism takes root’ The Guardian 22nd July 2012. 
530 National media outlets have been widely criticised for providing the oxygen of publicity to extremists from 
Muslim communities as well as the far-right. For instance, Anjem Choudary (formerly of Al Muhajiroun) was a 
guest on BBC Newsnight the following day after the Woolwich incident (23rd May 2013), and EDL leader 
Tommy Robinson appeared on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme following a suspected arson attack on a 
mosque in Muswell Hill, London that is widely suspected to have been carried out as ‘revenge’ against the 
Woolwich killing (11th June 2013). 
531 Cf. the recent case of six Muslim men who were convicted of plotting to carry out a gun and bomb attack 
on an EDL rally in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire. Paul Peachey, ‘Islamist gang of six jailed for at least 18 years 
each for plotting bomb attack on EDL rally’ The Independent 10th June 2013. 
532 Matti Bunzl, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds old and new in Europe (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 
2007); Nasar Meer and Tehseen Noorani, ‘A sociological comparison of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim 
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substantial similarity and overlap between the racism that Jewish communities experienced 
in the past, and that which Muslim communities are currently experiencing.533 This is 
evidenced by the invocation of ‘cultural and biological discourses’ to emphasise ‘otherness’, 
and to draw into question the suitability of the ‘other’ to adjusting or living peacefully in 
the UK. For instance, both Muslims and Jews have faced suggestions that they are 
culturally unfamiliar with democracy and democratic processes due to radical or 
fundamentalist tendencies.534 And just as the loyalty of Jews to Britain was brought into 
question by sections of the press and politicians in the early 20th Century,535 so Muslims 
today are often at the receiving end of the same suspicious, polarising question: are you 
British or Muslim?  
 
Yet while the task of tackling Islamophobia might technically stand to benefit from the past 
experiences of British Jews in combating anti-Semitism, it is further compounded by 
attitudes and instances of Jewish Islamophobia on one hand, and Muslim anti-Semitism on 
the other. On the official level, both the MCB and the Board of Deputies of British Jews 
have on separate occasions accused the other of engaging in or sanctioning prejudice 
against the communities that they represent.536 Often these sentiments can be intertwined 
with the highly emotive ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and indeed such accusations 
have most commonly flared up in relation to moments of Israeli military aggression.537 Yet 
expressions of prejudice are also wider and deeper than this, with instances of anti-Semitic 
discourse reported to have been expressed in mosques by religious leaders and 
publications538 as well as by political figures.539 Jewish figures, for their part, have regularly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sentiment in Britain’ The Sociological Review Vol. 56:2 (May 2008), pp. 195-219; Reuven Firestone, 
‘Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism: History and Possibility’ Arches Quarterly Vol.4:7 (Winter 2010), pp. 42-53; 
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(2008). 
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536 See Chapter 5, Section 3 of this thesis, on the ‘Israel test’, which was not the first time that the MCB 
protested that it was being pressured to tone down its criticism of Israel on account of appearing to condone 
anti-Semitism. Also Simon Rocker, ‘Muslim Council of Britain must be boycotted until reform’ The Jewish 
Chronicle 24th September 2009, in reference to rapprochement between the government and MCB after the 
Daud Abdullah incident.  
537 See as an example the exchange of correspondence between the MCB and the Board regarding the Jenin 
Massacre in 2002: Iqbal Sacranie, ‘Critics of Israel not anti-Semitic’ Letter to the Editor, The Times 13th May 
2002, and Jo Wagerman, ‘Impact of the Middle East on Britain’ Letter to the Editor, The Times 22nd May 
2002.  
538 ‘Undercover Mosque’, Dispatches, Channel 4. Broadcast on 15th January 2007. 
It is important to note here that anti-Semitism expressed by Muslims in a religious context is apparently far 
less ambiguous to detect than the Islamophobia by Jews for the simple reason that, chronologically, the 
Jewish faith preceded Islam, thus there are numerous historic references to Jews in the Qur’an, many of 
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conflated anti-Zionist political stances with anti-Semitism, and given succour to populist 
far-right discourses on an inherently illiberal and extremist Islam, whose followers, ‘unlike 
other minorities… expected their host culture to adapt to meet their requirements.’540 
 
Having said this, away from political and theological conflicts between both communities, 
as influential as they might be, there are also signs that dialogue collaboration between 
Muslim and Jewish institutions are helping to address Islamophobia on a practical level. In 
the same way that Muslim communal organisations have looked to the prior experience of 
British Jews, there have also been cases where Muslim efforts in addressing Islamophobia 
have turned towards Jewish endeavours in the area of anti-Semitism. One prominent recent 
example is the Tell MAMA Islamophobia monitoring helpline, which received guidance 
and advice from the CST, ‘to establish and professionalise itself’.541 Cases such as this can 
hold much promise of productive cooperation and solidarity, rather than a rivalry of victim 
mentalities that critics of identity politics have warned against.542 Yet at the same time, they 
can also draw attention to important discrepancies. One case in point is the recent grant 
that has been allocated by the Department of Education to the CST, to cover the costs of 
hiring security services for government funded Jewish schools. Muslim institutions have 
never enjoyed similar government assistance, and indeed, the decision to deploy police 
protection to ‘vulnerable Islamic sites’ in response to a number of ‘Woolwich revenge 
attacks’, has been seen as ‘long overdue’.543 This point simply brings us back to the Equality 
Gap, by highlighting differential treatment. As I shall go on to argue in my concluding 
chapter, such discrepancies are better dealt with by cross-community dialogues and 
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alliances which promote the shared interests of communities with a view to narrowing the 
Equalitiy Gap in all its manifestations. 
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Chapter Six – Conclusions: 
 
 
This thesis has been an effort to study the development of Muslim identity politics in the 
UK between the years 1960-2010, utilising the vantage point of a specific angle – issues of 
freedom of expression. It has used recognition theory to explain the motivations and 
justifications behind the emergence of Muslim identity politics and claims-making over 
recent decades, and argued that the existence of an Equality Gap has been the main reason 
for the continuation of this type of identity politics. By examining case-studies related to 
the theme of freedom of expression, it has identified different chronological phases in the 
development of Muslim identity politics, and highlighted important themes that have 
contributed to the path that this identity politics has followed. It has also considered and 
assessed some of the most recent developments, and their anticipated impact on the future. 
 
For this concluding chapter, I will use four main questions to summarise and bring 
together the findings of my research, as well as looking to the prospects for future work 
that it can lead to. The first question helps to provide a sense of chronology and summary 
of the time-period covered by the thesis, while the last three questions correspond to the 
themes that I introduced in my introductory chapter – namely free speech, equality and 
identity politics: 
 
1- What were the main phases in the trajectory of Muslim identity politics over the 
past 50 years, including their defining features? 
2- How has free speech fared and how does it help us to understand the trajectory of 
Muslim identity politics in the UK? 
3- The Equality Gap – has it been filled? 
4- What next for Muslim identity politics – has it had its day? Is there a better way? 
Following this assessment, I will evaluate the thesis as a whole, highlighting the key points 
that I will have demonstrated, and how they have contributed to the current body of 
research as well as discussing the limitations and constraints that I came across in the 
course of my study. Finally I will end with proposals on how my contribution can be taken 
further, in future research. 
 
 
 
 211 
1- What were the main phases in the trajectory of Muslim identity politics over the 
past 50 years, including their defining features? 
During the 1960s, modern Muslim consciousness in Britain was only just beginning to lay 
down roots through the emergence of a range of organisations which were linked to trans-
national Islamic movements. For these groups, Muslim identity was at the core of their 
mission and self-understanding. By the time that the first localised community campaigns 
and national unity initiatives were underway, there was already an express desire among 
many British Muslims for greater recognition from the government and official institutions. 
This was exemplified in many of the local and regional campaigns around education and 
schooling that I have discussed in Chapter 2, as well as the calls by the UMO for the 
official recognition of Muslim holidays, provision for time off without penalty for Muslim 
employees for Friday prayers, and the recognition of Muslim family law.  
 
Freedom of expression issues can serve as a sort of prism during this period, through 
which differences in history as well as social, cultural and political heritage between Muslim 
immigrant communities and British public and political culture emerged to the forefront. 
The Rushdie Affair drew polarised responses from both sides as it dealt with subjects that 
each of them held in extremely high regard. Muslims could not countenance such perceived 
callous ridicule of their most revered personality going unchecked. They felt indescribable 
humiliation over the contents of a literary piece, one which portrayed the sources of their 
faith, and for many, their own self-worth, in terms so offensive that they could not even 
bring themselves to utter them. On the other hand the British government and many in 
wider British society could not accept the call for censorship of a literary piece on the basis 
of merely (in their eyes) the offence it had happened to cause. Rather, it seemed that these 
Muslims needed to make progress in coming to terms with liberal ideas on freedom of 
expression, a stance which only accentuated the deep hurt felt by Muslims who were then 
all the more frustrated at being misunderstood. 
 
The Rushdie affair was the first time that a national issue came to such a head – providing 
conditions that demanded from the existing array of Muslim community leaders and 
groups that they recognise the crucial value that creating a united front would add to the 
furtherance of their cause. It also compelled them to seriously think about how they could 
articulate their claims-making in such a way that was both accessible and persuasive to the 
government, the media and wider British society. This is not to say that they were 
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successful at this stage, far from it, as I have shown in Chapter 3, the whole affair can be 
considered to have been more of a failure than a success in terms of dialogue between 
Muslim community representatives and the government. However, what did emerge from 
the legacy of the Rushdie affair was a resolve on the part of both Muslim organisations and 
the government that it was best for a repeat of this situation to be avoided. Consequently, 
the UKACIA maintained relations with the government through to the early 1990s, and the 
government, for its part, encouraged community leaders towards the formation of an 
official unified body to facilitate its engagement with British Muslim political claims-
making. 
 
From the mid-1990s up until 2001 we have seen what can be regarded as the heyday of 
British Muslim identity politics. With the MCB up and running, we saw a coming together 
of British Muslim organisations and activists on the broadest platform yet. While the MCB 
was more inclusive than any of its predecessors had been, it was still by this stage 
functioning very much within the very limited sphere of community activists, and still 
predominantly controlled by those hailing from a revivalist/reformist background. Positive 
encouragement and public promotion of the MCB by the Labour government went a long 
way, and it seemed as though the MCB was finally moving forward to gaining a much-
coveted status and recognition that was on a par with that enjoyed by the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews. Conversely, the Labour government was benefiting by enjoying a 
direct and influential channel into the Muslim communities of Britain, including mosques 
and the largest national and regional organisations.  
 
Two turning points then brought about changes that have seen Muslim identity politics 
take a path which could not have been envisaged during the early days. The terror attacks 
of 11th September 2001 threw the MCB into the limelight as never before. Its new found 
role as official ‘spokesman’ for British Muslims gave it a huge reach and exposure, but also 
brought with it the considerable challenges of balancing the demands of credibly 
representing its extremely diverse constituency on the one hand, and maintaining good 
relations with a government whose foreign policy ambitions were fast becoming a source 
of anger and dismay among British Muslims. In facing this impossible situation the MCB 
ultimately took the decision to oppose the government on matters relating to foreign policy 
and the war on terror. In doing so, it effectively had to forge out a new path for its future, 
since its opposition of the Blair government’s military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq 
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meant that it could no longer count on the same level, or the same exclusivity of support 
from the government. The post-9/11 period saw Muslim identity politics diversify into 
seeking partnerships across other sections of civic society on common-interest issues, 
including opposition to the war and opposition to the rising Islamophobic tactics that were 
being employed  by far-right groups such as the BNP. Additionally, with the coming of age 
of younger, British born generations, creative and less conventional forms of self-
expression – for instance utilising arts, modern technology – were being explored as 
alternatives or complements to the traditional methods of formal political protest and 
representation that had been preferred by the older generations. 
 
The second turning point came after the terror attacks on London’s public transport 
system that took place on 7th July 2005. These prompted serious introspection on the part 
of the government and Muslim community organisations alike, as they reconsidered their 
existing approaches towards radicalisation, extremism and security. A new raft of anti-
terror legislation included ‘encouragement clauses’ which took terror offences into the 
realm of speech and expression by criminalising the encouragement or glorification of 
terrorism. The Prevent strand of the government’s Contest scheme for tackling 
radicalisation at home also weighed heavily on themes of free expression, not only because 
of its self-declared mission to win the battle for ‘hearts and minds’, but also as it became 
associated in the eyes of many, and particularly many Muslims, with surveillance and 
intelligence gathering.544 
 
At the same time, the increasingly anti-Muslim focus of the British far-right as well as the 
growing national debate on the viability or otherwise of multiculturalism both contributed 
towards feeding an increasingly vocal and often threatening Islamophobia. The support 
that this Islamophobia regularly received in public discourse, was too often met with 
                                                          
544 Parallels have been drawn between today’s Muslim communities and Irish communities between the 1970s 
and  1990s, with both perceiving that they are viewed by the state and media, and thus segments of the public 
as ‘suspect’ communities. As such, they feel that they are being expected to ‘prove’ their loyalty and 
‘Britishness’ in a way that is not expected of others. Cf. Mary J. Hickman, ‘“Suspect Populations”: Irish 
communities, Muslim communities and the British justice system’ in Criminal Justice v. Racial Justice: minority 
ethnic overrepresentation in the criminal justice system ed. by Kjartan Pal Sveinsson (London: Runnymede Trust, 
2012), pp.27-29. Muslim responses to this have included the Kafa (Enough) Islamophobia campaign (2009), 
which was jointly led by the Stop the War Coalition and the BMI. Its launch statement said: ‘We call for a 
broad-based campaign to confront the growth of racist attitudes towards Muslims and rising governmental 
and state harassment of Muslim citizens.’ Source: ‘Stop Attacks on the Muslim Community’, available at: 
http://stopwar.org.uk/images//kafa_statement.pdf,[accessed on 10th August 2013]. Also ‘Schedule 7 
Stories’, a website run by the charity, CagePrisoners, to document and raise awareness around ‘the 
experiences of suspect communities at UK ports’, see: http://schedule7stories.com/ [accessed 10th August 
2013]. 
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passive or lethargic responses from people in positions of power and influence, to the 
extent that its very existence was questioned by some, and derisively belittled by others. 
What was seen as a laissez faire approach to public discourse that was hostile to Islam and 
Muslims smacked of double standards when juxtaposed with the tough talk that was being 
employed by the government in relation to the encouragement and glorification of 
terrorism. This in turn fuelled further resentment among Muslims for the government’s 
counter-radicalisation strategies – resentment which was only very marginally quelled, if at 
all, by the introduction of the largely inept Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. 
 
By the close of the decade, relations between the MCB and the government had suffered as 
a result of what had proved to be the toxic mix of securitisation with community cohesion. 
Multiculturalism became a scapegoat in many quarters for society’s anxieties around 
security and immigration. This, combined with the far-right’s focus on anti-Muslim 
discourse, pushed the government to revise the nature of its engagement with Muslim 
representative organisations. With the emergence of a host of new Muslim representative 
and advocacy bodies, each seeking to represent diverse voices from amongst British 
Muslim communities, the government realised it did not have to rely exclusively on the 
MCB to act as its interlocutor, and the MCB came to appreciate that it was in no position 
to command such an exclusivity. Conditionality became a new feature of engagement, as 
talk of loyalty and British values was a key feature of this latest phase of the 21st Century 
multiculturalism critique. Finally, voices within the Muslim community have been playing 
an important role in pushing for modernisation and greater transparency of structure and 
operations within the MCB, as has been the case with the communal representation of 
other minority communities, such as the Jewish Board of Deputies. These factors, 
combined, have meant that the future of identity politics is set to take a new turn in priority 
and focus. 
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2- How has free speech fared and how does it help us to understand the 
trajectory of Muslim identity politics in the UK? 
The fact that freedom of expression has cropped up so regularly as a point of contention 
over this period between the government, British Muslims, and wider society, is itself 
fascinating. The Rushdie affair helped to rally together previously disparate Muslim 
community initiatives around a common cause, at the centre of which was freedom of 
expression, and the debate over the legitimacy or otherwise of calls to restrict it. Following 
this, speech-related causes always featured prominently in the articulation of Muslim claims 
to the government, as my first summarisation of the Equality Gap showed.545  
 
By the close of 2001, freedom of expression was beginning to feature through a new 
dimension – as a component of civil liberties which were felt to be under increasing threat 
from the recently enacted anti-terrorism legislation. This was in addition to the more 
nuanced freedom for Muslim community groups, specifically the MCB, to maintain their 
right to a free and independent stance on current affairs, irrespective of government policy. 
The realities of the modern terror threat, the drive towards securitisation through anti-
terror laws and the government’s participation in the War on Terror all had implications on 
the government-MCB relationship.  While there were significant efforts made by both sides 
to coordinate responses to the attacks, there were also several points of sore disagreement 
and divergence. These included increasingly draconian aspects of the new anti-terror 
legislation, and the widespread opposition among British Muslims (as part of strong 
opposition in the wider public) to military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
Out of this scenario, there emerged increasingly confident voices from within Britain’s 
Muslim communities that were keen to express themselves and communicate their 
experiences, perspectives and values by building partnerships with others and exploring 
more creative means of communication. This trend went some way in generating 
significant progress from the near-stalemate in inter-cultural dialogue and the sense of 
communicative dissonance which had been such a notable feature of the discourse around 
the Rushdie affair.  
 
Yet elements of this dissonance have remained, and are exemplified by the attitudes of 
relative tolerance by the political establishment towards a regular appearance of anti-
                                                          
545 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Muslim bigotry in mainstream press, despite pleas from Muslims and supporting anti-
Islamophobia activists for acknowledgement of this problem, for restraint and for shows of 
solidarity.546 From a legal perspective, consistent calls from Muslim organisations for 
legislative reform to criminalise incitement to religious hatred ignited heated debate around 
the future of free speech in the UK, and the role, if any, that the state had in limiting it to 
protect vulnerable groups. One consequence of this debate was that while a law was 
eventually passed in 2005, extensive objections and amendments in parliament it did not 
deliver the even-handedness (in relation to the Race Relations Act) that Muslim groups had 
so long called for.  
 
On the other hand, in the area of security, the introduction of the controversial 
‘encouragement clauses’ in the Terrorism Act 2006 – even if they proved largely 
unenforceable in the courts – had the consequence of feeding the perception that Muslims 
were being unduly singled out, regulated and suspected. This view was only bolstered by 
the impression that a similar suspicion was being planted upon any Muslim who had the 
gall to express misgivings or frustration, let alone opposition, to the UK’s foreign policy, 
lest this expression fall foul of the new laws. Additionally, the case of Ahmed Faraz gave 
rise to substantial fears that the courts would be prepared to criminalise certain extreme or 
archaic theological positions by prosecuting for the possession or distribution of the texts 
upon which they were based. Coupled with this, was the troubled reception of the Prevent 
scheme within Muslim communities, and its reputation varying from being an intelligence-
gathering exercise at worst, and an extensive PR project at best. All of these factors 
combined served in one way or another to diminish freedom of expression within Muslim 
communities – whether in real terms, or in people’s perceptions of the extent of this 
freedom that they enjoyed. So whether it was self-censorship precipitated by a ‘chilling 
effect’, or actual experiences of harassment, surveillance or arrest; the general sense was 
that freedom of expression was being severely limited in the name of security, with far less 
qualms than had been expressed over calls to restrict incitement to religious hatred.  
                                                          
546 For example, see the Alternative Leveson Inquiry into the practise and reporting of Muslim and Islamic 
affairs. This was launched as a response to the ongoing Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics 
of the press – which was initiated in the wake of the phone-hacking scandal of July 2011. The Alternative 
Leveson argues that ‘The Leveson Inquiry has failed to adequately address the negative media coverage 
relating to Muslims and Islam. The reason an alternative inquiry is necessary to investigate what many regard 
as widespread and systematic discriminatory practises in reporting on Muslims and Islam in the British 
media.’ [source: ‘Background’ The Alternative Leveson at: http://www.alternativeleveson.org.uk/?page_id=13 
accessed on 7th August 2012]. 
Or more recently: Mehdi Hasan, ‘We mustn’t allow Muslims in public life to be silenced’ The Guardian 8th July 
2012. 
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To return to the 2005 Religious Hatred Act; with its introduction, and the abolishment of 
the long-defunct blasphemy laws in 2008, the Equality Gap, as described in Chapter 2, 
seems to have narrowed considerably. Indeed, with significant progress having been made 
in terms of background concerns relating to recognition and respect for Britain’s Muslims, 
is it now time to take stock and ask if the Equality Gap still exists? I will address this, and 
related issues in the following section. 
 
3- What next for Muslim identity politics – has it had its day? Is there a better way? 
In order to answer this question, it is useful to revisit the early days when the notion of 
Muslim identity politics on a UK level was gathering momentum and the Equality Gap was 
beginning to be seriously articulated. During the Rushdie affair, this was happening for the 
first time, and as I have described in Chapter 3, the Equality Gap to which the UKACIA 
and others appealed consisted of a speech component and an action component. To re-
cap, the speech component included the continued existence of blasphemy legislation in 
English law to which the Church of England had recourse, to the exclusion of other faiths, 
significantly Islam. It also included the shortcomings of current legislation in proscribing 
incitement to religious hatred. As for the action component, this related to the inadequacy 
of anti-discrimination legislation in appreciating the complexity of the British Muslim 
experience as an ‘ethno-religious’ group. The clearest way to illustrate this gap was to refer 
to the inclusion of Jews and Sikhs under race-discrimination legislation, but the exclusion 
of other faiths. Again, this anomaly was most significant with respect to Muslims, as the 
largest minority faith in Britain. Together, these components represented the central claims 
around which the UKACIA was framing its representations to the government by 1993, 
when it made a submission to the Home Secretary on this matter.547 
 
By 2010, Muslim identity politics in Britain had weathered an intense and often complex 
course. Formal relations and lobbying combined with willingness from the government had 
yielded recognition on various levels; the religion question in the national census has helped 
to provide the best demographic snapshot of Britain’s Muslim community so far, making 
coordination with local authorities on needs, services and the articulation of claims easier, 
more accurate and more credible. There were strides made in political representation both 
in parliament and on a local level. Government departments took greater steps to cater for 
                                                          
547 UKACIA, Muslims and the Law in Multifaith Britain (1993). 
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the specific needs of British Muslims in different areas of life, for example by establishing 
the British Hajj delegation, and instituting a Muslim advisor to work in Her Majesty’s 
Prisons.  
 
Society has also moved on. Global politics, terrorism at home, and the resurgence of the 
far-right have all played important parts in igniting fears around immigration and feeding 
into a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’. This has witnessed introspection and speculation within 
government, policy-makers and public commentary about whether it is conducive for 
society to continue to recognise identity politics or whether the notion of minority group 
representation has had its day. Detractors will protest that Muslim identity politics is little 
more than a ploy used by self-important and self-appointed community leaders to cultivate 
a grievance culture and bask in the ‘perks’ of the victim-status that they feed with over-
exaggerated claims of Islamophobia.548 Yet there are others who refuse to ‘see identity 
politics as antithetical to political perspectives focused on the good of society as a whole.’549 
Modood argues that there remains a place for identity politics, and that for many, the sense 
of Muslim identity that they feel, ‘has nothing to do with religiosity’550. Rather, ‘Muslimness’ 
can, and does, mean different things to different people. Additionally, he notes that Muslim 
feelings of community, and especially affinity with the ummah, are ones that do not have the 
luxury of being supported or celebrated by the British government. Rather, these 
relationships are often the subject of suspicion and a questioning of loyalties. I would add 
to this that as long as significant elements within society continue to express hostility, 
distaste or hatred towards Muslims, there will be no end in sight for Muslim identity 
politics, since it is these experiences which often serve to make people far more deeply 
conscious, defensive, and even proud of their identities.  
 
So rather than seeing an end to identity politics in the coming era, I would like to argue that 
Muslim identity politics faces new challenges, and that these challenges call for an 
adjustment in the way that identity politics is conducted. Modood argues that this is already 
happening.551 On the other hand, Sir Iqbal Sacranie has called for the Muslim community 
                                                          
548 Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad (2009). This is a view which has recently been given extensive airing in the press 
by Andrew Gilligan, e.g. Andrew Gilligan, ‘The truth about the ‘wave of attacks on Muslims’ after Woolwich 
murder’ The Daily Telegraph 1st June 2013, where he refers to an ‘Islamophobia industry’, for whom ‘the 
narrative of British Muslims under attack, increasingly hated and feared by their fellow citizens, is essential for 
recruitment’ (to Islamism).  
549 Modood, Multiculturalism: a civic idea (2007), p.136.  
550 Ibid. 
543 Ibid., pp.139-142. 
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to enter a new phase, one of ‘greater engagement as individuals in the civil society around 
us’, which would replace the age of identity politics, which, he argued, although it ‘has been 
psychologically satisfying, and allowed socio-economic inequalities to be addressed, it also 
nurtures community self-interest.552 Modood disagrees, and I have also discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis how new forms of creativity and expression are on the rise 
within British Muslim communities, and that conventional and traditional ways of 
organising and representation are being questioned, as calls to democratise these 
organisations further and make them more transparent and accessible are, slowly but surely, 
making gains. Indeed, as the discussion in the Post-script has shown, these developments 
are happening within other minority communities as well, specifically in Jewish identity 
politics. 
 
I propose that we are at a stage, not where the Equality Gap has become less significant, 
but where we are in a position to revise its articulation. I submit that it can now be 
described as follows:  
1- Legal – primarily this relates to the limitations of Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
2006 and the case for its potential strengthening. 
 
2- Applicative – this relates to the application of security measures in post-9/11 and 
post-7/7 Britain, which has been shown to contribute to the victimisation of 
Muslims as a community. This feeds into the third and final category: 
 
3- Cultural – this relates to the persistence, and growth of cultural anti-Muslim 
sentiment and Islamophobia. Modern concerns surrounding terrorism and security, 
the war against terrorism and debates on multiculturalism and immigration have all 
fed into the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the far-right. That anti-religious hatred legislation 
has been a weak weapon against Islamophobia has given room for its spread to go 
comparatively unchecked.  While this is not a trend which emanates directly from any 
section of the government, official inaction or indifference towards Islamophobic 
discourse has contributed towards this trend. And although this problem is not one 
that can be appropriately solved by hard legislation, it nonetheless provides a strong 
reason for the continuation of Muslim identity politics into the future.  
 
                                                          
552 Sir Iqbal Sacranie’s valedictory speech to the MCB AGM in 2006. 
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These three categories, together, sum up the basis of the case from which Muslim 
representative organisations can continue to call for greater recognition and respect. The 
methods that they utilise to further this are clearly already under revision, as is the 
government’s approach to engagement with representative groups. I want to suggest here 
that lobbying in the traditional sense does not have to be the primary role of representative 
groups. While it can and must surely still play a role, there are plenty of avenues for 
partnerships, networks and coalitions that can be explored within the paradigm of identity 
politics. These can involve cross-community ventures that campaign for matters of 
common interest, while at the same time breaking down cultural barriers and building 
bridges. Such partnerships have the advantage of drawing attention to the legal and 
applicative aspects of the Equality Gap, while also, in practice, targeting the cultural aspect. 
Additionally, they have the potential of allaying the concerns of critics about identity 
politics fostering attitudes of victimhood and competitiveness between minority 
communities, as well as reification hampering accurate and authentic understanding 
between communities, and between communities and the state. For example, civic 
partnerships that connect people across the lines of faith, culture, socio-economic factors 
in aid of issues of shared interest can provide ample opportunities for Muslim 
communities, and individuals, of all shades to come forward and make their voices heard, 
rather than simply leaving this role exclusively to representative organisations. Some of 
these have been already taken up, as I have shown in Chapter 5, but I believe that these 
have the potential to play a far more central role in raising awareness of the (revised) 
Equality Gap, and working to narrow it.  
 
Further research: 
This thesis has been necessarily constrained by space and focus, and therefore there are 
several avenues that can be pursued by further research. I have focused specifically on the 
development of Muslim identity politics within the UK. However, there has been a parallel 
development of Muslim identity politics across Europe and North America. There are of 
course similarities and differences, and these are contingent upon the constitutions and 
political structures and well as the public cultures of the respective states. In some 
countries, the state has been explicitly involved in establishing Muslim representative 
councils (France being an example), whereas in other countries, the development has been 
more organic. However, many of the countries in Europe and North America face similar 
challenges to those which British Muslim identity politics has experienced in recent 
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decades. The fallout from 9/11 was of course global, and many European countries have, 
sadly, experienced terrorism in the name of Islam at home as well. Thus one potential next 
step would be a comparison of one aspect of the development of Muslim identity politics 
across two or more nations, or indeed a comparison of aspects of British and American 
experience. 
 
The concept of an Equality Gap which I have discussed at great length in this thesis could 
be explored with reference to inequalities within Britain’s Muslim communities. So identity 
politics as experienced by Muslim women’s organisations or female Muslim community 
leaders would be a good way of exploring the extent to which there might be a gender 
equality gap among British Muslims. 
 
Another aspect of further research could be to hone in more closely on how the resurgence 
of the far-right has affected, and continues to affect the field of identity politics. There is 
ample material for such a study to focus on the UK – the recent (if short-lived) electoral 
successes of the BNP, the establishment of the EDL (and extremist responses from within 
Muslim communities such as the poppy-burning by ‘Muslims Against the Crusades’), as 
well as the intermittent police operations that have uncovered ‘bomb factories’ in the 
homes of supporters of far-right groups have all contributed to a growing sense of alarm 
within Muslim communities on matters relating to Islamophobia. How this alarm is 
translating into the actions and dealings of Muslim representative groups (for instance, 
counter responses such as ‘Muslims for the UK’ and Muslim involvement with anti-racist 
alliances such as Hope Not Hate), and how the government and sections of wider society are 
responding to this is an area where there is much potential for further research. 
Additionally, such a study could also be taken to a European level, where, in some 
countries, the far-right has been considerably more successful at the ballot box than in the 
UK.  
 
The comparisons and contrasts that I have drawn between British Muslim and British 
Jewish communal organisations can also provide avenues for further research. The role of 
both the MCB and the Board is under close scrutiny within their respective communities 
and it would be interesting to examine how they each respond and evolve in light of shared 
challenges, including calls for greater democratisation and transparency and the inevitability 
of younger leaders taking on greater leadership roles. Additionally, there is scope for 
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further research into British Muslim identity politics that takes into account the political 
engagement of communities of different Muslim theological denominations. Here I have 
focused on organisations with a (majority) sunni background as well as some shi’a 
organisations insofar as they have been involved with collective Muslim communal efforts 
(such as the Al-Khoei Foundation’s involvement with the MCB and MINAB). Further 
studies could look more deeply at the range of diverse organisations within British shi’a 
communities and the differences between them and their approaches towards political 
engagement. Thus it is hoped that this study will prove to be a useful foundation for 
further lines of enquiry and research. 
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Radical Middle 
Way 
Fig.1 Reproduction of Sadek Hamid’s ‘Applying Ramadan’s six major Islamic tendencies to the British Muslim context’ ref: Sadek Hamid 
‘British Muslim Young People: facts, features and religious trends’ Religion, State and Society (2011) 39:2-3, p.253. 
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Muslim 
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Minhaj-ul-Quran 
Fig.2 Historical version of Sadek Hamid’s ‘Applying Ramadan’s six major Islamic tendencies to the British Muslim context’, based on 
landscape of Muslim organisations/trends between 1960-1990s.  
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Table 1: Glossary of Muslim representative/advocacy groups in the UK: 
 
Earliest Unity Initiatives: 
Name Established Constituency Key figures Notes 
FOSIS – Federation of 
Student Islamic 
Societies 
1963 Muslim 
students in the 
UK and Ireland 
– through 
affiliated 
student Islamic 
societies in 
universities and 
colleges. 
High turnover of 
leaders/organisers 
as it is a student 
organisation.  
Key alumni have gone on to lead other Muslim organisations including 
some of those profiled below and international alumni have also take up 
leadership roles in government, public policy, NGOs and international 
business. Some examples include: President Abdullah Gul of Turkey; 
Anwar Ibrahim, former Prime-Minister of Malaysia; and in the UK Dr 
Hany El-Banna, founder of Islamic Relief; and Farooq Murad, current 
Secretary General of the MCB. 
UMO – Union of 
Muslim Organisations 
1972 UK and 
Ireland. Works 
from the basis 
of a number of 
member 
organisations as 
well as 
individual 
volunteers.  
Dr Syed Aziz 
Pasha (d.2011) 
Was at its most active/prominent in the 70s and 80s. Now has extremely 
limited presence or impact. It is yet to be seen if it will survive beyond the 
recent death of Dr Pasha (November 2011). 
Post- Rushdie affair 
Name Established Constituency Key figures Notes 
Muslim Parliament UK 1989 Constituted of 
‘Muslim 
Members of 
Parliament 
Kalim Siddiqui (d. 
1996), 
Ghayasuddin 
Siddiqui (1996-
Suffered from infighting and a split after the death of Kalim Siddiqi. Now 
largely dormant, bar irregular topical public statements from Ghayasuddin 
Siddiqui – although leanings have shifted markedly from Khomenite, 
heavy, confrontational and aggrieved rhetoric to conciliatory tones 
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(MMPs)’ and 
various 
committees, 
but no clear 
election 
procedure, or 
identifiable 
electorate. 
present).  embracing of civic participation, secularism, democracy and opposing 
extremism and foreign-influenced Islam. 
Participated in the Stop the War Coalition in the early 2000’s and also 
launched a ‘model Muslim marriage contract’ in 2008, for British Muslims 
wishing to marry under Muslim law, claiming to uniquely secure equality 
between men and women, while appreciating the realities of modern 
British Muslim family life, and remaining faithful to the Islamic tradition.  
Ghayasuddin Siddiqui has also been involved with British Muslims for 
Secular Democracy (see below). 
UKACIA – UK Action 
Committee on Islamic 
Affairs 
1989 Representatives 
from a range of 
Muslim 
organisations. 
Iqbal Sacranie Now defunct with its mantle having been taken up by the MCB. 
MCB – Muslim Council 
of Britain 
1997 Affiliated local, 
regional and 
national 
Muslim 
organisations 
and mosques. 
Secretary 
Generals: 
Iqbal Sacranie 
(1997-2000 and 
2002-2006) 
Yousuf Bhailok 
(2000-2002) 
Muhammad Abdul 
Bari (2006-2010) 
Farooq Murad 
(2010-present) 
Established to be the main Muslim representative body in 1997. Remained 
largely so through to 2005, after which the establishment of a range of 
alternative organisations coupled with a tense relationship with the 
government weakened the MCB’s position as the primary community 
representative body. It has nonetheless continued to function and develop, 
and while it hasn’t re-established the close rapport with government that it 
enjoyed during its ‘honeymoon’ years, it still does liaise with various 
government departments, run pan-community initiatives and speak on 
Muslim issues in the press. 
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Post- 2005 Representative Bodies 
Name Established Constituency Key figures Notes 
MINAB – Mosques and 
Imams National 
Advisory Board 
2006 Jointly founded 
by the Al-
Khoei 
Foundation, 
British Muslim 
Forum, Muslim 
Association of 
Britain and the 
MCB. Each of 
these 
organisations is 
represented in 
the board and 
its various 
committees.  
Positions rotate 
between 
representatives of 
the various 
founding bodies.  
There are signs that government made cautious forays into regulating 
mosques, through the publication of a consultation paper in 2005 entitled 
‘Preventing extremism – places of worship’ which proposed potential 
powers for ‘controllers’ of mosques to exclude persons or groups, and for 
courts to have the power to close places of worship where deemed 
necessary. However, swift and adamant opposition was put forward both 
by the MCB and a large number of major mosques to any insinuation that 
there could be any sort of ‘state-control’ over mosques.553 
 
There were numerous calls from politicians and in the media for greater 
regulation of imams and mosques, particularly in light of concerns that 
some mosques were effectively functioning as extremist headquarters. The 
most high profile case being the North London Central Mosque which was 
controlled by Abu Hamza and his supporters up until a police raid in 2003. 
The MCB commissioned a study, ‘Voices from the Minarets’554 which 
interviewed imams and mosque committee members on a range of topics 
including mosque governance, structure, remit and the role of imams. This 
study then laid the foundations for the establishment of MINAB, however 
the degree to which MINAB can command legitimacy to regulate mosques 
is debatable.  
 
BMI – British Muslim 
Initiative 
2005 Lobby group – 
no defined 
membership. 
Sought to 
Mohammed 
Sawalha, Fida 
Alaeddin, Azzam 
Tamimi, Anas 
An organisation spearheaded by members/previous associates of the 
Muslim Association of Britain. Came into being after a strategic decision 
was made by the MAB to divert its focus and resources away from the 
Stop the War Coalition alliance and international affairs, and towards more 
                                                          
553 MCB Press Release ‘Muslim community rejects inference that mosques foment or encourage terrorism’ (22nd November 2005) available at 
http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/presstext.php?ann_id=179 [accessed on 16th June 2013].  
554 C3ube Training and Consultancy, ‘Voices from the Minarets’ (MCB, London; 2006). 
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represent the 
‘Muslim 
community’ in 
general.  
Altikriti domestic British Muslim community issues such as community 
development and training, and youth work. Mainly motivated by a desire to 
put forward views on international issues, which they criticised the MCB 
for maintaining a passive/muted stance towards. They were also vocal on 
matters relating to security and counter-terrorism as well as Islamophobia. 
Also, twice organised an Islam Expo event in London in 2005 and 2008. 
Activity seems to have become rather intermittent and largely reactive since 
2008, mainly due to funding shortages and leading figures’ other 
commitments.555 
Website: www.bminitiative.net [accessed on 12th June 2012]. 
BMF – British Muslim 
Forum 
March 2005 Largely sufi-
oriented 
(barelvi) 
mosques and 
imams across 
the UK. 
Khurshid Ahmed, 
Zareen Roohi 
Ahmed 
Launched in 2005 with 500 affiliated mosques and support from 
parliamentarians. It sought to become ‘a co-ordinating platform that 
aspires to provide a focus reflecting the hopes, fears and aspirations of the 
grassroots… to complement and enhance the work and achievement of 
other national platforms of the Muslim community.’556 Between 2008-2010, 
the BMF apparently went through a period of reform, after its decision to 
come out in support of the government’s 42 day detention plans for terror 
suspects caused major divisions in the organisation. It is said to have been 
re-launched in 2010 but appears to nonetheless be conspicuously invisible 
thus far.  
SMC – Sufi Muslim 
Council 
June 2006 No defined 
constituency. 
Haras Rafiq, 
Azhar Ali, 
Sheikh Hisham 
Kabbani 
(inspirational/spiri
tual figure) 
Apparent paradox of seeking to ‘represent’ (presumably politically?!) the 
‘silent majority’ of ‘apolitical’ Muslims.  
                                                          
555 Personal conversation with Mohammad Kozbar of the BMI, London, 6th August 2011. 
556 BMF Secretary-General Gul Muhammed speech, quoted in the official account of the BMF opening conference in Walthamstow, London, 11 th March 2005: ‘British 
Muslim Forum: Sufis Rise’, – published on old BMF website http://www.britishmuslimforum.org/index.php (broken link) [accessed in June 2005]. Version saved at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050427133635/http://www.britishmuslimforum.org/view_press_release.php?id=12 [accessed on 12th July 2011]. 
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BMSD – British 
Muslims for Secular 
Democracy 
April 2008 No defined 
constituency. 
Founded by 
Yasmin Alibhai-
Brown. Current 
director is 
Tehmina Kazi. 
Aims to raise awareness within Muslims about secular democracy, and to 
encourage religious understanding, harmony, and a celebration of the 
‘various Muslim cultures, values and traditions which are present in British 
society’.557 
Progressive  British 
Muslims 
November 
2005 
No defined 
constituency. 
Farmida Bi, 
(apparently the 
sole board 
member) 
A group of self-described ‘liberal Muslims’, who emphasised ‘cultural 
identity’ and felt unrepresented by existing faith-based Muslim groups.558 
Post-2005 New Research and Consultancy Bodies 
Name Established Constituency Key figures Notes 
Quilliam Foundation 2006 Counter-
extremism 
think-tank. 
Ed Husain (Until 
2009) and Maajid 
Nawaz 
Founded by former Islamists providing research, training and consultation 
on counter-extremism and claiming unique expertise and insight drawn 
from the personal experiences of its staff inside various Islamist groups. 
Gained widespread interest and acclaim but also the subject of strong 
criticisms. 
CENTRI – Counter 
Extremism 
Consultancy, Training, 
Research and 
Interventions 
Circa. 2008 Counter-
extremism 
consultancy. 
Haras Rafiq, 
Rashad Ali 
Offers commentary, training, consultancy and interventions on matters 
relating to extremism. 
Muslim Institute Dates back 
to the 
1980’s but 
revived and 
relaunched 
in 2010 
Research 
institute. 
Merryl Wynne 
Davies 
Aims to ‘promote and support the growth of thought, knowledge, research, 
creativity and open debate within the Muslim community and wider 
society.’ Activities include conferences, events, debates and a newsletter 
publication – ‘Critical Muslim’ as well as a dynamic website – 
www.musliminstitute.org [accessed 10th June 2012]. 
                                                          
557 http://www.bmsd.org.uk/pages.asp?id=2 [accessed on 10th July 2011]. 
558 http://www.pbm.org.uk/about.htm [accessed on 10th July 2011]. 
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after a long 
spell of 
dormancy.  
Cordoba Foundation 2005 Research and 
public relations 
organisation. 
Anas Altikriti A research and public relations organisation ‘committed to dialogue and 
rapprochement between Islam and the west’559 – provides an opposing 
perspective to the ‘ex-extremist’ narrative which favours the promotion of 
‘apolitical Islam’, by championing political and civic engagement on the 
basis of Islamic values.  
MEMO – Middle East 
Monitor 
Circa. 2008 Research 
organisation. 
Daud Abdullah Seeks to provide reporting on the Middle East, particularly the Palestinian 
question ‘opinion makers and decision makers in a deliberate, organized 
and sustained manner.’ While this body is clearly focused on foreign affairs, 
much of its interest centres on British foreign policy in the Middle East, 
and it has proved to be a useful forum for Dr Daud Abdullah (MCB 
Deputy Secretary General, 2006-10) to put forward perspectives in this 
field that proved too controversial for his former role at the MCB.  
Inspire 2009 Women’s 
empowerment 
and counter-
extremism 
consultancy 
Sara Khan, 
Tahmina Saleem 
Organises leadership training for Muslim women, runs campaigns for 
gender equality and human rights as well as consultancy work on ‘tackling 
extremism and the Prevent agenda’, community cohesion and integration. 
Website: www.wewillinspire.com [accessed on 12th June 2012] 
 
  
                                                          
559 http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/about_us.php [accessed on 10th July 2011]. 
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